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ABSTRACT
In this study, I look at the mutually reflective changes in society and
autobiography in works definitive for their various periods: Augustine's The
Confessions from antiquity; Rousseau's The Confessions from the eighteenth century;
the autobiographical writings o f Gertrude Stein, from the modernist period; and, most
im portantly here, the focus on the developm ent o f David Antin's work as representative
o f both postm odernism and current culture. Specifically, I consider the construction o f
the self in respect to art, literary theory, memory research, and science and technology.
During the second half o f the twentieth century, computers have permeated
alm ost every facet o f society. Transm ission o f inform ation in a high-speed, electronic
society is represented as fragments and collage, and Antin's early disjointed
autobiographies reflect this. His work, however, does not merely extend or expand
upon traditional autobiographical methods; it turns sharply and breaks from long-held
cultural notions o f how nature and the self function as illustrated in autobiography,
rejecting all previous beliefs o f order and where the se lf may be located. As he ages, his
work m oves toward a radical type o f order or unity, reflecting the current technology
and the ongoing cultural desire for order. This desire is reinforced by the growing
interest in neural networks, quantum physics, and chaos theory, all o f which prom ote
the premise that underlying patterns or recursions exist throughout various levels o f a
highly interconnected system. By finding the recursion, we allow the order o f the
system to emerge. However, because patterns may not be immediately observable w hen
a system is in a particular stage o f change or scale o f m easurement, a system often is
viii
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mistakenly considered random or without order. Essential to finding the pattern or
order o f the system is increasing the scale used to m easure the system until period
doubling, repetition, or a strange attractor is established. Similarly, Antin believes that
no definitive view o f the self can be constructed in a limited, single text called an
autobiography. Instead, numerous works spanning a vast tim e period are necessary to
allow patterns that create sense and coherency to emerge, thus defining the self.

IX
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
"i like the fringe...it seem ed to be the place where everything meaningful happened"
(David Antin 1993, 6)

The classic autobiographies o f any given age reveal m uch to us about the culture
in which they are written. In particular, they reflect the definitive theories o f recalling
and practices o f presenting memory for a specific age. In revealing the cultures from
which they come, these autobiographies can be examined to determine how literary
theory, memory research, and science and technology sim ultaneously affect one another
and are mutually reflective o f the construction o f the self in that society. A lthough this
interaction is most immediately prom inent in postmodern works, it is not unique to
current culture but, rather, is part o f a continuing pattern that is observable in the
autobiographical texts o f writers who define their periods. Additionally, as
autobiography has developed from historical to contemporary times, the representation
o f the self has shifted, in response to culture, from a cohesive being, as in St.
Augustine's work, to a random assortm ent o f fragments in postm odern autobiographies,
to a nebulous externally constructed web in current texts.
Autobiography has been well discussed in term s o f both mem ory and the self
and occasionally in term s o f the interaction o f literary theory, mem ory research, and
culture (some notable scholars o f this area include Eakin 1985, 1992; G usdorf 1956;
Spengemann and Lundquist 1965; and W eintraub 1975, 1978). In addition to
discussing how these various disciplines interact, scholars for the most part address how
culture forges the individual. However, they barely, if at all, touch upon the way

1
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autobiography may be used to exam ine a culture—its theories o f literature and m em ory
as well as scientific technologies that in part define that culture. As autobiography has
evolved since the first m ajor work, St. Augustine's The Confessions, culture, o f course,
has also changed. Society has becom e markedly diversified, fast paced, and disjointed.
The institution o f the Church, which was the dom inant force in Augustine's tim e, has—
like other social institutions-been splintered, increasing the challenge for
autobiographers searching for a way by which to show the subject in relation to
numerous institutions-or none. As writers have striven to define the self as it is
affected by society, the study o f autobiography has provided a way for scholars to study
past cultures in contrast to current society.
In this study, 1 look at the mutually reflective changes in society and
autobiography in works definitive for their various periods: A ugustine's The
Confessions from antiquity; Rousseau's The Confessions from the eighteenth century;
the autobiographical writings o f Gertrude Stein from the m odernist period; and, m ost
importantly here, the focus on the developm ent o f David Antin's w ork as representative
o f both postmodernism and current culture. By looking at Augustine's autobiography,
we see how his culture defined itself com pletely in relation to religion. In Rousseau's
time, religion still occupied a role in society; however, culture was becom ing m ore
secular. As a result, Rousseau and those in his culture considered how their actions
affected both their relationship with other members o f society and their relationship
with God. In the m odernist period, the num ber o f sources to which people were
accountable continued to increase as society became m ore diversified and com plex due
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to global changes ranging from the Industrial Revolution to World W ar I. By
exam ining the autobiographical writings o f Stein, we can see how changes in society
affected the individual, who, like society, was perceived as more diversified and
complex. In contrast to preceding periods, David Antin's autobiographical work shows
sharp turns and abrupt breaks in long-held cultural notions o f how nature and the self
function. His work begins as representative o f postm odern thought but develops to
represent contem porary ideas that break and question all previous beliefs o f order and
where the self may be located. When looking at his early work, readers see a collage o f
unrelated fragments presented in various unidentified voices. Antin's work indicates
that the num ber and identity o f elem ents to which individuals bear a relationship during
the postm odern period are m ultiple and undefined—a significant change from the single,
w ell-established concept o f the individual in relation to God during Augustine's time.
However, Antin's work evolves to em phasize the relation between interconnected
elem ents that affect and com pose the self, which he sees as a retrospective construction
that exists outside o f the hum an body.
In looking at the various phases o f Antin's writing, we can see his work as part
o f a pattern in autobiography which began with Augustine, in which the culture o f a
writer is m anifest in the work. The scientific thought and accom panying technology
prevalent in a given period affects how everything in society functions at that time, and
in turn the technology shapes what and how people in that society remember. In
A ugustine's day, science and philosophy were synonym ous; theories concerning the
brain and memory were not the result o f the invasive experim entation that defines
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science today. In The Confessions, while A ugustine recounts his life story, he also
explores his thoughts on how he believes his m ind is able to remem ber his past. During
antiquity, an individual's life was considered to be a reflection o f the larger providential
story and was viewed linearly, having a start (birth) and finish (death). The ultim ate
goal for Augustine and those who share his culture was to be with God. Likewise,
Augustine believes that his m em ory unfolds linearly, and he writes his text using the
sam e linear, chronological structure to reflect both his m em ory and the assum ptions o f
his society.
Rousseau's autobiography, like A ugustine's, unfolds in a linear, chronological
style, reflecting the belief that linear progression is the correct order. In contrast to
Augustine, though, this desire for linear order is not due to a belief in providence but to
an understanding that because hum ans develop in time, so, too, should their life stories.
Rousseau's text also differs from Augustine's in that it reads m ore like what is now
considered to be a traditional novel. That his text resem bles a novel is no accident; the
novel was becoming a major literary form during the period in which he was writing
The Confessions. His writing, like other ground breaking writers whose work
characterizes their historical period, takes a shape (in this case, a new genre) that
eventually became the popular form associated with his era. At this time, the invention
o f the printing press made the production o f texts easier, allowing for new and longer
forms o f writing to emerge, and allowed for greater distribution o f these texts to a m ore
widespread readership.
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With more copies o f his book available to m ore readers, Rousseau found him self
compelled by the idea o f being understood by all o f his possible readers—people that he
considered to be as m uch his judges as God. In telling his life story, he shows that he,
like Augustine, is accountable to God, but, m ore im portantly for Rousseau, he is
accountable to his com m unity. Whereas Augustine's culture was largely a religious one,
and so responsibility to God and community was the same, Rousseau's largely secular
community splits the individual's responsibility between God and society. When
Augustine's and Rousseau's texts are examined as reflective o f their culture, the shift
from a largely religious to a largely secular society can be traced. In showing that he is
accountable to m ore than God alone, Rousseau begins to develop an idea that
subsequent writers also address—that the individual is shaped in part by an increasing
num ber and variety o f influences.
In the m odernist period, Gertrude Stein continued in the vein o f previous
autobiographers by presenting the self as it is shaped by current culture. She, however,
takes autobiography further as she delves into how the self is constructed through
memory, not just how one remem bers while writing an autobiography. Because the
modernist period is characterized by, among many things, technology that made distant
areas o f the world m ore easily accessible, people at this tim e were influenced by a
variety o f cultures and events. Technological advances also increased the speed at
which information to and from these areas was com m unicated, which, in turn, affected
the way in which people remembered that information. As technology advanced, the
introduction o f autom obiles and airplanes into society allowed people who were
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previously separated geographically to interact with one another m ore easily. World
W ar I also brought together people from a variety o f cultures. As diversity increased
within geographic regions, a sense o f distinct com m unity and personal history began to
fade; people were now challenged to m aintain some sense o f individuality as they
assimilated into a global com m unity.
As the individual becam e m ore multifaceted in response to the increasing
num ber and variety o f influences, the self became m ore difficult than ever to represent
as a complete, definitive being. W riters continued to address the lim itations o f language
as representative o f thought, but conceded that words were still the best mode o f
communication available. Conventional writing styles could not adequately reflect the
changing society or ways that thinking occurred, so writers again searched for styles
that would better com plem ent the representation o f a m ultifaceted individual in a
society that was more globally united by technology. D uring the m odernist period,
avant-garde writers experim ented with styles that m irrored thinking processes as
understood by advances in science and technology and that took into account the
multiple perspectives that com prise individuals.
One o f the m ost influential and experimental m odernist writers concerned with
language both as an end in itself and as an accurate representation o f thought was
Gertrude Stein. Her writing style, which is fluid and circular, reflects her thinking
process and creates a sense o f m otion and immediacy, as i f her ideas are unfolding for
the first time on the paper before her. This style mimics the way both Stein's mind and
the culture o f her time work. With W orld W ar I and the advent o f technologies leading
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to the autom obile and airplane, the speed at which society functioned increased
significantly, which is represented by the intricate time- and m otion-conscious texts o f
avant-garde writers o f the period.
The days in which science and philosophy were synonym ous had given way to
two distinct fields, where science was now considered a discipline based on physical
experim entation to support intellectual theories. Stein, who studied to be a doctor,
writes in a circular style that parallels the scientific brain and m em ory theories o f her
period. In the 1920s, scientists who were interested in learning about the brain placed
electrodes on hum an scalps in an attem pt to measure brain activity (Rose 1993). From
these experim ents, they concluded that the brain regularly underwent "rhythm ic waves
o f electrical activity" (Rose 1993, 78). The resulting m etaphor o f the brain sending
messages and searching for m em ories in waves, although still basically a linear model,
com plem ented the stream -of-consciousness writing styles that were also gaining
popularity in literature o f the period. Although the developm ents in these fields were
similar, their relationship was not necessarily causal, but, probably, m ore a result o f
general cultural undercurrents o f the time. As N. Katherine Hayles points out,
"Different disciplines are drawn to sim ilar problems because the concerns underlying
them are highly charged within a prevailing cultural context" (1990, xi). She describes
the sim ultaneous influence o f different fields, including literature, as a feedback loop
that "connect[s] theory with culture and culture with theory through the m edium o f
technology. Literary texts and theories [are] also involved in this cycle, for they too
[are] affected by technology at the same tim e that they [are] affecting it" (xiv). So
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while brain research and literature may not directly influence one another, the ideas
arising in each do reflect and permeate the current society. Thus, disciplines eventually
affect one another, even if they do so unintentionally or unknowingly, m aking the study
o f one discipline helpful in revealing developm ents in the other.
What Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein show—how difficult it is to represent the
se lf through language and how as the world becom es perceived as more com plex, so
does any attem pt to present the self as a w hole—David Antin continues in his
postm odern autobiographies. Simply titled Autobiography and "Autobiography 2,"
A ntin's texts provide a window through which to view how changes in society affect the
self and how it is presented in autobiography. His work, however, is not merely an
extension or expansion o f traditional autobiography; it is a break from conventional
ideas o f what constitutes autobiography in reaction to w hat he saw as a totally new
culture after modernism.
Reflecting the increasing complexity and interconnectedness o f society, Antin's
work brings together num erous aspects—such as unidentified voices, clips from
advertisem ents, and news item s—that had never before been considered appropriate for
an autobiography. His break from convention, paradoxically, continues in the
traditional vein o f autobiography to a degree; like previous autobiographers who
incorporated the various influences o f their cultures in their writing, Antin incorporates
the m ajor influences o f the time—in his case, rapid developm ents in science and
technology and their effect on other fields o f study. It is just that these influences are
the very causes for the break in how the self is viewed and, therefore, constructed in
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autobiography. For example, during Antin's period, scientific research on the brain
affected developm ents in numerous other fields such as com puter technology, and
Antin's w ork comments upon the significance o f technology in his period, while his
writing style reflects that technology.
During the second half o f the twentieth century, com puters have impacted
almost every facet o f society, including brain research and writing. Advances in
computers have led to the testing o f similar theories in brain research and have changed
the way we receive and send information and, therefore, the way we write. Since
computers were first introduced in the 1940s, they have increasingly been compared to
the brain. From that time until the 1980s, com puters transm itted information in a linear,
sequential manner. Although this method was fast, backups in processing occurred
because o f fixed speed limits built into linear transm ission (Rose, 1993). Information
processing in computers needed to be improved, and com m unication between brain
scientists, com puter experts, and Artificial Intelligence researchers in the 1980s led to
this improvement. Through interdisciplinary com m unication, researchers inspired by
biological m odels determined that if computers could be designed to process
information in parallel, then the speed limitation associated with the available linear
processing models could be eliminated.

The scientific community's acceptance that

nonlinearity is representative rather than exceptional (Hayles 1990), coupled with
growing technology, coincides with a society in which m ethods o f transportation and
com m unication have gained tremendous speed. To m eet the needs o f a faster-moving
society, inform ation must also be transmitted faster, producing a barrage o f stimuli that
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is represented in art as fragm entation and collage. The m ultiple perspectives and
influences that have em erged have made common, or defining, social institutions
practically extinct, leaving individuals on their own to search for some way to define
themselves. Because there are now so many com binations o f influences possible with
which to identify, it has, in turn, become increasingly difficult for individuals to identify
and comm unicate sim ilar experiences with each other.
A contradiction seems to arise, however, when a greater focus on the self
appears in postm odern thought alongside a theory that em phasizes a break from
tradition, a calling into question o f hum an relations, especially the notion o f a cohesive,
continuous self or o f a subject as the central orchestrator o f an artwork. This
contradiction is even more significant in terms o f autobiography. Antin responds to the
paradox o f postm odern autobiography by creating a text in which the self is hinted at in
terms o f how it is defined by surrounding objects, a view sim ilar to Michel Foucault's in
which individuals do not com pose culture; rather culture com poses individuals
(Foucault, 1970). In Antin's autobiography, the "I," "he," and "you" are unidentifiable
and constantly changing; they are often clearly not Antin and are never absolutely
Antin. This shifting o f person and voice mirrors current culture, which is marked by an
increase in speed and volum e o f information. Antin's voices reveal shards o f other
people's stories, som etim es sensical and sometimes not, and force the reader to
determine how these shards o f stories may have bearing on the autobiographer who is
not clearly present in the text. His emphasis on fragm entation and his lack o f an
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obvious subject or center to his text reflect his belief that conventional w riting styles do
not accurately represent postm odern culture.
Furthermore, A ntin's fragmented writing style, like fast video cuts, directly
results from and reinforces the frenetic culture that acts on the brain, thus influencing
how the brain adjusts to assim ilate, remember, and present experiences. By eliminating
a defined subject, Antin com m ents both on the perceived view o f individuals in present
society and on the inadequacy o f traditional autobiography techniques in a postm odern
world. The autobiographers who precede Antin acknowledge that, although traditional
writing styles are inadequate, language remains our m ost prom inent m ethod o f
communication. These predecessors, therefore, continually attempted to show who the
self was by writing descriptions o f their own lives as seen from the outside, as well as
by trying to articulate the internal experience. In contrast, Antin sees the attem pt to
present a self tlirough narrative descriptions and personal anecdotes as futile, so he
breaks from all conventional autobiographical writing and abandons these m ethods
altogether. Instead, he presents various quotes, phrases, and stories from m any sources
that are important in shaping his life.
Antin's early disjointed autobiographies that lack conventional textual transitions
correlate with trends popular in the science and art o f postm odern thought. Current
work in brain and memory theory indicates that when particular neurons usually used in
transm itting information are dam aged, the brain will find other paths o f neurons to
follow. Therefore, the need for particular neurons to make specific connections is in
dispute; the brain can actually function without all o f its connecting fibers and neurons.
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or can substitute neurons, altering the final output or message. Likewise, current video,
photography, m usic, and perform ance art present images that seemingly are unrelated
and that lack the unifying elem ents present in traditional narrative. Because the images
are unrelated, any images can be substituted, and numerous interpretations are possible
that the view er m ust instantly decipher and assim ilate for herself. In all o f these
instances, the transitions that show the relationship between images or ideas either are
missing or are interchangeable, creating the possibility for countless m eanings and
interpretations. Because everyone's schem a is unique and constantly changing, the
attempt to present one authorial m eaning is not a realistic goal for the postm odern
writer.
As Antin develops, his texts continue to address the issues o f his society, and in
doing so, his writing style changes significantly. By the end o f what it m eans to be
avant-garde (1993), Antin has gone from presenting fragments without any
cohesiveness for the reader to showing how we ultimately can and m ust m ake some
sense o f the disjointedness in society. He takes seemingly unrelated fragm ents and
finds a way to make some type o f sense or coherency out o f them. Ultimately, he
m oves toward a form o f unity. Just as the m odernist writers, Rousseau, and Augustine
do.
Antin's move toward unity reflects the current technology and the ongoing
cultural desire for unity, which is reinforced by the growing interest in neural networks,
quantum physics, and chaos theory. Neural networks in computers, which were initially
based on biological models, search for patterns within an existing system so that new
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inform ation introduced into the system can be assim ilated through identification with
those patterns. Similarly, a m ajor premise o f both contem porary chaos and quantum
theory is that underlying patterns exist throughout various levels o f a highly
interconnected system; the system changes shape as information within it shifts
continually, allowing new forms o f order to emerge before collapsing back into the
system . We see order in recursion, but this recursion often is not apparent when
system s are in particular stages o f change or at a scale where patterns are not
im mediately observable. For new forms o f order or patterns to emerge, the scale used to
m easure or view the system often has to be increased. To visualize this, imagine
looking at an object tlu-ough a zoom lens cam era and then lengthening the lens so that
the object is seen in context with its surroundings. Suddenly the object is defined by
and seen in relation to everything around it. Antin's work follows this shift to a larger
scale. In a break from the notion that the self can be constructed and presented
definitively in a single text called an autobiography, he argues that showing the patterns,
sense, and coherency that define the self reach well beyond the boundaries o f a single
text or genre to som ething broader and all encompassing, which is nothing short o f a
life's worth o f work. Yet again on the fringe, tangled in paradox, Antin's ideas o f what
is necessary for the most com prehensive view o f the self—a complete body o f w ork—
preclude the writing o f one's own autobiography, calling into question a genre already
surrounded by blurred boundaries at best.
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CHAPTER 2. THE FOUNDATION OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY WRITING:
THE CONFESSIONS OF ST. AUGUSTINE AND JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU

Any meaningful study o f autobiography m ust consider the works o f St.
A ugustine and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These writers established the foundation upon
which autobiographers continue to build and that critics continue to reference. Their
texts, considered ground breaking in their tim e, introduce ideas about memory and
representation o f the self in society and, in doing so, reveal the culture in which they
were written. Their works serve as reference points when exploring autobiography in
any period and allow us to see the changes through which the genre and culture have
evolved to arrive at where we are in contem porary society.
Although separated by almost 1300 years, Augustine and Rousseau consider
sim ilar issues in their texts, issues that remain to be addressed by autobiographers who
succeed them. Both o f these writers are interested in memory and its role in defining
who they are, and both are concerned with their ability to communicate experience and
meaning to others. Augustine and Rousseau detail these introspections in ways that can
be seen to reflect the ideas, ways o f thinking and com m unicating, and the concept o f the
individual in their respective societies.

Representation of culture in St. Augustine's The Confessions
St. Augustine's The Confessions, generally recognized as the first major
autobiographical work, can be examined for m any purposes. One such purpose may be
to determ ine the role o f the self and the theories o f memory commonly accepted in
A ugustine's culture. Both the book's content and structure are representative o f his

14
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period; and through examining both, we can see the conceptions that defined life at that
time. During latter antiquity, Christians had becom e the m ajority o f the population in
Europe (W eintraub 1978, 20). Christianity dom inated to the degree that, for the
m ajority o f the people, and especially for Augustine, the purpose o f life was viewed
completely in relation to one social institution—the Church. An individual's life was
considered to be a reflection or microcosm o f the larger providential story, and it
progressed linearly, having a start (birth) and a finish (death). Karl W eintraub describes
autobiography as late as 1681 as still being closely tied to religion and asserts that
events in people's lives acquired meaning from their relation to eternal truths (1975,
844). People had to stay on the straight path to God or else be considered lost, as is
made clear by A ugustine's regard for anyone who deviated from Christianity. In The
Confessions, the goal o f life is to reach God, and, according to Augustine, a way to
reach God is through memory: "One may attain joy in one way, another in another way,
but the end at which they are all aiming is one and the sam e, namely, a state o f joy.
And jo y is som ething which no one can say he has no experience of; therefore, he finds
it in his memory" (232). For Augustine, God and jo y are one and the same, and they are
only recognizable, hence attainable, because o f memory. Therefore, memory is integral
to achieving the single, well-defined purpose o f life in his culture.
The Confessions reflects its creator and his society; and in doing so, it reflects
the prom inent role o f the Church at that time. The title alone brings us into the church
where we, the readers, are eavesdroppers listening to A ugustine speak to God. Every
page provides testim ony o f the error o f Augustine's w ays—whether it is stealing pears.
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being unchaste, or following the M anichees—until his conversion to Catholicism and a
life with God. That God and the Church permeate every page o f his book reinforces the
role o f the Church in Augustine's period; the Church was the institution by which
society defined itself and individuals gauged their worth. Correspondingly, the
Christian subject matter o f art and literature o f the period illustrates the strong influence
that the Church maintained in society at the time.

Narrative structure of Augustine's The Confessions: rhetoric and chronology as
supports of Christianity during antiquity
Both the extension o f the confession box m etaphor and the denunciation o f the
Manichaean religion in favor o f Catholicism dem onstrate A ugustine's awareness o f his
audience. He writes as if his words are intended only for God's ears, but he, o f course,
is writing for mortals. To appeal to his readers, he uses rhetoric, which he taught for a
living (70). Following the guidelines o f rhetoric, he calls upon a higher authority, in the
case o f this book the highest authority, i.e., the word o f God, to enhance his arguments,
and, hence, he cannot be contradicted. When Augustine criticizes the Manichees for
using rhetoric to gain control over people, he uses rhetoric at the sam e time to persuade
readers that Catholicism is preferred by God and to debunk the M anichaean religion
whose "arguments are checked, overthrown, and put out o f court by you, God o f truth"
(178). He condemns the M anichaean religion, saying it is plagued with fallacies (108)
and lacks proof (117). His condemnation is based on the inability o f the M anichees to
produce a flawless argument. Augustine supports his argument against the M anichees
by providing a detailed example o f a choice between two evils, one which takes a
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person to the theater and the other which takes a person to the M anichees. The passage
continues to unfold like a model argument, deferring to a higher authority and following
up with more support, such as that which com pares a person's decision to jo in the
M anichaean religion to other bad choices—specifically murder, theft, and adultery.
Finally, the section ends by reaffirm ing his thesis that the M anichaean religion cannot
stand up before God.
In addition to using his m astery o f rhetoric to present his story, Augustine
structures his book to reflect the cultural desire for order, which, in his case, leads
directly and purposefully to God. His book unfolds chronologically and in a series of
numbered sections, each o f which tells o f an event leading up to his eventual
conversion. He organizes his story into what he considers to be the required "perfect
order," which for him is chronological (217). Current society, as in Augustine's period,
desires order, specifically chronological order in autobiography. Because we live in
time, it is convenient and sensible for us to organize events in the order in which they
occur in relation to the passage o f time. However, this linear organization tends to
imply that events in time possess a cause/effect relationship that may not necessarily be
true. It often leads autobiographers to ignore events that may not directly contribute to
the cause/effect developm ent o f a specific story.
Despite the problem s associated with chronological presentation o f events in
autobiography, it remains the m ost com m only used organizational pattern. P. J. Bakin,
in Touching the World: Reference in Autobiography (\992), m ost satisfactorily
addresses the continued use o f linear narrative in autobiography and sees it as m ore than
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only a convenient form already in place; he sees it as a "response to the fundamental
tem porality o f human experiences" (86). Because the self develops in time, presenting
its story following that tim e line seems sensible. However, this presentation o f the life
story m ust not be viewed as interchangeable with the representation o f how one
naturally remem bers the selfs story unfolding. M em ory is actually very nonchronological (191).
To believe that we naturally rem em ber our lives chronologically, or to insist, as
Augustine does, that this is the correct or perfect order because it resem bles the order o f
God is no longer reasonable. Jam es Olney in M etaphors o f S e lf (1972) discusses the
relationship between the natural sciences and faith. He writes that as late as the
beginning o f this century, the sciences w ere based on the following assum ptions:
first, that there is a causal order in nature and the universe...second that there is
some unfailing relation between the formal organization o f the hum an m ind and
the formal organization o f nature; and a faith, therefore, that the human m ind is
capable o f discerning and describing the ordered processes that rule the natural
universe. (11-12)
Possessing such faith can only come from having absolute trust in God, as Augustine
does, and believing blindly that "the universe is an orderly place because I know it is"
(Olney 1972, 12). Scientists now accept that chronology or linearity is not the natural
order (Foucault 1970, 82; Hayles 1990, 143) but is, instead, one way for us to m ake
sense o f our lives and to im pose m eaning on either a part or all o f it m ore easily.
Olney, in M etaphors o f S e lf supports this need to order when he com m ents, "the
vital im pulse to order that has always caused man to create and that, in the end,
determ ines both the nature and the form o f w hat he creates" (1972, 3) is the purpose
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behind autobiography writing. The impulse to order, to get one's story to make sense
regardless o f w hat events are included or excluded from a particular perspective, I
believe, is constant in human nature; however, the actual or resulting order, i.e.
narrative structure, and approach to the creation o f the narrative changes with culture.
Lawrence Byrne (1989) reiterates what is com m only accepted by scholars o f
autobiography and m em ory (for example, G usdorf 1956 and Olney 1972 and 1993),
w hich is that autobiographers unconsciously im pose a narrative coherence on events
that m ay not have been coherent at the tim e that they actually occurred. This has always
been the point o f constructing a narrative; anyone concerned with the writing o f
autobiography is aware that events are random and do not obtain m eaning until they are
put into some context or perspective. Byrne does not, however, distinguish between
creating a narrative that m akes a well-written story and creating a narrative that
resem bles the actual developm ent o f the self through time. Augustine addresses this
issue in his discussion o f memory and its relation to the self.
R ecalling a n d p re sen tin g inform ation: A u g u stin e's m odels o f m em ory
W riters since Augustine have organized their autobiographies in many different ways in
the attem pt to reflect more the process o f remem bering. This attem pt to illustrate how
the m ind operates or orders has, as Olney (1972) points out, allowed for the creation o f
autobiographical texts o f varying forms. A ugustine's text provides a starting point from
w hich we can track, chronologically for the purposes o f this study, the evolution o f
narrative structures and popular theories regarding how the mind searches for and
categorizes inform ation in autobiography. Because Augustine was in the habit o f using
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one format repeatedly when presenting his argum ents, it is likely that how he thought
about his life when he was constructing his argum ents was either consciously or
subconsciously influenced by this style. Bearing this in m ind, we can see how the
communication tools available affect the way in which writers are able to remember as
well as the way in which they choose to write. Like the actual tools available,
information and how it is communicated also affect how writers receive and process
material in their minds. During antiquity, the concepts o f science and technology as we
know them were unheard of, and theories regarding how memory and the brain work
were not based on the experimentation associated w ith science since the late 1800s.
In The Confessions, Augustine presents his views o f the role o f memory in one's
life and how memory actually Works, which are also the accepted cultural beliefs
regarding m em ory at the time. By looking at A ugustine's treatment o f memory, we can
gain insight into what his society believed and valued. W hile several scholars (Eakin
1992; G usdorf 1956; Spengemarm and Lundquist 1965; and W eintraub 1975) assert that
a writer's culture and personal environment shape the w riter and her or his
autobiographical work, they do not address how examining autobiography may answer
questions regarding the nature o f a particular culture itself. In Augustine's case, he and
his com m unity saw memory as the pathway to God, reaching whom was the sole
purpose o f their existence. Because reaching God was the ultimate purpose o f and
reason behind every decision in life, memory became significant to living correctly
according to the beliefs o f the time. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly for this
dissertation, Augustine's ideas reflect the scientific theories o f memory accepted by his
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community, and by exam ining his text, we can determ ine the level and perspective o f
science regarding m em ory during antiquity.
In Book X o f The Confessions, Augustine contem plates the pow er o f memory.
For him memory is neither easily definable, nor is it fully com prehensible. He does,
however, in this book, arrive at two types or m odels o f memory: one w hich views
memory as a receptacle or physical location in the mind and one which considers
memory to be a force or active agent. Olney has named these models archaeological
and processual, respectively (1993, 872). In the archaeological model, Olney describes
memory as a noun that A ugustine refers to in terms such as "harbor" and "stomach."
According to Augustine, experiences enter through the senses and are sorted and stored
in various com partments where they become memories. It is in these com partments,
Olney says, that m em ories reside until they are needed and, hence, are then retrieved or
dug up by the autobiographer. In the processual model, Olney describes memory as a
verb, possessing the ability to weave together m em ories and patterns.
Augustine expounds on the versatility and power o f m em ory when he writes,
"From the same store too I can take out pictures o f things which have either happened to
me or are believed on the basis o f experience; I can m yself weave them into the context
o f the past, and from them I can infer future actions" (219). This description o f memory
as having the capacity both to hold inform ation and to assim ilate new experiences onto
our existing mental schema serves as a transition into A ugustine's description o f
memory as a powerful force that may be used to reach God. He com pares his search for
God to that o f animals returning to their homes. M em ory is so vital to life and to
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forging the self that he believes all creatures, "even beasts and birds have memory;
otherwise they would not be able to find their ways back to their dens" (227). Just as
memory is necessary for beasts and birds to find their way home, mem ory is also
necessary for hum ans to find their way hom e, and, for Augustine and his fellow
Christians, home is God.
Augustine's ideas about m em ory are highly sophisticated and interestingly
sim ilar to the theories currently popular in the scientific community. Throughout time,
there have been numerous theories in the sciences and hum anities regarding memory;
however, concrete evidence has yet to be produced to confirm the plausibility o f any
particular theory. Augustine's philosophically oriented view o f m em ory remains
equally possible o f becoming the definitive theory o f mem ory as current views that are
based on extensive invasive experim entation on the brain. Specifically in this regard,
consider Augustine's perspective on how the brain distinguishes com plete from partial
memories:
The whole thing had not slipped from our memory; part o f it was retained and
by means o f this part the other part was sought for, because the m em ory realized
that it was not carrying along with it the totality which it was used to and, going
unevenly, as it were, through the loss o f som ething to which it was accustomed,
eagerly demanded the restoration o f what was lacking. (229)
The proposed ability o f the brain to recognize when a mem ory is incom plete and to
work with available inform ation to retrain itself in order to recreate the initial
experience is a theory currently being investigated by num erous scientists and various
disciplines (for example, John Briggs and F. David Peat in chaos theory 1990; Daniel
Dennett in psychology 1991; B art Kosko in fuzzy logic 1993; Karl Pribham in
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neurophysiology, discussed in Briggs and Peat 1990; and Steven Rose in biochem istry
1993).

The individual and the self in Augustine's culture
While hypotheses and theories regarding how m em ory functions have not advanced
significantly in term s o f producing conclusive evidence to support any o f these theories,
this lim ited understanding has not dim inished the role o f m em ory in defining the self.
Wlien A ugustine writes, "Yet this force o f my m em ory is incomprehensible to me, even
though, without it, I should not be able to call m yself myself," (226) he acknowledges
his limited understanding as a human while yet again forwarding the purpose o f his
book. Just as the force o f God is m ysterious yet necessary to directing his life and
shaping who he is, memory, which for A ugustine is directly linked to God, is
incom prehensible yet necessary to defining the self. The com plexity o f memory is at
the same tim e an inexplicable curiosity and a necessity, for, although Augustine and
other w riters throughout history have tried to define mem ory because o f its integral role
in determ ining who we are, it has escaped full com prehension. The inability o f humans
to com prehend memory supports Augustine's description o f its vast boundlessness,
because without boundaries, like the universe, som ething cannot be contained, hence it
always retains a sense o f mystery and curiosity because o f the unknown that exists
beyond our range o f comprehension.
Despite the human inability to grasp a com plete understanding o f memory,
memory remains vital to creating and identifying the self. This acknowledgm ent o f the
role o f memory in understanding the self, as well as the concern with the self at all, was
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scarcely considered prior to Augustine (Freem an 1993; G usdorf 1956; and W eintraub
1975). There was autobiography, for example Em peror Augustus' Res Gestae, but this
only recounted historical feats and did not address any type o f self-examination
(W eintraub 1975). Outside o f Heraclitus, w ho as Olney points out was the first "to
declare that every cosmology begins in self-knowledge," (1972,4) Augustine was the
first formal w riter to concern him self with questions o f selfhood and individuality.
Using memory, Augustine is able to recall his past experiences and to show how these
experiences, guided by the hand o f God, have formed the person he has become.
In The Confessions, Augustine obviously is represented prominently. However,
during antiquity, people saw them selves in com m unity with others and not as
individuals (Eakin 1985 and G usdorf 1956). In a culture where the self as an individual
does not exist, autobiography, as we have com e to consider it, cannot be possible
(Gusdorf, 1956). Therefore, it seems both bizarre for A ugustine to search for a self
through memory and contradictory, almost hypocritical, for him to write an
autobiography when his society, as he would have us believe, was so closely identified
with the Church, which stressed unity with God and not individuality. In writing about
African cultures, Olney points out about that individual and group identities merge so
that the part represents the whole and the whole is em bodied and personified in the part
(1973). If this rationale is applied to Augustine, who believed he was a typical
representation of his Christian culture, his decision to w rite about him self is no longer
problem atic because in speaking about him self he is speaking about his community.
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Karl W eintraub's statem ent that during antiquity, people believed wise men
should only talk about them selves for didactic purposes (1978, 12) certainly applies to
the intentions o f A ugustine, who told his story to show him self as an example by which
others could hopefully learn and convert ju st as he had. W eintraub writes:
The text in no way suggests that Augustine self-consciously thought o f him self
as a unique individual with the life task o f translating his uniqueness from mere
potentiality into actuality...Quite to the contrary, the indications are that he saw
the story o f one Christian soul, the one he could know best, the typical story o f
all Christians. (1978, 45)
Augustine never sees his life as special in relation to the lives o f his fellow Christians.
He, like they, had unique experiences that eventually lead to the same place—God.
W eintraub writes that The Confessions have one center—the relationship o f Augustine's
soul and God—and that everything else, even M onica, is only peripheral (1978, 44).
While this may be true, it is not because Augustine is egocentric but because he believes
his story is also the story o f his Christian com m unity, and so there is no need to pause
long on their stories, w hich would only be modified versions o f his own. Augustine
excludes from his book influences outside o f the Christian community, such as the
M anichees, except for how they played a role in his eventual conversion. Is it remiss to
disregard any person or group that is outside o f his Christian community and to give the
impression that it had no pow er or presence within the culture? Perhaps, if we judged
Augustine's intentions using contem porary criteria. However, Augustine's dismissal o f
elements outside o f the Christian com m unity again reflects his culture's linear view o f
life and refusal to recognize any deviation from the accepted "correct path" o f living.
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The idea o f one correct path, one Christian soul, one self and com m unity representing
and em bodying each other, perm eates Augustine's culture and text.

The limitations of language
In describing the unique experiences o f his typically Christian life, A ugustine struggles
with the notion that he cannot adequately convey the m eaning o f his experiences and his
conversion. He recognizes the limits o f language in representing internal experiences.
His description o f his attem pt to com m unicate as an infant parallels a writer's attem pt to
communicate at any age:
I wanted to express my desires to those who could satisfy them ; but this was
im possible, since my desires were inside me and those to whom I wished to
express them were outside and could not by any sense perception o f their own
enter into my spirit. A nd so I used to jerk my limbs about and m ake various
noises by way o f indicating what I wanted, using the limited form s o f
com m unication which were within my capacity and which, indeed, were not
very like the real thing. (21)
His desire to be understood and frustration with the inadequacy o f the com m unication
tools available to him are com m on issues that writers continue to address and which
inspire experim entation with language, structure, and style in the attem pt to match the
internal experience with the external interpretation. Augustine recognizes that in trying
to express the inner self, m eaning is lost in the translation. Although he understands
this limitation, he continues the attempt using language and a writing style that mirrors
what he believes to be the natural or proper thinking order, i.e., linear structure. He can
write his story countless ways, trying to som ehow represent the self fully and correctly,
but the meaning will never be complete. M ichel Foucault seems to articulate this
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deficiency most accurately when he writes o f the differences between visual and oral
communication:
It is not that words are imperfect, or that, when confronted by the visible, they
prove insuperably inadequate. N either can be reduced to the other's terms: it is
in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in w hat we say.
And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use o f images, m etaphors, or
similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their splendour is not
that deployed by our eyes but that defined by the sequential elem ents o f syntax.
(1970, 9)
Although Foucault is w riting about the discrepancy in viewing and in talking about
Dutch painting, his argum ent applies well to the problem that arises when any m edium
is used to represent another: one cannot be reduced to the other's terms.
Augustine recognizes the possibilities and the limits o f language. Language, in
general, allows us to com m unicate our thoughts effectively with one another. However,
in making our emotions or internal experiences understood to someone outside o f us, we
find language falls short. Despite this limitation, language remains our m ost prom inent
method o f com munication. Regarding this issue in terms o f autobiography,
Spengemann and Lundquist write, "Autobiography does not com m unicate raw
experience, for that is uncom m unicable. It presents, rather, a metaphor for the raw
experience" (1965, 502). Autobiographers, including Augustine realize that no matter
how vivid the metaphor is, it remains a layer between the raw experience and the
external receiver. By no m eans should this layer be viewed strictly as a hindrance
because, although it separates, it also joins the raw experience and the external receiver.
M etaphor makes m eaning possible. With this in mind, writers create m etaphors that
represent their experiences m ore exactly, and, to have meaning, these m etaphors usually
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correspond to the technology and conditions o f their particular culture. However,
merely updating the m etaphor does not significantly im prove the com m unication o f the
internal experience. To do this, m ost experim entation occurs with the structure o f the
language, where the writer attem pts to m irror the working o f the m ind while it is
recalling the experience. The hope here is that, in taking the mental journey w ith the
writer as she or he recalls an experience, the reader will understand how the writer
arrived at the metaphor, and its m eaning will be enhanced.

Forging the self through memory and writing style to reflect cultural constructs
Memory and language (writing style) can only partially reconstruct an actual
experience. The challenge o f any autobiographical text is to overcome the com bined
effect o f this inadequacy. Augustine's effort to meet this challenge is im mersed in
cultural expectations, which are reflected, perhaps even m agnified, in text. As the
organization and narrative structure o f his book reflects the culturally accepted notions
o f order, Augustine's stylistic approach to language also mirrors the literary techniques
popular in his day. His sentence structure often relies on repetition and m eter to create a
rhythm that further builds and reinforces his argument. Augustine uses these techniques
throughout his text and m ost effectively to conclude his book when he writes:
How can one m an teach another m an to understand this? W hat angel will teach
an angel? What angel will teach a m an? This m ust be asked o f you, sought in
you, knocked for at you. So, so shall it be received, so shall it be fo u n d , so shall
it be opened. Amen. (350)
By closing his book this way, he leaves the reader with an impression that is strong
because o f both its message and its delivery'. He intellectually affects the reader through
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Biblical echoes and words and basally affects the reader through rhythm. His
knowledge o f form and ability to use it skillfully im presses the reader who m ay be
unaware as to why she or he is affected and perhaps even convinced by Augustine's
words.
W hile his writing style is representative o f the literary techniques popular in his
day, its reliance on providence for direction and structural order is indicative o f the
belief that remained unchallenged until the end o f the 18th century, which was that
nature possessed an inherent, usually linear, order (Foucault 1970; Hayles 1990).
Wliereas hum ans were thought to be messy and disorganized, nature, in contrast,
possessed a pattern, a sense o f order to which hum ans aspired. According to Karl
W eintraub, the Christian doctrine indicates, "In his Fall m an had lost control o f him self
as a unified being and become prey to the m ultitude o f perverted forces within which
pulled him in so m any conflicting directions that he lost him self and his way" (1978,
38). To unify the self again, to be whole by being with God, one had to devote all o f
life to this effort. This desire for unity was a distinguishing philosophy between the
M anichaean and Christian religions. As W eintraub points out, "while the one saw the
life task in learning to separate what had unjustly been condem ned to coexist, the soul
with the body, the other saw the salvation in reuniting in one healthy whole what man
by his own fault had permitted to be torn asunder" (1978, 45). So, in rejecting the
M anichaean religion for Christianity, Augustine reinforces his desire for unity,
coherence, sense, and wholeness.
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Augustine's goals for the self parallel and represent the goals o f his culture, and
his choice o f C hristianity indicates the cultural acceptance o f unity with God. After his
conversion, A ugustine was awed by the inherent, God-created order in nature and
believed that his life's work was to find a way and place to fit into that order and to be
complete with God again (W eintraub 1975, 830). A ugustine writes that he is in
shattered pieces and so writing The Confessions, tracking how his life relates to God's
purpose, creates an order and reconstructs him as a whole person (Jay 1984, 176). In
attem pting to achieve the divine order o f nature and God, Augustine structures his
communication to m irror what he believes to be the perfection that exists only in nature.
W hen he writes, "Let your works praise you that we may love you, and let us love you
that your works m ay praise you. For they have a beginning and an end in time a rising
and setting, growth and decay, form and privation. So they have their succession o f
m orning and evening" (347), he is using rhetoric and style to m im ic and approach as
closely as possible the linear order in nature believed to be created by God. Hence, he is
praising God both directly by what he says and indirectly by how he says it.
Although Augustine proposes several m odels o f mem ory, as discussed earlier,
all o f the m odels ultim ately reinforce the linear order that is prescribed by his culture.
The practices or codes o f a culture shape everything in that culture, including language,
values, and empirical orders (Foucault 1970, xx). During latter antiquity, linear,
chronological order dictated society to the degree that anything or anyone that deviated
was considered ju st that—a deviate. The em phasis on linearity affected even the
subconscious, as we see in one o f Augustine's descriptions o f memory; "some things are
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produced easily and in perfect order, just as they are required; w hat comes first gives
place to what comes next" (2 17). The need for order is so imperative that even the
subconscious is not allowed the freedom to act as it m ight naturally, associating
memories because o f their relationship to one another rather than as occurrences in a
sequential order.
Elizabeth de M ijolla writes that Augustine tries unsuccessfully to find God's
place in memory (1994, 24). Augustine, however, does not actually look for God's
place in memory but looks for the way in which memory may help him to reach and
recognize God wherever He dwells. M emory as a force has the ability to guide an
individual up toward God. However, it is limited at the same tim e because God is
found beyond or above memory. As Augustine describes, "I mount up through my
mind toward you who dwell above me, and now 1 shall go beyond this force o f mine
called memory, for I desire to reach you at the point from which you may be reached"
(227). Memory is the catapult by which one can reach God, but it does not bring an
individual completely to God. It is necessary for living correctly because with it
individuals define who they are according to the rules o f the Church. It is only capable
o f helping individuals to know who they are and to stay on the right path.
Although the force o f memory does not deliver individuals com pletely to God,
memory as a receptacle is absolutely necessary for recognizing God after death.
Augustine questions both how people will know God if they have never before seen him
and "whether the happy life is in our memory. For we could not love it, if we did not
know it" (230). In addressing this concern, he writes extensively about the pow er o f
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memory to help us recall the sight, smell, or taste o f something when it is not in front o f
us. Just as memory allows us to recall that which we have previously experienced, it
will allow us to recognize God when we reach Him again, although we are unable to
reconstruct as mortals what His image is. The implication is that we once were with
God and will return or ascend to Him at the end o f this life, since "from the tim e I
learned you [God], I have not forgotten you"(234). Because we can only recognize that
which we have previously experienced, we m ust have known God before we began life
on earth. Therefore, building on Plato's proposal o f memory, Augustine argues that we
m ust have entered the world with the beginnings o f a mental schema or m em ory already
in place from God and onto which we assim ilate new experiences so that they follow
the order that focuses life on, and toward, God. I f this is the case, then m em ory
becomes the single most significant property o f our being (234).

1300 years of slow progress: cultural developments from antiquity to the
Eighteenth century
As may be expected, in the 1300 years that separate St. Augustine and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau, scientific and technological developm ents occurred and cultural beliefs
shifted, impacting the view and role o f the self in society. Science went from being a
purely philosophical discipline to one which required, in addition to theoretical
assumptions, physical experim entation. In the late 1400s and early 1500s, Leonardo da
Vinci, an artist, architect, and engineer, produced intricate drawings o f the brain and its
ventricles (Rose, 1993, 76). Correspondingly, m em ory m odels reflected the changing
views o f the scientific com m unity as m ore was learned about the structure o f the brain
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and as technology, such as electricity, developed. M em ory m odels evolved from
Augustine's theory o f m em ory as both a place and force to René Descartes' hydraulic
model o f m em ory in the 1600s to the electrical maze or "telegraphic" model o f m em ory
in the late 1700s and early 1800s, reflecting the permeation o f electricity in society.
Also during this 1300 year span, European culture shifted from being wholly
situated in religion to being predom inantly secular. As M ichel M ontaigne's Essays from
the late 1500s reveal, secularization allowed individuals to see them selves as ju st that—
separate, unique entities, and not m icrorepresentations o f a larger society. The growth
o f secularization coupled w ith advances in science and technology shook the long-held
belief that the self is a cohesive, single-purpose entity that reflects the providential view
o f life that leads straight to God and self-com pletion.

Representation of culture in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Confessions
W hereas Augustine's The Confessions is generally recognized as the first m ajor
autobiographical work, hence making him the first m ajor autobiographer, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau is often considered to be the father o f m odem autobiography (Eakin 1985, 4).
His work introduces ideas concerning the se lf within society and the representation o f
that self in such a way that subsequent autobiographers could no longer validly regard
the self as the single, cohesive being o f A ugustine's text. Like A ugustine's text,
Rousseau's autobiography reveals the culture in which the self is situated. Both The
Confessions' coxi\.e.ni and organizational structure reflect the ideas prevalent in
Rousseau's eighteenth-century society.
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In Augustine's autobiography, culture is defined com pletely within the larger
construct o f religion, as Christians believed that they were on earth only in passage to
God. However, as secularization grew, especially by the end o f the M iddle Ages, the
providential view o f life began to lose ground (W eintraub 1975, 844). By the
eighteenth century, religion occupied a significantly less powerful position in society.
God was no longer the absolute authority as judicial systems were put into place;
instead, society becam e the judge o f people (Elbaz 1988, 42). As society becam e more
secular, individuals becam e just that—individuals concerned m ore with their own
diversified existences than with the thoughts o f a united Christian pilgrim age to the
afterlife (W eintraub 1975, 844). Karl W eintraub points out the shift in focus o f
audience address in Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies; "while Augustine,
befitting a God-centered view, confesses his soul to God and only incidentally to his
fellow men, Rousseau, as a measure o f the degree to which the world had become
secularized, has nothing to confess to God, but everything to his fellow men" (1978,
299-300). This shift in audience address correlates with a shift in authority from
Augustine's singular identity o f the Church with com m unity to Rousseau's identity with
various institutions in his secular society. As a result, Rousseau m ust consider how his
actions affect both his relationship with God and, more importantly, his relationship
with the m em bers o f his society.
W ith an increased concern for how society judges one's actions and ideas, along
with a dim inished view that we are in this world only on pilgrim age to the afterlife with
God, the here and now gains a trem endous sense o f urgency, importance, and finality.
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As Michel M ontaigne w rote nearly two hundred years before Rousseau: "But it seems
to me that death is indeed the end, but not therefore the goal o f life; it is its finish, its
extremity, but not therefore its object. Life should aim unto itself, a purpose unto its e lf
(1963, 405). This view contrasts starkly with Augustine's belief that the goal o f life is
to reach God: one way or another, "the end at which they are all aim ing is one and the
same, namely, a state o f joy" (1963, 232). Montaigne's introspection detailing the
development o f the self and its responsibility to and interaction with society serves as a
transition, in this case, to track the developm ent o f secular philosophy regarding the
purpose o f life from the tim e o f Augustine to Rousseau. M ontaigne's Essays, unlike
Augustine's The Confessions, is neither a confession to God nor a model or
representation o f a Christian on the road to God. M ontaigne presents his philosophy to
his readers and writes:
For likewise these are my humors and opinions; I offer them as what I believe,
not what is to be believed. I aim here only at revealing myself, who will perhaps
be different tom orrow, if I learn something new which changes me. I have no
authority to be believed, nor do 1 want it, feeling m yself too ill-instructed to
instruct others. (1963, 25-27)
Montaigne writes about the need for one to look inside o f oneself and take stock, to
come to terms with the philosophy that shapes who one is.
The effect o f secularization, the celebration o f living for the present moment,
expressed so eloquently by M ontaigne, underscores every story in Rousseau's The
Confessions. In one sentence which reads, "I have not been able to cut this tale short,
for it has been important to trace it in exact detail, this period o f my life having had an
influence upon the future which will extend to my dying day," (453) Rousseau
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encapsulates the m any purposes o f writing his autobiography. Rousseau's
autobiography is a tale—i.e., a story containing an uncertain am ount o f em bellishm ent—
and he repeatedly reminds us, the readers, that he has had to use his im agination to fill
in the gaps o f his failed memory when constructing this narrative. As p ro o f o f his
story's veracity, he says to us that he has had to trace every detail or else chance either
that his words be disputed or that he be accused o f intentionally hiding som e truth. So
Rousseau fills hundreds upon hundreds o f pages, undoubtedly grateful for the
introduction o f the printing press into Europe during the Renaissance. He traces, like a
pen on his memory, the events o f his past, with the pen m oving steadily forward on a
firm (so Rousseau believes) time line. He recognizes that every incident or personal
encounter has its place in the continuum o f our lives and influence on our character. In
these last two aspects, Rousseau's ideas closely resem ble A ugustine's, although these
writers are separated by some 1300 years.
Obviously, more than time divides Augustine and Rousseau. Rousseau's
statement, "this period o f my life having had an influence upon the future w hich will
extend to my dying day," (453) punctuates the view o f life in a secular culture, which is
far removed from Augustine's Christian community. Rousseau understands that every
action that he or som eone else makes causes a ripple, som etim es a wave, in society and
on the lives o f everyone in that society. Furthermore, this change alters in som e way the
developm ent o f his person and life until death. This view is also shared by Augustine,
but the two writers' philosophies diverge beyond this point. W here Augustine sees our
actions in this world as affecting our lives in the next, Rousseau sees our actions as
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affecting us in this world only. Rousseau, reflecting his culture, is not concerned with
the notion o f an afterlife. His and his culture's goal was to live this life fully for itself.
W ith a shift in the defining goal o f life from that o f reaching God in the hereafter
to that o f living fully in this world came a shift in the em phasis on the se lf and the
reason for telling one's story. The disintegration o f com m unity with the em ergence of
individuality allowed, perhaps required, individuals to tell their personal achievem ents
in order to carve out their position in society. At last it was acceptable to w rite about
o neself for the sole purpose o f distinguishing oneself am ong others and not, as
A ugustine, to teach or to show oneself as an example. In the introduction o f his 1953
translation o f Rousseau's The Confessions, J. M. Cohen writes:
Before his day there were perhaps two great autobiographies, St. Augustine's
C onfessions and Santa Teresa's Life o f Herself, and both these works were
written not for personal display o r justification but to tell o f a vital experience
which m ight serve as an example to others. By Rousseau's age, how ever, men
had begun to see them selves not as atoms in a society that stretched dow n from
God to the world o f nature but as unique individuals, important in their own
right. It was possible for the first time, therefore, for a m an to write his life in
term s o f his worldly experience, and to advance views on his place in the
Universe that bore only a distant relationship to the truths o f revealed religion.
(7)
The purpose o f autobiography had shifted in response to a culture that had m oved from
being alm ost exclusively religious to being prim arily secular. N o longer w as the
purpose o f writing solely to provide an example o f how to follow the correct path
leading to the ultimate joy o f once again being united w ith God. Instead, w riting was a
m eans to attest to one's personal trium phs and accolades in this world in relation to
other individuals. To meet the standards and expectations o f his secular culture.
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Rousseau goes to great lengths in his autobiography to tell as many stories as he
possibly can with the hope that "whoever you m ay be that wish to know a man, have the
courage to read the next two or three pages and you will have com plete knowledge o f
Jean-Jacques Rousseau" (300). He is the w riter to whom we look to find the inception
o f the personal mem oirs genre, which rem ains popular even if it is not challenging or
interesting as literature tw o hundred years after its introduction.
W hether his stories reveal his failed attem pts to steal apples (amazingly sim ilar
to Augustine's childhood incident o f stealing pears) or his blundered sexual exploits or
his abandonm ent o f his five children, R ousseau always aims to show that he is "like no
one in the whole world" (17). While asserting his uniqueness he, at the same time,
believes that his readers will eventually see in his faults their own shortcom ings and,
thus, not judge him too harshly or think, "I was a better man than he" (17). With
Rousseau, we begin to see more com plexity in how we evaluate ourselves and each
other because the m ake-up o f society is itself m ore diversified, rendering it im possible
to weigh various people's lives with the same scale. Rousseau's stories illustrate the
com plex nature o f the individual and are full o f human efforts and errors in the attem pt
to capture the com passion o f his readers. Every detail is crucial for Rousseau because it
both reveals one's nature and records, as com pletely as possible, a mom ent in one's life;
and in a secular culture, every m om ent is crucial because life is finite.
Just as the content o f The Confessions represents the concerns o f Rousseau's
culture, the organizational structure o f the text follows the popular literary form o f the
day and reflects ideas regarding life and order at the time. Rousseau's book opens with
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a b rief description o f his purpose addressed to his audience. He then im mediately
m oves into w hat has since become the conventional life-story opener: "I was bom at
Geneva in 1712, the son o f Isaac Rousseau, a citizen o f that town, and Suzanne Bernard,
his wife" (17). From the outset, Rousseau lets us know that he intends to describe the
events o f his life, his position in society, and who he is in exact succession, with nothing
intentionally omitted or rearranged in the always straight ahead time line. Each o f his
books contains sections dated to cover specific years. Rousseau's text actually adheres
more stringently to a blatant chronological time line than Augustine's; but, as discussed
previously, Augustine's text follows what he considers to be the natural linear
progression o f a Christian soul. At the end o f The Confessions, Rousseau again
addresses his audience to end simultaneously his book and the reading o f his story to
M me d'Egm ont and her companions.
The blurring o f the listening audience and the reading audience addressed in The
Confessions increases the complexity o f the book's structure but by no m eans is
original. This practice o f framing a narrative can be found in works that precede
Rousseau's, such as Sir Philip Sidney's O ld Arcadia and St. Thomas M ore's Utopia.
Rousseau, like Augustine, masterfully employs the literary techniques popular in his
day. Using rhetorical tropes, he reiterates often his argument's thesis of, "you [the
reader] will watch the m arch o f events and judge whether I could have stayed it" (391).
Following his thesis he describes an account o f terrible circumstance in which no one,
according to Rousseau, could have escaped unscathed, and then punctuates his argument
with a final plea for understanding and empathy from his audience.
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As previously noted, Rousseau's book, like A ugustine's, unfolds in chronological
order. Like Augustine, Rousseau and his culture still view linearity and chronology as
the "proper order" (561). Unlike Augustine, however, this is not because the order
parallels the path through life to God but because the order tracks the development and
progression o f one's life through time in this world. Elizabeth de M ijolla points out,
"Rousseau's continual concern for the 'order' and 'sequence' o f The Confessions reveals,
in part, his respect for the norm o f chronological narrative, a norm that works both for
and against his self-knowledge. Carefully ordering his life for presentation in The
Confessions, Rousseau sacrifices, to a degree, introspection for exposition" (1994, 80).
In this observation, de M ijolla accurately points out that, while Rousseau's chosen
structure does show how he becam e the m an he is, it also prevents him from perform ing
the meditative self-analysis that Augustine and M ontaigne view as critical to
understanding who that man is.
The use o f classical rhetoric, chronological order, and the narrative frame all
contribute to making The Confessions read more like a novel than nonfiction. This was
obviously intentional, as the novel was becom ing a m ajor literary genre during the
eighteenth century, with the purpose o f entertaining taking precedence over that o f
teaching or setting example. Rousseau aim s to construct a fluid, engaging narrative,
even if that means delaying the mention o f certain experiences "for fear o f interrupting
the thread o f [his] story" (587). Particularly, he creates a work that mirrors the very
popular picaresque novel. The adolescent protagonist bum bles through life, and, by
sharing his mishaps and developm ents with an audience, hopes to gain the audience's
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empathy and understanding. As W eintraub describes The Confessions, "It is the story o f
a youth, rarely settled for long, wandering about in search o f life and h im s e lf (1978,
311).
As part o f creating the appearance o f a picaresque novel and o f validating his
argument, Rousseau includes correspondence between him self and others, am ong them
Diderot, M me de Luxem bourg, the Abbé, and M me d'Epinay. The letters not only
contribute to the appearance o f the book as a novel or support the argum ents presented,
they also reinforce the prevailing cultural desire for linear order. Often Rousseau refers
to chronological order as "proper order," and he supports this belief with the
chronological dating and progression o f his book. W hen he m ust arrange some undated
letters so that he may place them in the book, he fills with anxiety, "as it were groping
in the dark, in order to arrange them in their proper order" (561). The arrangem ent o f
most o f these letters bears no significance one way or another on Rousseau's story, yet
he becom es rather disturbed by his inability to remem ber which was written first. The
desire for order, to see exactly how every event or word exchanged occurred in
sequence, is so critical to his culture in which life is brief and com posed o f m oment
upon moment, that he feels com pelled to order even unrelated letters.

Narrative structure in Rousseau's The Confessions
The organizational structure o f Rousseau's The Confessions mirrors the trends o f his
culture and is closely tied to the actual narrative structure. Like Augustine, who uses
elements o f the rhetorical argument, the popular literary form o f his day, Rousseau also
chooses from the tools available in his culture and com poses a very readable narrative
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that resembles any fictional novel o f his period. In telling, or rather in creating, his
autobiography, he admits quite freely, "Here is what I have done, and i f by chance I
have used some im material em bellishm ent it has been only to fill a void due to a defect
in memory" (17). From the beginning o f his story, he lets the reader know that he is
attuned to what the public enjoys reading—even if he does proclaim at one point that he
does not intend for his book to be published while he or anyone in the book is alive
(373)—and that he will do all he can "to provide enough interest to hold the reader to the
end" (506).
In addition to presenting a detailed, seamless, and entertaining story, Rousseau
hopes his narrative depicts the developm ent o f a complete, whole being in such a
m anner that readers may com e to know who Jean-Jacques is. Using a chronological
narrative in autobiography is comm on and logical because, as John Eakin points out,
"the self is a developmental, time-em bedded construct" (1992, 198). Charting "the
trajectory o f how one's self came to be" (Freeman 1993, 33), Rousseau follows the
linear tim e frame because that m irrors the occurrence o f the actual events. By insisting
upon a linear time line, however, Rousseau refuses to acknowledge that m eaning
acquired from experience does not necessarily occur in the same order in which events
may have taken place. M eaning is acquired and appropriated to events only in
retrospect (G usdorf 1956); therefore, selecting m emories for presentation creates (more
than Rousseau is aware or admits) rather than represents a self (Lloyd 1986, 180).
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E akin puts forth the question, "W hat kind o f sense does it make that
autobiographers should resort to narrative, especially chronological narrative, when they
come to represent their lives?" (1992, 191). Resort, indeed, for as Eakin further asserts:
structure represents an important opportunity for self-expression in
autobiographical narrative, although m ost autobiographers neglect it, assum ing
that content and style will serve to com m unicate their sense o f individual
uniqueness...any appeal to the order o f m em ory will discredit the notion that
chronological order is somehow an intrinsically 'natural' representation o f hum an
experience. (1992, 191)
Experim enting with various narrative structures in the attem pt to m irror what the w riter
believes to be the way one actually develops and rem em bers is what ground-breaking
autobiographers do. W hile the chronological narrative may be an outdated, ineffective
form for contemporary autobiographers, it was the innovative form for an exam ination
o f the self in the eighteenth century because the practice o f self-exam ination itself was
still relatively new (W eintraub 1978, 325). In this sense, when Rousseau convinces
him self that he remembers properly only when he does so in chronological order, he
believes this is because that order mirrors the order in which his life unfolded. He does
not acknowledge that various events occurring at different times work together to create
a meaning, usually at a time far removed from when any one particular event took place.
That m eaning and selfhood do not follow a strictly linear progression is a concept
beyond the understanding o f Rousseau and his eighteenth-century society.
A problem with Rousseau's belief that selfliood and meaning unfold
chronologically is that as he approaches the time o f his writing he is unable to
understand how his present fits with his past. As his ability to sequence or order events
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dissipates, he writes, "All the rest o f my life has been nothing but afflictions and
heartaches, which I find it so sad to recall, and which com e to me in so confused a form
that 1 can no longer reduce my story to any sort o f order. Henceforth 1 shall be obliged
to arrange my facts haphazard, as they come to my mind" (553). He does not appear to
recognize that he has all along selected specific events that contribute to the narrative
and the Jean-Jacques he wishes to portray, or that the selection o f these events requires
time and distance in order to determine how they fit in with the image he tries to
convey. As M ontaigne wrote centuries earlier, "A man who does not have a picture o f
the whole in his head cannot possibly arrange the pieces" (1963, 159). As Rousseau
nears the present in his story, he cannot possibly have the retrospect necessary to
assim ilate that part o f his life with all that has com e before. This case reinforces the
notion that, while autobiography attempts to m irror a life, the narrative cannot merely
be a tracking o f events in tim e—it m ust be a selection and ordering o f those events that
have m eaning from a given perspective (G usdorf 1953).
The limitations o f chronological narrative in representing the self, touched upon
by Rousseau, rem ain topical to writers even now. Paul Jay credits Henry Adams'
autobiography. The Education o f Henry Adam s, with being about "the end o f history,
the end o f historiography, the end o f the 'whole' and 'coherent' ego, and the end o f
'Adams'—it is also about the ends to which autobiography, as a narrative practice, has
come" (1984, 159). Furthermore, Jay writes that Adams' "observations about the real
limitations o f narrative as a form for the twentieth-century self-reflexive writer are tied
to the expanding limits o f hum ankind's conception o f the s e l f (1984, 159). While
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Adams certainly drives hom e the notion that there can be no one coherent s e lf and that
the narrative in autobiography is insufficient, Rousseau deserves credit for introducing
these very ideas in the eighteenth century. Although he may not completely grasp why
his narrative form is inadequate for his purpose, he is able to recognize and articulate his
observation:
The further I go in my story, the less order and sequence I can put into it. The
disturbances o f my later life have not left events tim e to fall into shape in my
head. They have been too numerous, too confused, too unpleasant to be capable
o f straightforwai'd narration...N ow my story can only proceed at haphazard,
according as the ideas com e back into my mind. (574)
Rousseau may not fully appreciate the natural relation or "haphazard" connection o f
different stimuli or m em ories in his head, but he does begin to see that time and
retrospect are necessary for determ ining or appropriating m eaning on past events that
define the self. Also, he calls to attention, even though he does not explore, the issue
that chronological order or narrative obviously falters when one is trying to delve into a
meaning o f the self. He views the non-chronological relation o f m emories as
problematic, but writers who follow him will argue that these "haphazard" connections
are, in fact, what m ake us unique individuals.

Eighteenth-century technology and theories of memory as reflected in Rousseau's
text
In the time between Augustine and Rousseau, com m unication technology and theories
o f memory naturally changed with society. The invention o f the printing press led to
the privileging o f writing during the Renaissance (Foucault 1970, 38) and made text
easier to reproduce and m ore accessible to readers. It w ould certainly be more feasible
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now to produce num erous copies o f lengthy texts relatively quickly that otherwise
would have been copied significantly slower, if at all, by a secretary.
While the printing press changed com m unication in the sixteenth century,
science was influencing how society viewed life. New scientific theories and findings
called into question society's foundation o f absolute truth regarding nature as previously
explicated by religion. Robert Elbaz writes:
With the scientific revolution, Descartes and Newton brought the m odem world
into a new phase which accelerated the displacement o f religion by science.
Common-sense knowledge based on the senses was replaced by mathematical
reasoning; new experim ents were carried out using quantitative m ethods o f
measurem ent...Religion was taken out o f nature and confined to the expression
o f beliefs and morals, while science took over in the natural world. (1988, 41)
The scientific revolution ushered in not only advances in technology and machines but
also new metaphors that described the brain and memory in contem porary terms.
Leonardo da Vinci, in the sixteenth century, was drawing intricate representations o f the
brain and its ventricles (Rose 1993, 76). By the seventeenth century, the scientific
community had agreed that m em ories resided in these ventricles and flowed throughout
the brain after passing through a control valve that separated the front and back areas o f
the brain (Rose 1993, 76). Descartes' amended version o f this early hydraulic model o f
memory to a free-flowing spirit, that m oved from side to side o f the brain until it
touched upon the desired m em ory, is actually quite sim ilar to Augustine's model in
which he searched his mind only to have m emories flow forth. The m ajor difference
between these two theories is that the m ethodology o f science had changed from one
that was philosophieally oriented to one that was more experimentally oriented. This
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difference continued to grow as science separated from religion to explain the natural
world.
The split o f science from religion corresponded with the changes in society's
view o f life; for example, Rousseau's predom inantly secular culture believed that living
well, not preparing for an afterlife with God, was the goal o f life. In turn, the role o f
memory as the path to reaching God faded, becoming, instead, a way to construct the
self into a coherent, whole being in this life. M em ory m odels continued to reflect the
com m unication technology in society, such as with the shift in view o f the nervous
system from a hydraulic model to an electrical maze following Galvani's electrical
experiments on frogs in the 1700s (Rose 1994, 77). Around the tim e o f Rousseau's
death, the telegraph was formally introduced into society and the brain and m em ory
was, for the day, described as a telegraphic signaling system. This telegraph m etaphor
complements Rousseau's own earlier claim that he could call up on dem and particular
memories. The developm ents in and borrowing among these various fields reaffirms a
premise o f this study that in any given culture sim ilar developments arise
simultaneously in different fields.
Although Rousseau's elaim about m em ory can be seen to foreshadow the arrival
o f the telegraph, he does not, as A ugustine does, elaborate on his ideas regarding
models o f memory. He does, however, provide readers with a few brief insights into
how he believes his mem ory works. M ost strikingly, Rousseau claims his "memory
calls up only pleasant objects" (261) and dism isses painful events so well that he
"cannot recapture them when [he] need[s] them" (261). The mechanical nature o f his
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m emory, sim ilar to the telegraph which sends and receives linear codes, reflects the
com m unication technology o f his day and reinforces the belief in linear progression
prevalent in his culture. However, unlike A ugustine's ideas about m em ory that hold up
consistently throughout his book, Rousseau's ideas often contradict what actually occurs
in his work, eventually disintegrating by the end o f the text. This inability to "call up"
in order to reproduce a linearly developed, whole, coherent self marks the beginning o f
the "end" that Jay notes takes place in Henry Adams' autobiography, but which actually
began to m anifest prior to Adams' work.
Rousseau says that he rem em bers only pleasant events and forgets the painful,
for which he is grateful "for never having known that vindictive feeling which is kept
boiling in a resentful heart by the continual m em ory o f insults received, and which
inflicts upon itself all the textures that it longs to inflict on its enemy" (540). This
proclam ation, however, seems ridiculous when it is placed alm ost at the end o f a work
w hich inundates the reader with stories that expose the flaws and evils o f everyone who
Rousseau believes has worked to destroy him but against whom he harbors no
resentment. Surely Rousseau does not expect us to believe this, but his content directly
contradicts his claims o f mem ory control. So, while he aims to present mem ory as
possessing some type o f mechanical quality, which does reflect the developm ents in
culture, ultim ately the m echanical m etaphor is inadequate.
By the end o f The Confessions, Rousseau is dejected by his inability to represent
the m ovem ent o f his recent memory: "I have so confused a mem ory o f this whole affair
that it is im possible for m e to impose any order or connexion on the ideas which com e
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back to me. I can do no more than record them in the scattered and isolated form in
which they com e to my mind" (579). Rousseau does not recognize the coherency in
free-associated images, although he does m ention earlier in the text without significance
that his m em ory o f dinner at Château de Toune, "which was the sweeter for the
innocence associated with it, recalled others o f the same kind" (397). He passes on the
opportunity to leave the linear narrative and to explore, as M ontaigne does in his
Essays, the natural associations o f memory and how they may be mirrored in a
nonlinear structure. Although Rousseau may not be as w illing as M ontaigne is to let his
style and mind "alike go roaming" (1963, 375), he does, by ultim ately calling attention
to the failure o f linear narrative and memory, provide the avenue which subsequent
m odernist period autobiographers will explore in depth, always in search o f the best
way to represent textually the working mind.

The individual and the self in Rousseau's culture
Georges G usdorf writes that Rembrandt painted sixty-two self portraits throughout his
career because he was aware that no single image could be the definitive se lf and that
only in view ing many perspectives over time could a "com m on denominator" o f the self
be determ ined (1980, 35). Likewise, Rousseau provides num erous insights into his life
so that w e may come away from the text with a sense o f his basic nature, despite the
various ways in which he was forced to behave when dealing with different situations
and people. In recognizing the fragmented nature o f the self, Rousseau touches upon
the problem o f trying to represent the self in text or even o f creating an autobiography
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that is not a fiction from the m om ent the w riter decides to impose a coherent narrative
on it.
Rousseau rem ains adamant in his belief that m em ory and life and, therefore, any
narrative describing them must follow a linear, chronological order. W hen his memory
and narrative diverge from this strict order, he grows frustrated and confused. His goal
throughout his text is to show who he is, and he fears that without the order expected by
his culture, he cannot possibly represent him self adequately or comprehensibly. In
attempting to represent him self comprehensibly, however, Rousseau continues to be full
o f contradictions; first his plea that no one should read his book when he is alive, while
at the same time he addresses his intertextual story and reading audiences; then his self
praise for not being vindictive, while his entire book exposes what he sees as other
people's wrongdoings toward him; now his claim o f uniqueness, while hoping that
others who read his story will identify with him.
The Confessions opens with Rousseau's almost adolescent proclam ation of
individuality:
1712-1719 I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent, and which,
once complete, will have no imitator. My purpose is to display to my kind a
portrait in every way true to nature, and the man I shall portray will be myself.
Simply myself. I know my own heart and understand my fellow man.
But I am unlike any one I have ever met; I will even venture to say that I am
like no one in the whole world. I may be no better, but at least I am different.
(17)
His belief that he is so different from everyone else in the w orld that no one will ever be
able to understand him resembles the egocentric tantrum o f a teenager. His immaturity
aside, however, both Rousseau's assertion o f uniqueness and prom ise to reveal his true
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self are relatively unexplored concepts in the eighteenth century. W ith the exception o f
M ontaigne, whose Essays showed the change in W estern European culture from
Augustine's Christian com m unity to an increasingly secular society where the
autobiographer now had the responsibility o f illum inating the private facets o f the
individual (G usdorf 1980, 34), Rousseau is the first m ajor autobiographer to present
him self to an audience for its exam ination, recognition o f uniqueness, and approval.
By first asserting his uniqueness, then hoping that others will com e to see
similarities between them selves and him based on his behavior in certain situations,
Rousseau is basically reiterating A ugustine's b elief regarding hum an nature. Augustine
thought that all Christians had the same nature, although individual experiences along
the Christian path to God m ay have been different. Rousseau's sim ilar belief that his
community will see them selves in his actions not only contradicts his statem ent that no
one is like him but also condem ns the nature o f his society to one that is m ean-spirited,
irresponsible, and unconscionable.
Rousseau's delusional vision o f him self as a unique but ordinary m an noted, he
does point toward the changing idea o f the individual. The shift away from Christiancentered culture, the split in science and religion, and technological advances, such as
that o f the improved m irror at the end o f the M iddle Ages, all contributed to a new
conception o f the individual by the eighteenth century (Eakin 1992, 84; Elbaz 1988, 41;
G usdorf 1980, 32). The individual was now seen as distinct from others rather than as a
typical representation o f the com m unity. As Guillem ette Jolinston notes, "the collective
self exists only through its prim itive foundations and cannot survive when confronted
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by a social world whose foundations rely not on prim itive sim ilarities betw een
individuals, but on differences between them" (1990, 277). With this dissipation o f the
collective self com es not only the need to show how one stands out in a com m unity but
also how one may still be accepted into that community. Rousseau's com m ent, "You
cannot judge...till you have read m e to the end," (261) is a plea for acceptance by the
com m unity he believes cannot understand him but which, alongside and w ith greater
consequence than God, judges him nonetheless.
As Rousseau lays out his story for his readers' evaluation and judgem ent, he
addresses the multiple institutions that judge and, hopefully, accept him. In addition to
God, Rousseau is now judged by the judicial system; the literary, music, and
philosophical com m unities; the aristocratic circle in which he mingles; his family; and
the general public. The individual now has several private and public selves, quite
possibly each with its own goals and agenda; this is far m ore com plicated than
Augustine's single life purpose that directed all facets o f life in his culture. N ow that
society considers the main purpose o f life to be to live well, individuals set their own
life goals, which for Rousseau include various endeavors in music, literature, teaching,
romance, and fam ily—none o f which has anything to do with living for God or preparing
for an afterlife.
Because Rousseau splits him self am ong so many diverse groups, he cannot
possibly be one persona that is identifiable as the same by each distinct group. He
understands that Jean-Jacques m ust be different for each o f these institutions, yet he
remains surprised by his own behavior: "I think I have already observed that there are

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53
times w hen I am so unlike m yself that I m ight be taken for someone else o f an entirely
opposite character" (126). His recognition that the self is not constant and is som etim es
unrecognizable even to our own person is an idea so far ahead o f its time that it will be
picked up by the m odernist autobiographers and remains an issue for scholars even
today. Because there is not a continuous, coherent self, Rousseau m ust create one. The
fact that a se lf must be created m akes the se lf an object left to the perception o f others
(Lloyd 1986, 170). Rousseau is acutely aware o f this, which is why he desperately tries
to ensure that his readers understand who he is within, because the object alone from the
outside does not resemble its inside. In trying to gain the em pathy o f and prove his
worthiness to his com m unity, Rousseau presents a version o f him self that explains why
he is who he is and how he becam e that com plex, som etim es unrecognizable, person.
Obviously memory plays a key role in the creation o f this version, for without it
Rousseau could not select past events that contribute to the image he wishes to portray.
Rousseau, representative o f a culture that em phasizes individuality, puts forth
descriptions o f his actions that distinguish his life from that o f others around him.
G usdorf attributes this developm ent in autobiography to the belief that:
The man who takes the trouble to tell o f him self knows that it will not be
repeated in the future; he has becom e m ore aware o f differences than o f
sim ilarities...he believes it is a useful and valuable thing to fix his own im age so
that he can be certain it will not disappear like all things in this world. (30)
In striving to distinguish him self among the other m em bers o f his society, Rousseau
reflects the aim in his culture, which is that individuals establish a permanent place for
them selves in an otherwise fleeting life. However, his desire to establish him self as
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absolutely different in order to ensure his place in history perhaps carries Rousseau to
the extreme, where he certainly is remembered but in a m ost controversial light.
The need to assert one's self in a secular culture where the individual must
answer to num erous institutions destroys any possibility o f a cohesive self, although
Rousseau tries to create one. However, as he admits, when he tries to assemble the
fragments o f his life into a continuous narrative, he has gaps that he must fill using his
imagination (128). He recognizes that there are m any sides to Jean-Jacques, and he tries
to show all o f these in the hope that by presenting all o f his sides he will create a whole.

The limits of language in secular culture
Rousseau recognizes the difficulty in trying to construct a single coherent Jean-Jacques
when he is actually composed o f many different fragm ents, each corresponding to
various facets o f his public and private lives. His struggle to represent the self is
compounded by the inadequacy o f language to represent the inner experiences o f those
multiple facets o f the self. Like Augustine, Rousseau is concerned that he will not be
understood, hence his readers will never know the true Jean-Jacques. As de Mijolla
writes, "Rousseau [in his autobiographical attempts] has repeatedly found his written
selves inadequate, as what is private in him has gone public to be wrongly
interpreted...his elegant verbal selves become strangers as they are read by others, only
to find, time and again, that his words belong to the world and he is all alone, still
untold" (1994, 83). Rousseau tries repeatedly, relating story upon story in hope that
eventually he will tell the one which crystallizes the "true" Jean-Jacques, i.e., the one he
believes him self to be. However, just as he never com es upon the definitive story o f
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Jean-Jacques, he also fails to find the language that fully translates his feelings. His
failures ultim ately occur because none o f these goals is realistically attainable. Critical
o f Rousseau, de M ijolla argues that Rousseau's insistence that language fails is actually
more the shortcom ing o f R ousseau's depth and not that o f language (1994, 84).
Rousseau may have his shortcom ings, but, to his credit, his assessm ent o f the limit o f
language is not one o f them.
A ugustine's frustration with language resides in knowing that, in not being able
to convey m eaning or experience exactly, he falls short in his didactic purpose for
w riting his confessions. Rousseau, not interested in being an exam ple o f Christian
living, is frantic, alm ost to the point o f neurosis, because, if he cannot show in language
who he really is inside, people will not understand and accept his behavior, which from
the outside appears less than admirable. Early in the text he states, "I should not fulfil
the aim o f this book if I did not at the same time reveal my inner feelings," (88) but
soon follows with the acknow ledgm ent that, "Feelings can only be described in term s o f
their effects" (105). He articulates the belief that there is no language for describing
one's inner experiences and changes. The best a writer can hope to do is describe the
physical or external m anifestations o f the inner experience. W ords alone are merely
suggestions o f what one really thinks and feels, and these suggestions become fainter
and less effective as culture becom es more secular, splitting the com m on base o f
experience into smaller, m ore num erous pieces.
It makes sense that our ability to understand one another stem s from our
identification with one another. Augustine struggled with the inability o f language to
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express his meaning, and he had the advantage o f a well-defined Christian com m unity
possessing the sam e set o f beliefs and goals. As the shared values and com m on
experiences o f a society begin to disappear, as they do in Rousseau's secular culture, it
becomes increasingly difficult for individuals with separate agendas to identify with
and, therefore, understand one another. N. Katherine Hayles comments on the
breakdown o f story in postm odern culture;
the texture o f life [is] created from a wealth o f small shared moments...In the
absence o f these shared contexts, experience is incommunicable. Facts can be
told; events can be narrated; but experience cannot be shared, for the cloth out
o f which it is woven has been destroyed. (1990, 238)
Hayles' observation may be about postm odern culture, but these contemporary ideas are
certainly traceable in Rousseau's The Confessions, where we see the early stages o f the
unraveling o f common experience in his culture. As individuals are affected by
different stimuli, each person becomes a unique composite, and metaphors cease to have
the same meaning for various people. The m etaphors are no longer effective; the
language is inadequate.

Forging the self through narrative in autobiography to reflect cultural constructs
Like Augustine, Rousseau uses writing style in his autobiography to reflect cultural
constructs and to reinforce his purpose for writing. Rousseau's choice o f the narrative
frame and picaresque novel styling m akes the text more accessible to readers o f the
popular literary genre o f the day, i.e., the novel. Furthermore, Rousseau believes his
stylistic approach infuses The C onfessions with a greater sense o f accuracy and veracity
because he reportedly addresses an actual audience that is present to scrutinize his story
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and judge his character. In this regard, the form works to Rousseau's advantage in
helping him to appear to prove his worthiness. The presence o f the audience sitting in
wait to approve o f Rousseau's story acts as a substitute for the rest o f society which
looks upon, hears, and judges Rousseau. If Rousseau can convince his audience o f
M me d'Egm ont and her com panions that he possesses honesty and integrity, then
perhaps his reading audience (the rest o f society) will be persuaded to follow suit.
Rousseau is not alone in his position o f being judged by his society; like Augustine, he
is representative o f his culture. In Rousseau's society, everyone judges and is judged by
the community.
The narrative form, in addition to following the popular literary genre and
creating the illusion o f honesty on the writer's part, imposes a linear order that joins
disparate events in the autobiographer's life. In The Order o f Things: An Archaeology
o f the Human Sciences, Foucault describes the capacity o f language both to fragment
the "monotony o f space" while it sim ultaneously unifies the "diversity o f temporal
succession" (1970, 113). Rousseau, aware o f the fragmented self that has developed in
his secular culture, where an individual has many private and public faces, uses
language in the attempt to unify these different selves, to link together his pieces o f
time, and to create a complete story. This story—made possible through access to
memory, language, and narrative—fulfills the needs o f both Rousseau (for his own
sanity and sense o f coherency) and his readers (in their desire for a seamless, finished
tale).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58
The fluid, chronological story that Rousseau presents follows the cultural belief
that nature follows a linear order—a belief that was prevalent in Augustine's tim e and
which went unchallenged until the end o f the eighteenth century (Foucault 1970;
Hayles 1990). At the time Rousseau was writing The Confessions, the belief that nature
was linear was still privileged and was reflected in the approach to technology, as with
the linear model telegraph. However, Rousseau's work reflects the loosening o f this
cultural truth. The cultural desire for linear, clironological order remains, but the
recognition that this order may not be as natural as it was once thought to be is
beginning to take place—if not yet in the open dialogue between scholars, then at least in
the subconscious motivations o f writers such as Rousseau. While Rousseau does try to
arrange the details and letters o f his life into their "proper order," (561) he does so to
show the succession o f events in a life that progresses in time.
Unlike Augustine, Rousseau does not write extensively either about the m ind's
pow er to produce things in a perfect order or at all about its capacity to lead us straight
up toward God. Culture may still prefer linear order, but the degree to which this order
is considered natural is starting to come into question, as we see with the difficulty
Rousseau has in m aintaining that order when trying to represent the self truthfully
without fictionalizing. His claim to have control over memories, unlike Augustine
whose m emories "flood forth" hopefully in perfect order, indicates the need to control,
to impose a particular order where one realizes (even if one does not acknowledge) that
particular order does not exist. His claim to "call up" memories like a telegraph is an
example both o f the influence o f technology on thinking and writing and o f how he
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must im pose linear order where it is not present. W hen he writes, "I can no longer
reduce my story to any sort o f order. Henceforth, I shall be obliged to arrange my facts
haphazard, as they come to my mind," (553) he seem s at a loss, as if he has som ehow
failed because he is unable to impose the expected order on his life. What he does not
recognize is the cultural im plication o f his observation. A shift in cultural
understanding o f order is occurring during Rousseau's lifetime. The previous belief that
nature is linear is beginning to give way to other ideas regarding order and coherency.
Where Rousseau considers non-chronological association o f m em ories to be
problem atic and haphazard, subsequent writers will em brace these associations as a
more natural type o f order, calling it stream-of-consciousness.
M em ory and narrative in Rousseau's The C onfessions also reflects the individual
need within one's culture to establish oneself as a distinct, respectable entity in a secular
society. It is only through mem ory that individuals can tell their own stories, thus
creating their identities both for themselves and their public. Because society as a
whole no longer firmly believes that the life story continues and acquires meaning in the
afterlife, individuals must som ehow find m eaning and purpose in this life. M emory and
narrative provide the m eans through which individuals can do ju st that—search,
evaluate, and arrange their lives into a meaningful, coherent story, which in the end
produces som e semblance o f a unified self. When Rousseau mentions how he
sometimes acts out o f character—as when he schemes dinner and lodging out o f M.
Reydet (126)— he shows that the self is actually fragm ented, many pieces o f which seem
so different in com position that they cannot possibly be related to one another in one
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person, yet they m ust be. The difficulty in representing these many selves textually and
in assim ilating these fragm ents into one whole increases as society becomes more
diversified. The Confessions reflects the growing problem o f representing a whole self
that is breaking into num erous fragmented public and private selves. Rousseau's text is
a pulse point at which we can determine the beginning o f a cultural awakening to the
dissolution o f the idea o f a single, unified self.
Rousseau's self-consciousness regarding the split between his private and public
selves marks a "turning point," as Ann Hartle calls it, in Rousseau's life (1983, 139). It
is at this point, when R ousseau begins his public life and tries to link it with his private
life, that he realizes he will always be misinterpreted by others. As the division between
public and private grows m ore distinct, he feels alone in his understanding o f the "true"
Rousseau. His m om ent o f self-realization when looking back over his life is as
significant as A ugustine's religious conversion. Like Augustine, who relies on memory
when describing his religious conversion, Rousseau also finds his m om ent o f selfrealization when he reviews his life through m em ory. Rousseau's conversion—the
instant in which he finds the change that defines who he is—occurs when he recognizes
the complexity o f the self, i.e., its irreparable splitting. This recognition is also a
moment o f cultural conversion, for the self will never again be able to be viewed as a
whole, at least not in the same way that it was in A ugustine's society.
Tracing the shift in culture from the time o f Augustine to Rousseau as reflected
in their representations o f the self, we can determine that as culture becomes more
secular and diversified, it also becomes necessary for individuals to distinguish
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themselves in society. Rousseau's culture does not identify or define itself solely with
the Church, as Augustine's culture did; and as culture identifies with an increasing
number o f institutions, pow er to influence individuals is divided am ong these temporary
institutions o f authority. W hereas Augustine concerned him self with always behaving
as a good Christian and staying on the track to God, Rousseau worries how scholars, the
aristocracy, the law, and his family perceive his actions. In response to an increasing
number o f social institutions acting upon and shaping the individual, the self seemingly
splits into m ore and more pieces, each very distinct in com position and unlikely to fit
together again as a whole. A ugustine saw that he was a man shattered in pieces who
would come together finally with the help o f God once he reached Him. Rousseau, too,
sees he is a man in pieces but can only try to reassemble him self with the help o f
imaginative em bellishm ent, which in the end produces what resem bles a patchwork
quilt containing unrelated cloths that are joined only by a common thread, which
Rousseau admits is imaginative, i.e., fiction. With his admission, the notion o f a
continuous, linear, complete selfhood can never again exist as simple fact; it cannot
exist at all.
Just as Augustine's and Rousseau's autobiographies reveal the changing ideas
regarding selfhood, both texts also reveal the effects o f technology on communication,
culture, and memory. As technology advanced from Augustine's to Rousseau's period,
communication changed to reflect the technology, both in the actual tools available for
communication (e.g., the printing press and telegraph) and in the m etaphors inspired by
these tools to explain the working o f the hum an mind. Similar ideas from seemingly
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unrelated fields began to emerge, as we see when Rousseau describes the w orking o f his
m emory in term s sim ilar to the w orking o f the telegraph.
Along with the shifting views o f how m em ory works, eighteenth-century culture
began to develop new schema to differentiate nature and hum an nature, because nature
and human nature were no longer seen as reflective o f one another (Foucault 1970). In
Augustine's time, nature was thought to possess a linear order, and human nature
aspired to m irror this "proper" order. By Rousseau's time, however, a fracture between
nature and hum an nature was in place, and the linear view o f nature was being called
into question. Human nature, however, because we are time-em bedded creatures, still
desired order, even if it had to be im posed. The notion o f order in regard to memory
and the self only becomes more com plex as culture changes and technology advances.
The avant-garde autobiographers who succeeded Rousseau provided approaches to
order, memory, and selfhood that were valid and influential for their day, but credit is
due to Rousseau for leading the way in m odern autobiography and in providing the first
view o f the fragmented self that yet remains an issue in contemporary autobiography.
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CHAPTER 3. AVANT-GARDE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IN THE MODERN PERIOD:
THE DESIRE TO CREATE A UNIFIED SELF OUT OF PIECES
The emergence of modernism: significant cultural changes in the 100 years
betkveen Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Gertrude Stein
Relative to the cultural changes that evolved in the 1300 years between St. Augustine
and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the advances in technology and science as well as resulting
shifts in com m only accepted social beliefs occurred at a rapid pace in the 100 years
between Rousseau and the m odernist writers. In his autobiography, The Autobiography
o f Henry Adam s (1918), Henry Adams, a w riter on the cusp on modernism,
acknowledged the im portance o f technology, specifically m achinery, to his culture by
providing a b rief history, noting particularly that the electric tram was introduced in
1883, followed by the autom obile in 1893. No doubt these advances in transportation
were m ore than a convenience for Adams; they were an inspiration to his creative
processes, as he writes, "he hoped to project his lines forward and backward
indefinitely" (1931, 435) and, "matter was m o tio n -m o tio n was m atter—the thing
moved" (453). The advances in technology, in this case those involving m ovement,
provided new vocabulary and m etaphors through which Adams could convey his mental
exploration o f the self.

Developments in science
The electric tram and autom obile were only tw o o f the inventions that crucially affected
society. The telegraph, which was introduced about the tim e o f Rousseau's death, and
the telephone, which followed in the early part o f the twentieth century,
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also increased the speed at which people communicated. As com m unication technology
improved, researchers who studied the brain borrowed the language and models from
that field to create metaphors to explain the w orking o f the brain. As Stephen Rose
points out, "The telephone was even more prom ising [than the telegraph], for speech
was here converted into patterns o f electrical flow across a wire. In a telephone
exchange m etaphor the brain processes messages coming in and going out; signals
from eyes connected to muscle contractions in the leg and so forth" (1993, 77-78). This
new m etaphor sim plified the explanation for how the brain and body performed
mechanical operations; however, it did not explain how the brain handled memory,
which is critical to defining the self. Although the telephone exchange model provided
a laym an's explanation for the working o f the brain, this explanation would remain
strictly theoretical until science could provide physical p ro o f o f its plausibility.
A dvances in technology in the nineteenth century were accom panied by
changing views in science. Although scientists since antiquity were aware o f the forces
o f electricity and magnetism and even studied them to som e degree in the 1600s and
1700s, significant advances in understanding these forces did not occur until the mid1800s when Jam es Maxwell developed the electrom agnetic theory (Penrose 1989, 184).
In his study M axwell determined that electric and m agnetic fields push each other
through space, causing the fields to oscillate and carry definite amounts o f energy with
them (Penrose 1989, 186-187). M axwell's discovery o f electrom agnetic fields coupled
with com m unication technology advances involving electricity (e.g., radio waves)
provided points o f research for scientists interested in studying the movem ent o f energy
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through the brain. In 1885 Hermann Ebbinghaus published a book on memory that
called for scientists and psychologists to reject speculation and to study mental
processes with more quantitative m ethods, such as those used in physics and biology
(Rose 1993, 107).
As science became m ore experimental or invasive, theories regarding the brain
began to support the metaphors that had grown out o f fields such as communication
technology. Biochem istry—the predecessor to neurochem istry—em erged in the 1910s
(Rose 1993, 39), bringing with it a new understanding o f the brain. Rose points out the
relationship between com m unication technology, m etaphors o f how the brain functions,
and actual quantitative brain research:
When, during the 1920s, it was discovered that the brain was indeed in a state o f
ceaseless electrical flux, that electrodes placed on the scalp could detect regular
bursts and rhythmic waves o f electrical activity changing with thought and rest,
sleep and wakefulness, this was instantly assimilated to the telephone exchange
model, with subscribers dialling in and being connected to their required
addresses by a central operator. (1993, 78)
Possessing a better understanding o f the physical working o f the brain, scientists began
to question the more complex issue o f memory, as evidenced by the more than 200
studies on eidetic (photographic) mem ory alone that were published before 1935 (Rose
1993, 103). The surge o f interest in mem ory would not relent; it remains an issue for
writers and researchers curious with the role o f m em ory in self-identity.
As science began to solve m ore o f the m ysteries o f life that Augustine's and even
Rousseau's culture attributed to God, providence lost its pow er as the single force that
directed the world. The providential straight path to God that gave purpose to life in
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Augustine's culture began to splinter in Rousseau's secular culture to suit worldly
pursuits, but progressed linearly forward nonetheless, ending with death. Paralleling
this direction during the early 1800s were developm ents in science, specifically the
second law o f therm odynamics, which explained entropy. In an isolated system,
entropy, which is m ovem ent toward disorder or the loss o f energy, increases with time
(Penrose 1989, 309). This would explain our forward progression toward death—a sort
o f ordered m ovement toward disorder arising from a total loss o f energy. Although the
prevailing scientific laws could not be used to answer all o f the mysteries o f nature, this
rejection o f providence as the explanation o f life continued in the nineteenth century as
scientists later became som ewhat fam iliar with nonlinear equations and their application
to discontinuous phenom ena, such as explosions and high winds (John Briggs and F.
David Peat 1990, 23). The recognition o f nonlinearity in nature further dim inished the
authority o f providence as the controller o f order and life's m eaning in a secular culture.
Because nature and human nature continued to be compared, when scientists
began to detect nonlinearity in nature they also began to investigate what was
traditionally seen as nonlinearity, or discontinuity, in hum an nature. As science
produced more and more ideas that seemed contrary to those for so long accepted as
God's truths, and the concepts o f nonlinearity in nature and discontinuity in hum an
nature took hold, the foundation o f "truth" in society was radically shaken. N o longer
was it possible to consider the world or life as inherently possessing a linear order; this
was a characteristic that had to be created if it were to exist at all.
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Developments in art
Artists interested in creating coherency or unity in their work needed new tools for the
endeavor. To break from the traditions that had apparently perpetuated m isguided
notions o f order, nature, life, and God, the avant-garde m odernists rejected the limited
literary forms that had been available to them. They celebrated the creative m edium for
what it was instead o f merely for w hat it could represent. They questioned cultural
hierarchies, seeing that each thing was as im portant as any other thing (Burns 1970, 19).
They rejected the emotive language o f the R om antics and em braced more direct,
descriptive language, such as that from the sciences, which were gaining prom inence in
and pervading society.
The rejection o f the traditional view o f life in light o f cultural changes occurring
because o f scientific discoveries m anifested itself in distinct yet sim ilar ways for the
various arts. In the visual arts. Cubism reflected the idea that there was no center to a
piece, but that a com position consisted o f equally im portant parts that needed to be seen
in a com pletely new way so that they m ight be seen for the first tim e again without
prejudice or preconceived value. Gertrude Stein described Pablo Picasso's Cubism as
the attem pt to see as a child who sees only a part o f his m other's body or face, not the
whole as an adult does. She said Picasso paints "to express things seen not as one
knows them but as they are when one sees them without remem bering having looked at
them" (Burns 1970, 22). According to structuralist Randa Dubnik, "Both Picasso and
Stein, in their pre-1912 work, present the fleeting, fragm entary nature o f perception, and
represent the integrity o f the individual m om ent o f perception before consolidation by
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memory into a conceptual whole" (1984, 4). Dubnik points out that structuralist
theories see these sim ilarities as evidence that Cubism lends itself well to literature
because the nature o f language itself is concerned with perception and signification
(1984,

X V ).

Stein, o f course, was not alone in her pursuit o f a new approach to writing that
would reflect the way she saw the world. Because in a given culture sim ilar ideas arise
in different fields at the sam e time (Hayles 1990, xi), m any avant-garde writers at the
beginning o f the twentieth century created texts that were described as Cubist, showing
an idea or subject in disconnected parts from m ultiple perspectives within a single work.
For example, Paul Auster in his book on twentieth-century French poetry remarks that
the works o f M ax Jacob, Blaise Cendrars, Pierre Reverdy, and Guillaum e Apollinaire
are frequently described as Cubist because they exhibit "sim ultaneity, juxtaposition,
[and] an acute feeling for the jaggedness o f the real" (1984, xxxv). He explains that
Reverdy's technique o f accumulating or synthesizing fragm ents into a whole in his
poem s was an entirely new approach to the poetic image, which was necessary because
Reverdy believed that the poetic image was a creation o f the mind, not a representation
o f what he saw (ed. Auster 1984, xxxv). Fragm enting an image decentralizes it, and the
artists believed this prom oted the sense o f m ovem ent in the work, a trait Gertrude Stein
similarly admired about the painting o f Paul Cézanne and tried to achieve in her own
writing (Stein 1937, 321).
The concepts o f m ovement, perspective, fragmentation, and decentralization
prevalent in the avant-garde art o f the early twentieth century reflected the concerns o f
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culture at the time. A s Rousseau's The Confessions first suggested, the belief in the self
as a continuous, single being was no longer plausible. This idea is illum inated further in
Adams' autobiography: " The young man knew no longer w hat character he bore.
Private secretary in the m orning, son in the afternoon, young man about town in the
evening" (1931, 194). The division o f the self among numerous responsibilities or
social institutions continued into the twentieth century, but accom panying these
divisions that resulted from an evolving society was a change in hum an character and
relations. Virginia W oolf wrote that "in or about December, 1910, hum an character
changed...all human relations have shifted—those between masters and servants,
husbands and wives, parents and children. And when human relations change there is at
the same time a change in religion, conduct, politics, and literature" (quoted in Con
Davis and Schleifer 1989, 15), Changes in every facet o f society indicate a shift in
cultural beliefs and hierarchies. When hierarchies are called into question, established
ideas that center or define a culture are also disrupted, and this is reflected in the art o f
the Cubists and avant-garde autobiographers in the m odem ist period that focuses on
fragmentation, new perspective, and decentralization.
Although the m odernists recognized that the shift in established cultural
hierarchies and hum an relations shattered how individuals defined them selves, thus
compounding the problem o f trying to see the self as continuous, they did not embrace
the idea o f a discontinuous self the way in which the postm odernists would. Instead,
since the m odernists could not represent a unified self, they attem pted to create a
unified self in their art. Adams believed that in 1900 philosophers and scientists were
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continuing to prom ote a "unity unproved and an order [i.e., linear] they had them selves
disproved" (1931, 495); and although the avant-garde artists attem pted to break from
established order, they, too, continued to prom ote a unity that simply did not exist.
Through either Cubism or stream -of-consciousness or texts containing m ultiple
perspectives o f the same event (as in W oolfs M oments o f Being), the artists tried
relentlessly to create som ething that could represent all o f what com posed an individual.
Despite their num erous approaches, they ultimately felt that they could not achieve an
accurate picture o f the self in text.
The com bination o f sim ilar developm ents from the various fields o f science,
com m unication technology, brain research, and art led to a view o f the se lf as a
discontinuous entity. The coincidence o f ideas from many areas is usually not due to
chance but to the fact that the ideas are general concerns underlying the entire current
culture (Hayles 1990, xi). During the m odem ist period, irreversible changes regarding
the self occurred. N ot only did scientists, philosophers, and avant-garde artists view the
self as fragmented, but they challenged the idea o f representing or recreating the self
through memory. M emory has always been the facility through which any form o f selfidentity is possible; however, the shape o f that identity is limited or determ ined by
num erous external forces. Artists such as Stein, Adams, Picasso, and W oolf used
m emory in the attem pt to construct or create a whole self from partial, inadequate, and
inaccurate glimpses. They, following in the practice o f Rousseau, presented as many
perspectives o f the self as they could in their work in the attem pt to som ehow create a
cohesive whole within the work itself.
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Representation of culture in Gertrude Stein's autobiographies: The Autobiography
o f Alice B. Toklas and Everybody’s Autobiography as reflections of an increasingly
secular and global society
By the beginning o f the twentieth century, science was answering many o f the m ysteries
o f life that had previously been attributed to God and was dispelling m any o f the
"truths" regarding nature, particularly the b elief that linear order was inlierent in nature.
As the findings o f science gained validity, technology derived from scientific theories
regarding electricity and nonlinearity also becam e com m onplace in society, in turn,
further supporting the new truths o f science. W hile many factions o f the m odem ist
movem ent shunned teclinology, some, such as the Futurists and avant-garde artists like
Stein recognized the role o f science and technology in society and incorporated it in
varying degrees into their work. Fascinated by the possibilities she saw available
through science and having had first-hand experience in the discipline as a medical
student at Johns Hopkins, she writes, "Science m eant everything and any one who had
an active mind could com plete m echanics and evolution, philosophy was not
interesting, it like religion was satisfaction in a solution but science meant that a
solution was aw ay to a problem" (1937, 251). W hat Stein found so interesting about
science was not that it provided a final, definitive answer, but that it offered a way to
explore and alter the hierarchy o f cultural truths, because "the laws o f science are like
all laws they are paper laws," (1937, 251) thus they and the beliefs o f culture are
impermanent. For Stein, science and technology have the power to shape culture, and
she reinforces this idea in her autobiographies by showing how these fields affect her
very personal world as a writer.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
Some artists considered the presence o f technology in art, particularly its role in
the mass reproduction and distribution o f works, as the demise o f the individual artist
and art work (Huyssen 1986, 9; De Lauretis 1980, 82; Taylor 1989, 456). Others,
however, embraced technology for the new creative potentials it opened in art and for its
ability to connect art and everyday life. This union made art more accessible to people
outside o f the art community. Regarding the role o f technology in the post-1917 avantgarde art movem ent, Teresa De Lauretis com m ents, "Changes in technological
production bring about changes in the everyday life world which then are taken up
(reflected, represented, reutilized, transformed) in art and literature. More importantly:
these changes in technology transform the technological structure o f art production
its e lf (1980, 82). In her autobiographies, Stein makes direct reference to numerous
technological advances that have been incorporated into her life. In The Autobiography
o f Alice B. Toklas, she writes about installing electric radiators in her studio, resulting in
her servant calling her modern for doing so (246). She goes on to say that her servant
"finds it difficult to understand why we are not m ore modern. Gertrude Stein says that if
you are way ahead with your head you naturally are old fashioned and regular in your
daily life" (246). Stein and Toklas, however, were far from old fashioned in any sense.
In the case o f their everyday lives, they surrounded them selves with modern
conveniences like the telephone, radio, and automobile. It is unlikely that anyone who
could have a car sent from the United States to Paris during World W ar I was
considered behind the time. To the contrary, Stein's economic privilege allowed her
access to new technological inventions that m ost o f society could not attain.
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In addition to owning the latest conveniences, Stein also had access to the most
current modes o f public transportation, including flying in airplanes. The mere presence
o f these advances in society does not merit inclusion in the study o f Stein's
autobiographies. W hat makes these advances relevant to this study is how they improve
the efficiency o f com m unication in Stein's increasingly global society and how they
influence how Stein sees and represents that world in her writing. When Stein had
telephones installed at her rue de Fleurus and Bilignin hom es, she joked, "now that I
was going to be an author whose agent could place som ething I had o f course to have a
telephone" (1937, 45). In the same way that the printing press increased the production
rate o f texts, thus making a writer's work more accessible to a w ider audience,
broadcasts on radio (1937, 204) brought literature into the hom es o f people who
otherwise may not have been exposed to Stein's work. Likewise, the telephone m ade it
possible for Stein in Paris and her agent in the United States to negotiate editorial
decisions, deadlines, publications, and speaking engagem ents that otherwise would have
taken considerably longer to arrange by post.
These tools presented Stein and her w ork to a more far-reaching and varied
audience than previously available, in turn, joining people who were geographically or
economically divided. Stein observed this change in society due to technology, and in
Everybody's Autobiography she describes it in terms o f walking through Paris: "I used
to say one o f the things about Paris was that you never met any one you know when you
were out walking. But now everything is changing and you know that is I well now any
one often meets them people you know or people who know you" (1937, 12). She is
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fascinated with the double-edged phenomenon, that as technology improves
com m unication and transportation, the boundaries o f the w orld begin to dissipate, thus
hom ogenizing her global society and allowing once isolated and distinct cultures to
influence each other. Her interest in this subject is explored in greater depth later in this
chapter as I discuss Stein's role o f the self and representation o f the individual.
Charles Caramello m akes another connection between technology and
com m unication as it is reflected in Stein's work. He writes:
At a clearly related second level, she is drawing a parallel between increasingly
modern and technologically accelerated means o f locom otion (standing,
walking, driving, and in Everybody's Autobiography, flying) and equivalent
means o f producing and dissem inating representations (gossiping,
writing/painting, broadcasting on radio, and in Everybody's Autobiography,
filming). (1996, 157)
The parallel between technology and the production and distribution o f art that Stein
presents in her autobiographies later collides in the works o f postm odern artists. Andy
W arhol, for example, blatantly incorporated technology into his art and used it to mass
reproduce his work, exploding the convention o f the unique art piece. Before this
would happen, however, Stein would show in her work how technology allowed her to
view the world from a new perspective (the air) and at a new pace.
In the next two chapter sections I will discuss how com m unication technology
affected the structure, and transportation affected the rhythm, o f Stein's writing.
Leading into these discussions, however, is the distinction that Stein m akes between the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For Stein, the airplane and Cubism both defined the
line between the centuries by providing a new view o f the w orld—a fractured, disjointed
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picture that corresponded with cultural developm ents, including the nonlinear scientific
theories, their resulting technologies, and industrialization. In Everybody's
Autobiography, Stein writes that flying allowed her to see w hat the ground looked like
from a new point o f view (197), thus giving her a new, twentieth-century perspective o f
her world. Flying also allowed her to connect once distant and distinct places, bringing
them into the schema o f her com m unity. She elaborates on the im pact o f the airplane
on her world view, the twentieth century, and art when, in Gertrude Stein on Picasso,
she writes:
The automobile is the end o f progress on the earth, it goes quicker but
essentially the landscapes seen from an autom obile are the sam e as landscapes
seen from a carriage, a train, a w aggon, or in walking. B ut the earth seen from
an airplane is som ething else. So the twentieth century is not the same as the
nineteenth century and it is very interesting knowing that Picasso has never seen
the earth from an airplane, that being o f the twentieth century he inevitably knew
that the earth is not the sam e as in the nineteenth century. (B um s 1970, 76)
This change in perspective brought on by the num erous cultural shifts is what Stein
shows us again and again in the content and form o f her autobiographies. She sets
herself up as the quintessential tw entieth-century writer—breaking from all that has
preceded her—just as she attributes the airplane in travel and Picasso's Cubism in art as
cultural markers o f the new century and new world view.

Narrative structure in Stein's autobiographies: resituating the fractured self in a
culture that still desires order
Just as the narrative structure o f Augustine's and Rousseau's work reflected their
culture's trends, Stein's narrative structure reflects the influence o f technology and art on
her culture while providing a distinctly early twentieth-century idea o f order. Her books
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seemingly open with what Rousseau m ade the traditional introduction to an
autobiography. The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas begins, "I was bom in San
Francisco, California" (1933, 3) and continues with a brief description o f family
background. While this may appear to be a typical introduction, Stein has already
broken from conventional expectations because this is inform ation on Toklas (as Stein
later reveals that "Gertrude Stein was born in Allegheny, Pennsylvania" [69]); and
although the book may be titled as Toklas' life story, no one mistook it for anything but
Stein's autobiography. Stein's break from literary convention with the first line, with the
title, with the instant that the idea o f writing the book in Toklas' voice entered her mind,
is a break that follows throughout the entire text and is a part o f every aspect o f her
writing. In Everybody's Autobiography, she drops the pretense o f writing from Toklas'
voice, but the narrative structure remains as nonconventional and fresh as that o f The
Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas, refusing to conform to an expected progression o f
straightforward chronology and singular, definitive perspective. From the m om ent the
reader picks up either o f Stein's autobiographies, expectations regarding the form,
content, and purpose o f autobiography are challenged.
I f readers were only to peruse the chapter headings in the autobiographies, they
would find that the texts overall follow a clironological order, starting with som e point
in the past—be it the detail o f birth or m om ent o f inspiration to write the book—and
progressing to the present tim e o f writing. This chronological development, which was
also present in Augustine's and Rousseau's texts, m ore closely parallels Rousseau's
purpose for such an order. That is, it supports the idea that hum ans are time-em bedded
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creatures who m ove and develop in time, even i f meaning or understanding does not
necessarily coincide with this chronological m ovement.
This organization o f chapters is the only elem ent o f linearity that Stein follows.
Beyond this element, she resists linear notions o f order that were disputed by science as
far back as the eighteenth century yet remained characteristic o f the art o f the nineteenth
century (Adams 1918, 495; Briggs and Peat 1990, 24; Davis and Schleifer 1989, 18;
and Taylor 1989, 301). Richard Bridgm an describes the structure o f a particular chapter
in The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas: "The fifth section, '1907-1914,' begins with
Alice Toklas joining the household...and concludes at the precipice o f the first great
war. Except for occasional notices o f the progress o f The Making o f Americans, the
narrative is virtually random" (1970, 227). While Bridgm an singles out a particular
section, Stein's seem ing random structure within chapters is typical o f both o f her
autobiographies. However, what Bridgm an concludes to be "virtually random" is
Stein's attem pt to maintain what she calls a constant present, and she does this by
repeatedly pulling the reader out o f the story with reminders of, "But to come back to
Roche," (1933, 45) "but all that will come m uch later," (1937, 2) and "now it is today"
(1937, 328). This is a way to see the fractured self as it is—moving and developing in
all directions at once—and not as a fabricated linearly continuous being that has
developed chronologically. The leaping o f tim e and stories in her texts also captures the
m ovem ent o f the twentieth century, which is characterized by a shaking up o f order as a
result o f developments in science and the first world war. She believed that the
twentieth century had a rhythm that set it apart from the nineteenth century, making
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former approaches to narrative now inadequate or inappropriate. As she writes in
Narration:
W hen one used to think o f narrative one meant a progressive telling o f things
that were progressively happening...But now we do not really know that
anything is progressively happening instead there is a m ovem ent in every
direction. (1935, 29)
The attem pt to capture m ovem ent in every direction elim inates any distinct center from
the text and is actually characteristic o f postm odernism , as David Antin's works
discussed in later chapters reveal.
However, still a m odernist, Stein ultim ately hopes to create some unity or
cohesion out o f all this sporadic movement. Her intertextual tangents, repetitions, and
fragments reflect the w orking o f the mind as it remem bers, but her overall structure
remains the m odern attem pt to create a unified whole. For example, the first edition o f
The Autobiography o f A lice B. Toklas contained 16 photographs. Bridgman points out
that the final photograph, w hich also concluded the book, was o f the first page o f the
m anuscript-returning the reader to the beginning o f the book (1970, 219). While the
narrative m oves all over in tim e within chapters, the chapters them selves progress
chronologically, only to w rap the reader back around in time at the end o f the book—
thus, ultim ately, creating a type o f circular form o f unity or wholeness and defying
conventional linearity that has a definite beginning and end.
The wandering structure o f Stein's narrative tracks the wandering o f her m ind as
she remembers. Beyond this, however, it reveals the influence o f culture on her
identity, which was a constant issue for Stein. Specifically in the autobiographies.
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Stein's first-hand know ledge o f science, exposure to technology, and personal
involvement in the avant-garde art community all affect her and, as a result, determine
how she presents, or rather creates herself in writing.
In part because she was in a position o f economic privilege, Stein was able to
participate in a lifestyle few could enjoy. She was able to attend Harvard University
and Johns Hopkins M edical School at the turn o f the century—no sm all achievement,
particularly at a time when wom en were heavily excluded from such opportunities.
While at university and m edical school, she researched brain tracts for a comparative
work (Stein 1933, 81) and also studied automatic writing in psychology (Stein 1933,
78). Both o f these interests apparently influenced her writing, as she had some sense o f
the theories regarding how the brain works. Her narrative structure em ulates these
theories by providing a sense that Stein is searching and presenting stories as they enter
her mind. She does this with phrases, such as the earlier m entioned, "But to come back
to Roche," (1933,45) which guide the reader through her mental journey. The
discovery during the 1920s that the brain was in a constant electrical flux o f rhythmic
waves (Rose 1993, 78) and studies in automatic writing to m irror this wave-like motion
o f the brain are apparent in Stein's work, which jum ps from one piece o f a story to a
piece o f another as an image or bit o f information sparks her to rem em ber a different
situation.
Stein's sw itching from story to story, which is more abrupt in Everybody's
Autobiography than in her first work, demonstrates the concepts underlying nineteenthcentury nonlinear dynamics. Scientists at the time were beginning to realize how
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prevalent nonlinear dynamics is in nature, which resulted in a better understanding o f
nature and new approaches to technology that affected everyday living (Briggs and Peat
1990, 23). This discovery in science not only led to a better understanding o f nature,
but its implications affected the view o f hum an nature and identity as well. Briggs and
Peat distinguish between linear and nonlinear solutions in terms o f contem porary use:
In linear equations, the solution o f one equation allows the solver to generalize
to other solutions...nonlinear solutions tend to be stubbornly individual and
peculiar. Unlike the sm ooth curves made by students plotting linear equations in
high school math classes, plots o f nonlinear equations show breaks, loops,
recursions—all kinds o f turbulence. (1990, 24)
Nonlinear dynamics has im pacted postm odernism more profoundly than it did
m odernism. However, it still applies to Stein's period because the products o f the
equations have not changed, and Stein's texts, which also break, loop, and repeat,
exemplify nonlinear theory. She is caught in the m odem ist middle ground that
accompanies shifts in paradigm s, in this case that in science regarding order/linearity
and disorder/nonlinearity.
The effect o f nonlinear solutions on Stein's cultural paradigm is detectable in her
work where individualism and fragm entation are emphasized. This paradigm is
radically different from the paradigm s o f Augustine's and Rousseau's culture. As
discussed previously, Augustine considered him self representative o f his Christian
culture, and this belief was supported by the definitive institution o f his society, i.e., the
Church. Moving away from this direct, providential relationship o f the individual and
the whole, Rousseau felt he was a unique individual but still o f the sam e basic nature as
his community. This concept was supported by the cultural belief in linearity (and
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linear solutions, as Briggs and Peat explain, allow us to generalize an entire system
based on an entity o f that system), so we begin to see that as cultural "truths" change,
they affect and reflect the view o f hum an nature. In this vein, Stein's autobiographies
show that she is not representative o f culture, even if she would like to believe she can
speak as everyone in Everybody's Autobiography, and her individual, fragmented
identity is supported by scientific "truths" o f her time. Stein's disjointed, recursive
narrative simultaneously shows the m ovem ent o f her mind while dem onstrating how the
principles o f nonlinear dynamics in nature have changed the view o f individual identity
in her culture. No longer can the individual represent all o f society, as David Antin's
autobiographies make even clearer. Therefore, narrative structure must reflect the
individual writer so that readers may come to understand better who that individual is.
Developments in science m anifested them selves in everyday technology at the
turn o f the century in the form o f inventions such as the telephone, radio, automobile,
and airplane. These conveniences contributed to the changing face o f culture and the
m anner in which individuals fit into and functioned within society. In The
Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas, Stein references using the telephone, reading over the
radio, and driving her Ford in service for France during the war. These technological
advances eliminated geographical boundaries between Stein and her audience and
worked on the principles that would be used as m etaphors to describe the functioning
mind. Likewise, improved transportation allow ed Stein to move about m ore quickly
and to reach distant places that otherwise would have been beyond her scope. While the
autom obile allowed Stein to see her environm ent m ore quickly in passing flashes, it was
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still a nineteenth-century view o f the world. It w as not until the invention o f the
airplane that Stein in Everybody's Autobiography felt the twentieth century had arrived,
and with the new century was a corresponding art m ovem ent—C ubism —that influenced
her w riting tremendously.
In her book, Ort Picasso, Stein attributes the making o f Cubism to three factors:
First. The com position, because the way o f living had changed, the com position
o f living had extended and each thing was as im portant as any other thing.
Secondly, the faith in what the eyes were seeing...com m enced to
dim inish...[and]
Thirdly, the framing o f life, the need that a picture exist in its frame,
rem ain in its frame was over. (ed. Bum s 1970, 19)
What Stein saw as the forces that led to Cubism were the cultural changes that
distinguished the twentieth century from the nineteenth. This breakdown o f hierarchies,
elim ination o f boundaries, and questioning o f what had always been accepted as true
created the need to find a new way o f looking at the world; thus Cubism developed.
The twentieth century that Stein saw as very distinct from the nineteenth is
evident in Cubism. Contem porary art critic Gaston Diehl describes the work o f Picasso
as "sim ultaneous points o f view o f the same object o r o f fragm entation o f various
objects glanced at" (1977, 46). No longer is one conventional or expected perspective
considered to be the definitive perspective. In a culture where hierarchies have been
disrupted and traditional centers removed, unfam iliar com positions emerge. Stein
writes about the correlation between what was happening in her society and how these
changes affected the art o f the period. In On Picasso she tells a story o f when Picasso
saw a camouflaged truck and immediately referred to it as Cubism (ed. Burns 1970, 18).
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In keeping with the new century, which was marked by changing beliefs in science and
subsequent developm ents in technology, Stein believed that W orld W ar I was unique
from any previous war. A bout the structure o f the war, she com m ents, "the composition
was not a com position in which there was one m an in the centre surrounded by a lot o f
other men but a com position that had neither a beginning nor an end, a com position of
which one corner w as as important as another comer, in fact the com position o f cubism"
(ed. Burns 1970, 18-19). The unique composition o f her society in the first world war,
which she saw as Cubist, is w hat she strove to emulate in her writing. The structures o f
her autobiographies do not resemble conventional, linear narrative structures, ju st as
Cubist paintings do not look like any previous art. However, both o f these art forms do
reflect contemporary reality (Caramello 1996, 12) as seen from new perspectives
brought about by changes in scientific views, cultural beliefs, or technology, such as
airplanes.
With all these changes taking place, disrupting conventional orders and
hierarchies, Stein's work, like Cubism, may appear to lack any center or unity. Borders
may have dissipated and structures may have been rearranged, however, a desire for
order still exists, and Stein reinforces this desire even within her nonconventional
structure. In Everybody's Autobiography she describes the hum an desire for order and
how she believes she escapes this need for structure by freeing her paintings from
frames. She writes, "pictures have been imprisoned in frames, quite naturally and now
when people are all all peoples are asking to be imprisoned in organization it is quite
natural that pictures are trying to escape from the prison o f framing. For many years I
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have taken all pictures out o f their frames, I never keep them in them" (1933, 322).
Like the pictures without frames, she takes away the traditional narrative structure to
"free" her writing. However, because society is becoming m ore global and cultures are
m eshing, identity is becom ing threatened, and the human reaction is to create some line
o f definition or organization that will allow one to retain a sense o f self-identity. The
desire for traditional order, organization, and structure as seen through the resistance to
the erosion o f recognizable self-identity is the same resistance Stein sees that readers
have toward her writing, which refuses to follow traditional, recognizable narrative
structure.
Although Stein's autobiographies do not possess traditional narrative structure,
and although she proposes that she frees writing from order or structure, ultimately her
work creates an order or cohesive whole. Like her love o f the detective novel in which
"The detective, as logical force who, in solving the crime, tam es the confusion
unleashed by the mystery and therefore restores order and rationality," (Berry 1992,
146) Stein restores a sense o f order and coherence by the end o f her book, even as she
sees everything m oving in different directions. The solution to the m ystery or the whole
picture o f Gertrude Stein, like the cryptogram in Everybody's A utobiography that needs
to be decoded, is self-contained between the covers o f the text. Randa Dubnik assesses,
"Both Picasso and Stein, in their pre-1912 work, present the fleeting, fragm entary nature
o f perception, and represent the integrity o f the individual m om ent o f perception before
consolidation by mem ory into a conceptual whole" (1984, 4). Dubnik sees that Stein's
work presents a part o f the puzzle that is fully constructed only through memory; and
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although this is true, Stein's work also has a more m icro-cohesiveness within the
individual text, with its repetition and wrapping back to the beginning with photograph
arrangement. Virginia W oolf, who also presented numerous perspectives and fragments
to reflect reality more closely, writes in M om ents o f Being XhsA "It is only by putting it
into words that I make it whole...it gives m e...great delight to put the severed parts
together" (1940, 72). W hereas Stein does not concede to wanting to create a unified
whole, her autobiographies do exactly that—a point that makes her w riting distinctly
modern, as opposed to the postm odern work o f David Antin that is discussed in the next
two chapters.
The overall narrative structure o f Stein's autobiographies supports the idea that
humans are time-em bedded creatures and reinforces the desire for a unified, cohesive
whole, while the internal structure reflects the idea that the world is m oving in every
direction. The narrative structure in total, then, presents a view o f the se lf that is
particularly twentieth century—the fragm ented nature and repetition resem bling the
viewing o f a Cubist painting, with the eye m oving over the canvas, hitting the same
object many times in relation to different things each time. This structure reinforces the
notion that the self m ust be seen from a com pletely new perspective, influenced by
different borders and rem oved from traditional hierarchies or roles (as W oolf said,
human relations had all changed). W o o lf gives distinct perspectives o f the same event
or person; Cubism breaks apart the expected composition o f an object; and Stein
reveals a piece o f a story several times in a slightly new way each time out o f the
expected chronological order. All o f these approaches force viewers to step back, to
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"see again" for the first time, because the self as it once was no longer exists. This
approach more realistically represents the se lf in conjunction with or in response to the
early twentieth-century western world. However, all o f these approaches also attem pt to
m ake a whole out o f the pieces, to give the artist and viewer a sense o f cohesiveness and
order which does not exist in nature. Because this order must be created, attem pts to do
so always are inadequate and will be abandoned later by the postm odern artists, who,
unlike the modernists, embrace the nonlinearity o f nature.

Remembering and presenting information: the influence of literary trends,
science, brain research, and communication on Stein's writing style as
representation of memory
Stein's economic privilege afforded her opportunities that ultimately influenced not only
what she wrote but how she wrote, which is generally the focus o f studies regarding her
work. As a university student she was involved in studies o f automatic writing as well
as o f the brain. At the beginning o f the century, when she was in medical school,
numerous theories regarding the w orking o f the brain were developing. For example, in
1875 experimentation on the exposed brain o f a rabbit revealed that there were electrical
pulses in the brain (Rose 1993, 180). This finding led to the 1929 published w ork by
Hans Berger in which he taped electrodes to the hum an scalp and recorded continuous
bursts o f electricity pulsing through the brain. Berger's work was soon followed by
neurophysiologists Edgar Adrian and Brian M atthews, who in the 1930s determined
that "the brain's ceaseless electrical activity showed characteristic waveforms that varied
with sleep and wakefulness, m ental activity or tranquility" (Rose 1993, 180). These
studies are representative o f the work that took place in brain research during the period
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in which Stein was also involved in the discipline. O f primary interest here is the
pervasive theory that the brain is a system in constant electrical flux. The notion o f
electrical flux is key, as it influenced the technologies o f the day, as well as the
m etaphors used to describe the way in which the brain operates.
In addition to invasive studies on the electric and chemical reactions in the brain,
psychologists during the first part o f the century were studying m em ory and automatic
writing. By 1935 m ore than 200 studies had been published exploring the difference
between childhood memory, which is eidetic (photographic or tim eless), and adult
m emory, which is linear and time-bound (Rose 1993, 103-104). The way in which the
brain rem em bers and translates that mem ory into language was studied in automatic
writing. Stein's work is often described as an example o f autom atic writing, and in
Everybody's Autobiography Stein addresses this very point. She touches upon a
newspaper article in which her writing is described as automatic writing, and she
dism isses the theory, saying, "No. W riting should be very exact and one must realize
what there is inside in one and then in some way it com es into words and the more
exactly the words fit the emotion the more beautiful the words that is what does happen
and anybody who knows anything knows that thing" (1937, 275). This sentence, which
is typical o f Stein's style, while dismissing autom atic writing at the same time aims to
create a sense o f the mind in motion, o f the language bubbling to the surface and
coming out o f the pen. And while the content o f the sentence refuses to support the idea
that it is com pletely automatic writing, the style contradicts that refusal, actually seems
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far from being language that simmered inside her head until it cam e out o f the pen exact
and perfect.
In The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas, she often thinks through a mem ory on
the page as with the passage, "Who was there. W e were there...and perhaps Marcelle
Braque but this I do not remember" (1933, 106). Passages such as this are far from
conveying perfected, exact thought, but are close to representing Stein's m ind searching
for the memory at that very m om ent in front o f the page and reader. N o doubt when
language is restructured to represent most closely the em otion it hopes to convey, it is
most beautiful and perfect; but even Stein (who insists she does not correct, but
sometimes cuts a little [1937, 320]) must edit to give the sense o f language evolving in
her head—which if not in total is still the basic idea behind autom atic writing.
The work that was being conducted by scientists and psychologists at the turn o f
the century was also evident in the technologies o f the period. Inventions involving
electric currents, such as telegraphs, telephones, and radios, resulted from the work in
the sciences and, in turn, were used as metaphors, such as the telephone exchange
metaphor described previously, to explain more sim ply to nonscientists the way in
which the brain worked. W hile these metaphors continued to reduce explanations to
basically linear procedures, the idea o f currents and waves that was dom inating science
was beginning to be explored by avant-garde artists as well, who were very interested in
capturing movem ent in their works. Virginia W oolf in M oments o f Being goes so far as
to describe what she calls her m ost im portant m emory as one o f listening to waves, and
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she writes o f this m em ory with the same rhythm that the waves originally had as their
sound moved through her senses and brain and into her memory. The passage reads:
If life has a base that it stands upon, if it is a bowl that one fills and fills and
fills—then m y bowl w ithout a doubt stands upon this m em ory. It is o f lying h alf
asleep, h alf awake, in bed in the nursery at St. Ives. It is o f hearing the waves
breaking, one, two, one, two, and sending a splash o f w ater over the beach; and
then breaking, one, two, one, two, behind a yellow blind. (1940, 64)
The rhythm o f waves m oving over the beach, pulsing through the brain, carrying the
reader through the text ties together the modernists' interest in capturing m ovem ent in
their work while using the metaphors from science that explain the m otion o f the brain.
This interest in rhythm , o f waves moving, be it in nature or w riting or the brain, is
evident in all o f W oolfs writing; the bowl that gives one her identity, i.e., memory,
which fills and fills as waves o f experiences move through the senses, is the foundation
o f life that makes any m eaning possible.
In keeping with the fascination with waves and motion, artists were also
influenced by other technological advances at the time, such as autom obiles and
airplanes. Just as seeing the ground from the air provided a tw entieth-century
perspective that related to the changing decentralized com position o f artworks, such as
in Cubism and Stein's m odern texts, modes o f transportation affected the pace o f
society, which Stein and her contemporaries tried to capture through their writing style
and brush stroke. She often refers to walking—how much she enjoys walking and how
much she walks every evening. In writing about her walking, she attem pts to
reconstruct the rhythm o f her walking and the way in which the w orld moves around her
as she wanders and thinks. Her sentences tend to be lengthy and fluid, reemphasizing
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the point she m akes while walking with Thom ton Wilder: "we talked about writing and
telling anything and I said...I had really written thinking" (1937, 311). Unlike the
autobiographers who preceded her and who had as the center or focus o f their text some
great conversion or life revelation, Stein believes her autobiography merely shows her
thinking, not her life. As Virginia W oolf points out, however, showing her thinking,
what makes one who one is, is the only way to understand who som eone is to any
degree whatsoever. In her ow n autobiography, W oolf writes:
Here 1 come to one o f the m em oir writer's difficulties—one o f the reasons why,
though I read so m any, so many are failures. They leave out the person to whom
things happened. The reason is that it is so difficult to describe any human
being. So they say: "This is what happened"; but they do not say what the
person was like to whom it happened. And the events m ean very little unless we
know first to whom they happened. ( 1940, 65)
By W oolfs account, then, Stein's autobiographies, detailing the way in which Stein
assimilates information and events, reveal far more successfully who Stein is than does
an autobiography in which m ere stories are related. Regardless o f what Stein's original
purpose may have been, the second autobiography continues to show her thinking, and
jum ps even more abruptly from thought to thought than the first text, which also
indicates the increasingly disjointed nature o f a technologically advanced, faster-paced
mid-1930s society.
Stein's interest in capturing the m ovem ent o f the world developed as she becam e
disenchanted with attem pts to represent the inside character o f people. In The
Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas she writes, "it was during that sum m er [in Granada]
that she first felt a desire to express the rhythm o f the visible world. It was a long
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tormenting process, she looked, listened and described. She always was, she always is,
tormented by the problem o f the external and the internal" (1933, 119). Her desire is to
capture the rhythm o f the world, to show that, like the world, "she has a great deal o f
inertia and once started keeps going until she starts somewhere else" (1933, 82). This
inertia drives her text, like she drives her Ford, forward to a new beginning, a different
way o f viewing or describing an event.
Stein's abandonment o f representing the inside character o f people and
subsequent interest in demonstrating twentieth-century movement resulted in her
recursive texts, as well as her further adm iration for the visual artists o f her time. As
previously discussed, she had great respect for Picasso's Cubist work as structural
representations o f a society with a new, decentered composition. H er fellowship with
other painters and writers also influenced her work. Echoing Stein's words regarding
the existence o f movement in every direction in the twentieth century (Berry 1992, 140141) was the observation o f her contem porary, French poet Blaise Cendrars, who said,
"everything around me moves" (ed. A uster 1984, xxxv) and who tried to convey the
feeling o f a single m om ent in his poems.
As technology improves, providing more efficient m odes o f transportation and
communication, the pace at which society operates and information travels increases.
The speed at which the external world m oves affects the internal processing o f the brain,
which is forced to accept and assim ilate new quantities and types o f inform ation as
quickly and intermittently as it is presented. Stein gives the reader the impression of
how information travels to and through her brain as it is first introduced to her and as
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she tries to rem em ber it as she writes. In her attem pt to present her working memory to
the reader, she writes lengthy, fluid sentences w ithout m uch punctuation so that she may
convey the feeling o f the event she is describing. F or example, in Everybody's
Autobiography she tells the following story:
We had a quarrel and I was not expecting to see him, it was very easy seeing
him everything being in confusion, I said and how did you come, oh Carley is
outside in the car, we were o f course not seeing him , we had completely
quarreled with him, so I went outside the gate and once more kissed Francis and
thanked him and shook hands w ith Carley, but did not stop not seeing him, and
then we had lunch and then we sent Jean and the Polish w om an away, she said
she had not com e to be as happy as she hoped to have been but then she was
certain it never could happen that she could com e to be happy again and then
Janet and her friend left Janet never does believe in staying, and the other two
the Frenchwom an and the Englishwom an left and there we were once more
looking for servants to have come in the house without our knowing anything
about them. (64)
The passage, the length o f a full paragraph, is a single sentence with sparse punctuation
that requires several readings for clarity. By the end o f the sentence, Stein has used
rhythm, length, and language successfully to create an atm osphere o f confusion and
exhaustion to reflect the content o f the passage. In this instance her writing style, as
Dubnik points out, conveys "a sense o f process and duration, and o f the time it takes to
know a person or understand an idea" (1984, 9). It is as if Stein were aiming to create a
sense o f what is referred to as real time, i.e., the actual time it takes for an idea to move
through the brain as represented by the time it takes to read her words.
In trying to show another way in which the brain absorbs information, she uses a
fragmented writing style to show the speed at which inform ation travels in her society.
W hen she abruptly changes topics or leaves ideas unfinished only to return to them
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later, especially in Everybody's Autobiography, she creates the feeling o f driving or
flying, with images speeding past her. She cannot get all o f her story out fast enough, as
she begins so many passages with one idea and ends them with, "but all that will come
much later," (1937, 2) prom pting the reader to expect m ore o f the tale to unfold later,
but also creating a sense o f urgency, o f being unable to say all she wants to say as it
comes back to her. She tries to create the sense o f sim ultaneous com m unication
reflective o f the new reality o f the twentieth century that postm odern writers later will
develop m ore com pletely in their work.

The modern self in Stein's autobiographies
As the pace at which the world operated changed due to new technologies and scientific
perspectives, the role o f the individual in that society changed as well. Rousseau's The
Confessions showed that the self was already becoming m ultifaceted as a result o f
secularization. Henry Adam s' autobiography further developed this idea, speaking o f
the self in num erous persons and addressing the difficulty o f trying to be one consistent
being in m any varied professional, social, and private situations. By the time Stein
composed her autobiographies, the perception o f the self had fragm ented to the point
that reassem bling the fragm ents had become the very subject o f m any works produced
by m odern artists, as evidenced in Cubist paintings and in the poetry o f writers such as
Pierre Reverdy, who synthesized fragments to form an image that he felt was "pure
creation o f the mind" (A uster 1984, xxxv). Likewise, V irginia W oolf in her
autobiography, as m entioned previously, used her w riting to assem ble the severed parts
o f her life into a whole story (1940, 72).
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Stein certainly w rote her autobiographies in this vein, providing readers with
fragments and perspectives that together created a sense o f Stein's world, which was
completed in the text even i f in reality it lacked cohesion. She m entions in The
Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas that the fragments o f The M aking o f Am ericans when
placed together produced a cohesive, whole view o f otherwise unrelated people (1933,
249). In a sim ilar manner, both The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas and Everybody's
Autobiography present a collection o f stories and insights that alone m ay seem almost
trivial but when considered w ith eveiything else in the text provide a Gertrude Stein for
that particular text.
On Stein's use o f autobiography as a genre, the critic S. C. N eum an comments,
"Stein specifically sets herself against the tradition o f the composite portrait" and does
not attempt to trace continuity in the self (1979, 16). While Stein sets herself against
the traditional autobiographies that preceded her, she does not, as N eum an believes she
does, abandon the notion o f continuity in the self completely. She, like her
contemporaries, attem pts to create, not represent, a continuity, or sense o f a complete
self, that derives from many perspectives in the text. In her cryptogram in Everybody's
Autobiography, the words m ust be decoded by the reader to reveal a comprehensible
message. This whole m ust be formed out o f the pieces and is a fabrication o f the artist
(whose work is com pleted, in part, by the reader), perpetuating the cultural desire for
order. A more accurate representation o f the fragmented self would not com e until the
postmodern artists finally reject the attempt to restructure the fragments o f the self into a
false whole.
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Improvements in technology contributed largely to changes in culture which
demanded that individuals become m ore multifaceted in their social, professional, and
personal roles. It is virtually im possible to read Stein's autobiographies w ithout
noticing her interest in how the technology o f the twentieth century m ade all areas o f
the world more accessible. W hile this was, indeed, an advance in term s o f
com munication, human relations, and experiencing the world in general, it also brought
with it a loss o f distinct com m unities or boundaries. And when boundaries disappear,
individual identity is threatened. Stein addresses this point in Everybody's
Autobiography. Regarding the difference in perspective between com posing The
M aking o f Americans and Everybody's Autobiography, she writes:
At that time I did not realize that the earth is completely covered over with every
one. In a way it was not then because every one was in a group and a group was
separated from every other one, and so the character o f every one was interesting
because they were in relation but now since the earth is all covered over with
every one there is really no relation between any one and so if this Everybody's
Autobiography is to be the Autobiography o f every one it is not to be o f any
connection between any one and any one because now there is none. ( 102)
As technology provides the means by which different cultures may be joined, the
boundaries between those cultures fade. As boundaries disappear, the need to maintain
a sense o f individual identity, o f self-preservation, forces the individual to create new
lines o f definition that make that person unique in a more homogeneous, secular world
(Daniel Dennett 1991, 174).
Unlike in Augustine's Christian com m unity where the individual was at ease
being a microcosm o f his community, Stein's secular society encouraged its m embers to
make their own individual marks. M aking one's mark becomes more challenging as the
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world becomes inereasingly hom ogeneous. The publisher's note in Everybody's
A utobiography says, "Stein transform s herself into the representative American, turning
her story into everybody's story" (1937, viii). W hile this m ay sound like a neatly
packaged transition at first, Stein is hardly representative o f any typical American. At
some point throughout the text, readers may identify with a particular part o f Stein;
however, it is improbable that many Am ericans at all have experienced her privilege o f
being independently wealthy, highly educated, openly lesbian (and, therefore, allowed
to forgo the constraining social custom o f m arriage to a man), and associated with
influential circles o f artists and political leaders. She m entions having tea with
President and Mrs. Roosevelt (1937, 264) as if it were alm ost commonplace, which is
an indication either o f her arrogance or o f her ignorance o f how most "typical" people
really do live.
Aware o f the breakdown in cultural boundaries, Stein strove to find and
maintain a sense o f individual identity in her w orld while accepting that her identity was
increasingly intertwined with the influences around her. As she puts it in Everybody's
Autobiography, "the world is getting all filled up with people and they all do the same
thing" (1937, 46). I f everyone does the same thing, differentiating the interchangeable
becomes more difficult (Caramello 1996, 134). In The Autobiography o f Alice B.
Toklas, Stein presents numerous stories about Picasso, Apollinaire, Matisse, as well as
many other artists and friends specific to the life o f Gertrude Stein. Her sense o f what
composes an autobiography is farther reaching than that o f Augustine or Rousseau,
whose stories were always in some direct w ay about themselves. By expanding the
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boundary o f what is considered to be appropriate for her autobiography, Stein sends the
message that this circle o f friends—the art and literary com m unity o f Paris during W orld
W ar I—is who she is. This extension is necessary to defining Gertrude Stein. The idea
o f the self as existing in any way other than as a part o f all that surrounds her is not
plausible.
As the param eters o f what is considered to be autobiography expanded in Stein's
twentieth-century society, the position o f the self within those param eters split and
shifted, disrupting the traditional center or focus o f the life story as seen in works like
Augustine's and Rousseau's. Certainly, each person was still the center o f her own
existence. However, unlike in A ugustine's and Rousseau's texts where every story was
strictly about them , Stein's autobiographies position her alongside many other people.
She shares space in her autobiography with the people in her life, and the portraits o f
these other people do not necessarily have to have meaning for Stein or reveal anything
about her at all. In her autobiographies, these other lives are im portant in their own
right.
Like a Cubist painting in which fam iliar objects are dism antled and reassem bled
from a new perspective to allow the view er to see again for the first time, Stein
dism antles the conventional autobiographical form and reassem bles it with
discontinuous parts o f stories from m any people's lives. She calls her studies o f her
friends "portraits," (1933, 114) and by dispersing bits o f them throughout the text next
to stories about herself, she creates a type o f coherency that is based on recurring
them es and that is dependent on the text. W ithout the text, there would be no unity—

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

98
there would be only random fragments o f stories. By using this technique, Stein forces
the reader to reevaluate expectations concerning autobiography and what com poses the
self. She is m aking us see the self from a new perspective—m uch like a Cubist painting
or landscape from the air—that is outside o f ourselves and that attem pts to encompass
the many varied roles o f the self.
As Stein shows in her autobiographies, to represent the self as the sole focus o f
the text is no longer possible or reasonable. To be more realistic, the self m ust be
presented as part o f a m ore global community. Stein writes in Everybody's
Autobiography that when she com posed The M aking o f Am ericans she started with a
history o f her family, then expanded it to a history of everyone her family knew, and
then expanded it further to be a history o f everyone (1937, 113). The inclusion o f a
more global com m unity as the story o f one's life indicates how the growing
communication technology o f the early twentieth century had made the world more
accessible. As a result, once unfam iliar cultures and people were now integral to
defining individual identity and had to be acknowledged as part o f one's own personal
history. This is not to say the self is a microcosm o f the com m unity or world, as it was
in Augustine's culture. As philosopher-scientist Bart Kosko describes in his book Fuzzy
Thinking: The N ew Science o f Fuzzy Logic, "Every whole contains its parts...But in
general the part differs from the whole. Here the part cannot totally contain the whole.
But it always partially contains the whole" (1993, 58). The pieces o f the self that Stein
presents do, in part, contain what defines Gertrude Stein, but none o f the pieces can
contain a representation o f all that defines Stein. Again, like a Cubist painting, each
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piece holds som ething o f Stein and reveals something quite different each tim e it is
considered in respect to another piece o f information or perspective. The parts are split
and dispersed, elim inating the conventional center o f self and forging a new one, i.e.,
the art work itself.
Bringing the pieces o f the self together in the text as a way to create a whole
picture o f the self at the time o f writing reflects the fragmented nature o f early
twentieth-century society while it also reflects the desire for order in hum an nature. The
problem with this m odem approach is that it still promotes linearity, which contradicts
all that had been discovered in science at the time. In a nonlinear world, the parts do not
add up to the whole. However, it is human nature to try to force a linear m odel on a
nonlinear world (Kosko 1993, 108). Although the avant-garde works o f the m odem
artists at first appear to reject linearity because they break from nonconventional
presentation o f linear order, they still, nonetheless, achieve the same result—a completed
whole. Writers and artists such as Stein recognized that the self w as actually
fragmented and developed in a nonlinear manner; however, trapped in the gap between
reality and desire, they still attempted to force a linear model o f "the parts add up to the
whole" in their works. These artists have made steps to reflect the society around them
by breaking objects into pieces, but all o f the pieces come together to create a false
whole in the work.

Language as more than a tool of communication
The inadequacy o f language in the writer's quest to find ju st the right way in which to
convey meaning has been addressed by all o f the autobiographers in this study.
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Undoubtedly, this issue is o f great im portance to all writers but is particularly a focus
for writers who grapple w ith defining and revealing the self in their work. Augustine
and Rousseau, as m entioned previously, were both concerned with ensuring that readers
understood their intentions. R ousseau was som ewhat distraught over the fact that he
believed no one would ever understand who he was no m atter how he said things in his
book; therefore, he felt he w ould be m isjudged by society. However, he continued
trying to convey his inner em otions, hoping to be understood, but ultim ately aware o f
his failure in this venture.
The possibility o f representing the inside to the outside became m ore critical to
modern writers as they reacted to the se lf splintering further in a grow ing technological
and secular society. Henry Adams m arked a turn in autobiography w riting in that he
departed from Rousseau's approach o f attem pting to reveal the self by laboriously
describing one's inner emotions. Instead, he wrote o f the exterior, o f the universe that
had contributed to the developm ent o f the m any sides o f Henry Adams. Through
understanding the world that acted upon Adams, the hope is that the reader will, in turn,
recognize some o f those influences and experiences, assim ilate them onto her own
schema, and then arrive at som e level o f knowing who Adam s may be beyond his public
face.
Likewise, Stein's concern w ith what she called the inside and the outside was so
great that she wrote about it specifically and at length in both o f the autobiographies. In
The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas she m entions her interest in "mixing the outside
with the inside" (1933, 156) and how in Tender Buttons "she began to describe the
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inside as seen from the outside" (156). She, like m any writers, however, found that it
was virtually impossible to translate clearly the inside to the outside. The attem pt to
describe either in tem is o f the other was as futile as trying to represent a painting in
music; the two mediums are not reducible to each other's terms. She had come upon
the same problem o f defining the inner self to outside people with which other
autobiographers had struggled. H er contem porary, Virginia Woolf, wrote in her
autobiography about the difficulty o f m aking one's self understood, o f describing the
hum an being to whom things happened, and, therefore, conveying the im plications o f
personal experiences (1940, 211). In the same vein, Stein argues in Everybody's
Autobiography that everyone likes m echanics because they can only m ean one thing to
everyone, whereas everything else (e.g., em otions) has a different meaning for every
individual. She writes, "nobody m eans the same thing by what they say as the other one
m eans and only the one who is talking thinks he means what he is saying even though
he knows very well that that is not what he is saying" (1937, 299). Even as one is
uttering the words to describe the inside, she is conscious that the language is failing
and the meaning is distorted.
Realizing the certain failure in trying to describe the inside in term s o f the
outside, and "possessed by the intellectual passion for exactitude in the description o f
inner and outer reality," Stein broke from "associational em otion in poetry and prose"
and embraced, instead, the "exact reproduction o f either an outer or an inner reality"
(Stein 1933, 211). N either em otions nor their results should be either the cause or
material o f writing. This clinical attitude toward writing resem bles the objective.
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detailed approach toward description in the sciences with which Stein was intimate.
H er insistence on keeping the inside and outside separate, as she says in Everybody's
Autobiography, m aintains their unique functions and by doing so makes it necessary for
the self, w hatever that is, to exist as the vessel between the two (1937, 271-272).
Establishing distinction in order to m aintain identity or selfhood parallels Stein's
com m ent regarding the dissipation o f geographical borders as global communication
technology improved, making it necessary to find and assert one's uniqueness in a
society where everyone seems interchangeable.
Stein's effort to establish objectivity and m aintain the distinction between the
inside and the outside translated into the distancing o f the narrative voice from the
subject's life described in her autobiography. However, she is not the first writer to
address the difficulty in describing a self that is constantly changing and, therefore,
indefinable. Prior to Stein, Henry Adams attem pted to establish objectivity in
representing the m ultisided, changing self by writing his autobiography in the third
person. For Adams, when he considers how his existence is reflected in his memory, he
sees many forces and perspectives o f Henry Adams, but he does not, cannot, see the self
or 1 o f the present moment. As a result, Adams refers to him self as Henry Adams, the
boy, he, one, the secretary, the traveler, and so on, but never as 1, myself, or me. The
voice he uses in the text reinforces both the reality that m em ory recalls a past self that
no longer exists in the present and the notion that because the inner self cannot be
conveyed adequately in the language o f the outside, the w riter may as well speak o f
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one's own life as an outsider would, because when looking at our past selves that is
ultim ately what we are anyway.
Adams' use o f the third person when talking about him self provided a way in
which the autobiographer could attempt to view his own life objectively, without the
em otion o f the internal experience coloring the description o f the outside. Taking
Adams' approach even further, Stein, in The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas, writes
about herself in the third person and behind the screen o f another person as narrator
altogether. In addition to letting Stein ignore inform ation that she does not want to
reveal to readers, writing in the voice o f Toklas provides Stein the distance o f an
objective external voice. Using this technique, she writes about the outside from the
outside, like a scientist, eliminating the problem o f inept translations she had found in
trying to write about the inside from the outside.
Even in Everybody's Autobiography when she drops the voice o f Toklas, she
continues the search for identity and the attem pt to give language to that which has no
language. Assum ing her own voice, she describes the life o f Gertrude Stein as
objectively or clinically as an external narrator by providing pieces o f stories as if she
had merely turned on a recorder and absorbed all that was occurring around her.
(Actually, some postm odern artists do take this very approach in their experimental
writings; however, the recorder was not yet available when Stein was writing.)
Neuman sees Everybody's Autobiography as the fusion o f theoiy and practice in that,
"Both its subject and its form are the 'human mind.' 'Hum an m inds,' lacking identity
contact rather than relate to things" (1979, 47). Because o f its alm ost postmodern
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structure, Stein's second autobiography feels even more detached from the inside o f
Gertrude Stein than the first. The second book does, however, create a picture o f how
Gertrude Stein's m ind processes the information and stimuli around her, even if she is
unable to give appropriate language to the effect that the inform ation and stimuli have
on the self. Readers may see how a hum an mind in the twentieth century reacts to the
increasing pace o f society, but they also see that giving language to the internal changes
that occur in reaction to society remains an unresolved problem for writers. Readers
also get the sense that the inability to describe the inside is not entirely the shortcom ing
o f language, but that it is not possible to describe effectively that which is not
completely understood. W hat is the self remains a universal unanswered question, and
for Stein, even after probing the issue from numerous perspectives, voices, and persons,
she still comes up unsatisfied in the end—reduced to the point o f saying, "perhaps I am
not I even if my little dog knows me" (1937, 328).
Stein's attem pt to capture the m otion o f the mind is the closest she brings readers
to any representation o f the inside. While critic Ellen Berry (1992) argues that the
fragmented nature o f Stein's narrative is postmodern, it actually aligns itself more with
Cubism in that the artist's aim is for the fragments ultimately to com pose a whole—an
idea fundamentally m odem , not postmodern. Many critics, and Stein herself in her
autobiographies, have discussed the connection between Cubism or art in general and
Stein's writing (Bridgm an 1970; Burns 1970; Caramello 1996; Dubnik 1984). In
Everybody's Autobiography, Stein acknowledges her adm iration for the work o f the
French poets, Cézanne, and the Cubists. Cézanne, she says, had the ability to paint "a
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feeling o f m ovem ent inside the painting not a painting o f a thing m oving but the thing
painted having inside it the existence o f movement" (1937, 321). H er ow n writing
conveys a sense o f walking or flying in the world or thinking through an idea and
arriving at a new place or epiphany at the same time that the pen does. Likewise, she
felt that by destroying the centralization o f com position the Cubists "would arrive at
m ovem ent being existing" (1937, 321).
W hen trying to convey a sense o f movem ent that corresponds with twentieth
century culture, the visual arts prove m ore adept at sim ultaneously presenting
information. Dubnik argues "that in painting, the isolated fragm ents are seen almost
sim ultaneously, and each bit o f visual information remains on the canvas while the
mind reconstructs the entity portrayed. Reading goes much m ore slowly. Images are
presented serially, and the entity portrayed appears less im mediately than in painting"
(1984, 24-25). Because painting is able to present images sim ultaneously and because,
as stated previously, the m ovem ent o f the eye allows the viewer to see a distinct image
in relation to other different im ages numerous times, it surpasses writing as a medium
for conveying the feeling o f the twentieth century. Stein knew this, but, as she was a
writer and not a painter, her challenge was to im itate in her writing, which is a very
linear medium, as closely as possible, the effect o f painting, which could be a nonlinear
medium. In what w as surely a lim itation o f language, Stein tried to realize potential.
To create a feeling o f m ovem ent in her writing, she went beyond the use o f a disjointed
narrative structure and long fluid sentences. She used language itself, in conjunction
with structure and style, to construct a version o f the hum an m ind in motion.
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Stein's use o f plain language in unusual linguistic constructions is directly linked
to the ideas in Cubism o f capturing m ovem ent in the w ork and seeing familiar images
new, as for the first time. These ideas were present in the works o f avant-garde artists in
the early twentieth century, as Ezra Pound called for artists to "make it new." Literary
theorists Robert Con Davis and Ronald Schleifer in describing the m otivation o f
Formalism write:
Since language is a medium o f com m unication before it is used in art, its
expressions and conventions inevitably will be overly familiar to the reader and
too feeble to have a fresh or significant impact in a poem. To be made new and
poetically useful, such language m ust be "defamiliarized" and "made strange"
through linguistic displacement, which means deploying language in an unusual
context or effecting its presentation in a novel way. (1989, 20)
Stein and the Cubists were both accused o f producing compositions that did not look
like reality, when, if fact, these works came closer to contemporary reality and nature
because o f their shattered, decentered form than any work that presented a false,
continuous whole (Caramello 1996, 12).
Wliat critics and readers considered to be Stein's lack o f clarity in her writing
(Stein 1933, 35) was actually a way for Stein to show language as more than only a tool
o f communication. By taking away standard punctuation and word order, Stein forces
readers to see language in unexpected com binations and to reread even the simplest o f
words for comprehension and subtleties in m eaning when the same words or phrases are
considered in relation to a slightly different com bination. Readers have to view each
word in relation to what precedes and follows it, often backtracking in an attempt to
pick up Stein's intention. This both causes the readers to see language new again, as if
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they are ju st learning to read, and provides an alternative to the strictly linear (or serial)
m ethod o f reading. Stein's built-in repetition o f ideas along with the readers' going back
and forth to reread adds a circular type o f progression to the text. I f not entirely
circular, the aim o f the text certainly is to be nonlinear or recursive, like the m ovem ent
o f the mind. In this, even though writing can never present sim ultaneous images as
effectively as visual art can, Stein still manages to give a new dim ension to writing—
thus raising the potential o f language beyond the inadequate com m unication o f the
inside.

Forging the self through memory and writing style to reflect cultural constructs
Like the ground-breaking autobiographers before her, Stein uses writing style to present
a picture o f a self that aims to be both representative o f society and unique at the same
time. In Stein's case, the self is forged rather than reproduced in the text. To create the
Gertrude Stein w ho appears in The Autobiography o f A lice B. Toklas and Everybody's
Autobiography, Stein tracks the working o f her mind as it functions in early twentiethcentury culture. Unlike her predecessors, however, she does not choose to write in an
already popular literary genre, but, instead, leads the literary world by creating a style
com parable to the com positions in other avant-garde art works that responded to the
changing culture. Because these forms were avant-garde, they met w ith great resistance
when introduced into society, as Stein tells about critics mocking and scratching at the
paint o f a M atisse w ork that they did not understand (1933, 35). These forms, as we
know now, becam e standards for art and later proved to reveal more about
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contemporary culture than conventional forms, which were out o f touch with the day's
accepted scientific ideas and technology.
Stein's autobiographies indicate that the literary theories prom inent in what
would become know n as the m odernist period were sim ilar to ideas in other fields, such
as art, science, and com m unication technology. The theories and ideas from these
various disciplines (specifically those regarding nonlinearity in nature, electrom agnetic
currents, and the decentralization o f established hierarchies) affected the role o f the
individual in society and, in turn, how that individual defined selfhood. In the literary
community, groups that would be term ed the m odernists, R ussian Form alists, and New
Critics had their own philosophies that often contradicted one another. Regardless o f
where each group stood on the specifics o f issues, the fact that between them they
incited a dialogue on coherence, order, and unity challenged long-held cultural beliefs
and called into question conventional hierarchies. W hile the literary com m unity was
doing its part to raise social awareness o f changes in cultural constructs o f "truth," it
was sharing com pany with art m ovem ents such as Cubism and Surrealism , which also
reflected the decentering o f established hierarchies and prevailing recognition that
nature is nonlinear. These ideas, as discussed earlier, resulted directly from discoveries
in science (such as nonlinear dynam ics and electricity) and the technologies that were
then developed using this knowledge (electrical appliances, telephones, radios,
automobiles, and airplanes for example).
The many changes in the m ake-up o f society that, in part, resulted from new
perspectives in science and developm ents in technology naturally affected the view o f
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the self and how writers expressed that self. By working backwards (as with memory)
and examining how the self is presented in Stein's autobiographies, we can see the
effects that the changes in culture had on the self. W hat is o f partieular interest in this
study is that the changes taking place in society did cause artists to be more
introspective and to reveal that introspection in their work. This was a move away from
nineteenth-century fictional novels and representational or external-to-the-self painting.
In Everybody's A utobiography Stein tells o f a conversation with Dashiell Hammett
during which they discussed how in the nineteenth century, men created interesting
characters in literature but wom en always seemed to make their characters mere
reproductions o f them selves (1937, 34). However in the twentieth century, she says, the
men, too, only write about themselves, and she asks Hamm ett why he him self does this.
His response is that when writers have confidence they can m ake other people in their
work, but when they have no confidence, as in the twentieth century, they cannot make
other people because they need to hold on to themselves. W hat Stein and Hammett
leave unsaid but understood is the reason men lost confidence in the twentieth century.
W omen—like any m inority who, for the m ost part, were traditionally excluded from the
literary com m unity—when they were able to write needed to assert their own existence
before they could even consider creating another character. For centuries, they had not
been in positions o f privilege that would allow them to exam ine and determ ine who
they were and, therefore, were not ready to create another; they first needed to create
themselves. Likewise, in the twentieth century with the onset o f two world wars and
changes in science and technology, all contributing to a shift in cultural hierarchies and
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social roles, all notions o f the self, including men's, became unstable. Because the "I"
was no longer a singular, centered entity, as Rousseau began to address in The
Confessions, the autobiographer needed to find the "I" through writing, through
gathering the pieces in m em ory and assembling them into what could be labeled a
whole person.
In attempting to create a whole person, Stein writes about what she calls the
inside and the outside and that, because both are necessary to the formation o f the whole
self, they must be kept separate and distinct. Although she theorized that she could
keep the inside and outside separate when describing one or the other, they affect and
change one another beyond hum an control. While the external world affects what we
can do and how we can respond to its effects, our minds create and influence what
occurs in the external world. The self acts more like a permeable m em brane than a solid
barrier or "vessel" between the two, and mem ory is necessary to translate information
between the internal and external. The com bination o f internal and external factors
assembled by the faculty o f mem ory forges what we call our identity or self. As
Richard Terdiman points out, mem ory is "the means by which the coherence o f our
identity and our history is constructed and sustained" (1993, vii). W hat type o f
coherency is possible in twentieth-century culture, as we have seen, is at best limited
and is at least unconventional. O f note, though, is Terdiman's recognition that
coherence and identity are constructions, not representations, o f the writers. Stein, as
we know from previous discussions, was very interested in identity but was never able
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to determine satisfactorily what identity was, although she did construct a com position
o f the self that reflected the com position o f a fractured culture.
Stein's disjointed narrative m im ics the nonlinear order o f nature and the
fragmented manner in which actions and inform ation from the world enter Stein's
senses. Likewise, the fluid style o f her writing parallels scientific theories regarding the
brain, with the developm ent o f biochem istry and the resulting finding that the brain is in
ceaseless electrical flux (Rose 1993, 78). The determ ination that nature is actually
nonlinear led writers to reconsider the developm ent o f the self, as well. In Everybody's
Autobiography Stein writes about the relationship between the developm ent o f the self,
time, and memory:
I meditated a good deal about how to yourself you were yourself at any m om ent
that you were there to you inside you but that any moment back you could only
remember yourself you could not feel yourself and I therefore began to think that
insofar as you were yourself to yourself there was no feeling o f tim e inside you
you only had the sense o f tim e when you remembered yourself (1937, 307)
In this passage we see the path o f her thinking as she questions whether the self is
actually aware o f the construct o f time. Her arrival at the answer that the self is only
aware o f time when we use memory to situate it in a particular time supports the idea
that the self, like nature, does not develop linearly but, rather, in circular loops and
jum ps—just as the brain works and her writing reflects. She is showing the creation and
developm ent o f a self. Her writing style also captures the rhythms o f the world, o f Stein
walking or driving or flying; and although she w ould like to maintain a sense o f the
constant present, she still needs mem ory to recall these rhythms. In reconstructing how
these external rhythms and fragments o f inform ation move throughout the writer's mind
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via electrical and chemical means and back out again, the m ind asserts itself, creating a
picture o f a unique individual-only that person's m ind is reflected in the text.
Therefore, even if Stein is not intentionally describing the inside and the events
described could be anyone's experience, the form still com es from the inside (Olney
1972, 17). It is the m ark o f the writer and reveals that specific person. Showing a
unique m ind working, selecting, and prioritizing is how the writer m aintains a sense o f
individuality in a fast-paced, global society where individuals seem interchangeable and
superficial.
Finding the balance between asserting individuality and living in a com m unity
has been an issue for writers, notably since Rousseau was torn between wanting to be
both like everyone else and unique at the sam e time. Finding this balance and coming
up w ith a whole, coherent self becomes increasingly difficult as society requires us to
live on m any levels and in many roles. At some point, the idea o f a unified self m ust
give way to the fact that we are too split by culture ever to form a cohesive whole again
(Taylor 1989, 480), a belief accepted by the postm odernists. The m odernists, however,
Stein included, persisted in their attempts to salvage the idea o f a unified self. They did
this using m em ory to create a unified and coherent self that existed as a work o f art—the
text. Unlike Augustine and Rousseau who use their autobiographies to reveal a great
conversion or epiphany, Stein uses her autobiographies to create a unique and com plete
self in the text. Her writing style and narrative structure progress in a somewhat
recursive, electrical current fashion to bring the reader full circle (like her signature "a
rose is a rose is a rose") and to create a com plete, self-enclosed text. Perhaps this is
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Stein's epiphany: In a global society where the self is so fractured and disjointed that it
cannot be reconstituted into a cohesive whole in society, it m ust be created in text.
The desire for unity persists, even as Stein notes, "Hum an nature is so permanent
in France that they can afford to be as tem porary as they like with their buildings"
(1933, 16), and mem ory is necessary to the consolidation o f the m any fragmented selves
into one (Dubnik 1984, 4), even if it is a false, textual creation. Ultimately Stein
com bines elem ents she wished to keep separate—the external, the internal, and memory-to form a com plete identity recognizable as Gertrude Stein that is reflective o f the
culture in which she lives. Like a C ubist painting in which all the pieces are present,
only in an unfam iliar or unconventional fashion, and more specifically like the painting
o f her by Picasso, she came to look like the created art work because the self had to be
created anyway. Both The Autobiography o f Alice B. Toklas and Everybody's
Autobiography, in their experimental approaches that led the literary world to accept
new forms and ideas, in the end reinforce the traditional cultural desire for unity and
order. For all o f Stein's intellectual discussion about the difference between the
nineteenth and tw entieth centuries and the prevalence o f nonlinearity in nature and
disrupted hierarchies, her autobiographies, in their Cubist resem blance, reinforce
cultural conventions o f closure, cohesion, and wholeness, o f the ability for everyone to
find "his own self inside him" (1937, 271). She is torn by the disparity between the
human desire for unity and cohesion and the search for reality, which is disjointed. At
the end o f her autobiographical quests, she has not determined either who the self is
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inside o f her or how a unified self can exist within this system —a question that
postmodernists will answer, not so simply, it cannot.
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CHAPTER 4. THE PARTS DO NOT ADD UP TO THE WHOLE:
FRAGMENTATION, COLLAGE, AND DISAPPEARANCE (RELOCATION)
OF THE SUBJECT IN DAVID ANTIN'S
A U T O B I O G R A P H Y "AUTOBIOGRAPHY 2"
Significant cultural developments between the 1930s and 1960s
Although only 30 years elapsed from the tim e Gertrude Stein published Everybody's
Autobiography in 1937 to the appearance o f David Antin's 1967 text, sim ply called
Autobiography, numerous significant developm ents occurred in this relatively brief
period. World War II brought about the widespread use o f and dependence on emerging
technology. For example, com m unication advancem ents such as telephones and radios
allowed for more efficient tracking o f troops and distribution o f orders. And, as N.
Katherine Hayles points out, "by World W ar II, transportation and aircraft had
progressed sufficiently so that rapid troop movem ents were possible, which in turn
m ade accurate and timely inform ation as critical to the war effort as weapons and
soldiers" (1990, 269). What had begun in W orld War I, previously referred to as the
Cubist war because o f its effect upon and perpetuation o f dissipating geographical
boundaries and decentralization o f power, reached new levels as orders could be
communicated immediately from great distances away from the actual fighting zone.
Thus, a major center o f power need not even be physically present in the obvious
structure o f the war.
After the war, technology developed exponentially com pared to previous time
periods. An increasingly global society and advances in technology mutually
perpetuated one another and influenced developm ents in other areas o f culture as well,
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such as science, education, com m unications, and the arts. All o f these factors affected
the role o f the individual in what had becom e a technology-driven world.

Developments in technology and science
As the victor in war directly correlated with w ho had the best equipment, which was
now associated with the best technology, governm ents dedicated research to the
developm ent o f technology that could be used for tactical purposes and then later used
to m aintain a position o f global leadership. This emphasis encouraged research in
electronics and computers, which utilized breakthroughs in sciences that included brain
research. The thinking was that by understanding how the hum an brain and memory
worked, scientists could further their understanding o f how to build machines that
functioned like intelligent beings. Ironically, as com puters have become more
sophisticated, they have provided insight regarding how the brain works; therefore,
both fields have been able to progress m utually. During the post-W orld W ar II period,
several seemingly disparate fields began to influence one another more directly than in
the past—specifically, for the purposes o f this study, technology and brain research, as
just m entioned, as well as literary theory, which will also be addressed in this chapter.
These interacting fields, in turn, responded to and affected culture and the role o f the
individual within society.
Improved technology allowed us to gain a better understanding o f the world. A
resulting battle to possess the best technology and the brightest scientists ensued
between governments because to lead the world technologically was to have control and
superiority. This struggle for world suprem acy determ ined not only what scientists
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researched and developed but also what schools taught children. Between the m odem
and postmodern periods, technology developed exponentially compared to sim ilar time
periods in the past largely because o f this struggle to gain control in an increasingly
global society. The airplane, which was introduced in the early part o f the twentieth
century, became commonplace, and air travel began to take on greater challenges o f
space and time. This period also saw the advance o f video and electronic technology
with talking movies, television, video cam eras and stereos in alm ost every American
home. Access to remote areas o f the world and galaxy was increasing, and satellites and
television made it possible for the general public to witness current events. A result o f
the increased interest in visual and electronic technology was a shift in the cultural
paradigm away from print and once again toward oral communication, conveyed
through technological means.
On its way to becoming com m on at this time was the computer. Although
com puters would not actually become practical for home use until the 1980s,
developm ent for government use (i.e., m ilitary) began in the 1940s. Since their
inception, computers have been used as m etaphors for the brain, while the two fields
have been essentially intertwined in their research developments. The comparison
between the two fields begins when we consider the language used to describe
computers. Terms such as memory and neural networks are taken directly from
biology. In turn, the language used to describe the biological processes o f the human
brain and memory since the advent o f the com puter encompasses terms such as input.
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access, process, store, and re call-all o f which give the brain a m echanical, inanimate
quality.
The sharing o f language between these disciplines is not surprising considering
that developments in com puters have all along been inspired by a desire to model the
brain. According to Laurene Fausett, who offers an excellent history o f the
development o f neural networks in the recent textbook. Fundam entals o f Neural
Networks: Architectures, Algorithms, and Applications, "The developm ent o f artificial
neural networks began approximately 50 years ago, m otivated by a desire to try both to
understand the brain and to em ulate some o f its strengths" (1994, 1). Fausett chronicles
that in the 1940s Warren M cCulloch and W alter Pitts developed what is considered to
be the first neural nets, which aimed to arrange neurons to represent logic functions o f
the brain. The entire history o f this field, she says, has been grounded in the "interplay
among biological experim entation, m odeling, and com puter sim ulation/hardware
implementation" (1994,22).
Biology continued to inspire research in technology. Alan Turing, who
developed the code-breaking machines that helped the A llies to win W orld W ar II, used
how his mind worked to approach the building o f a computer. As Daniel Dennett points
out, "he took the im portant step o f trying to break down the sequence o f his mental acts
into their primitive components" (1991, 212). By figuring out his mental processes step
by step, he could attempt to sim ulate this function in the construction o f his machine. In
the 1950s John von Neumaim, generally considered to be the father o f m odem
computing, built on the work o f Turing, also m odeling the brain's functions (Fausett
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1994, 23). The new von N eum ann machines, Dennett explains, "were called 'giant
electronic brains,' but they were, in fact, giant electronic minds, electronic im itations—
severe sim p lificatio n s-o f w hat William Jam es dubbed the stream o f consciousness, the
meandering sequence o f conscious mental contents famously depicted by Jam es Joyce
in his novels" (1991, 214). As Dennett's example shows and as the previous chapters
here have dem onstrated, the developm ents in technology and brain research m ade
themselves apparent in the avant-garde literature o f the period that reflected culture.
Additionally in the 1950s, Frank Rosenblatt performed com puter simulations
with a system that he called a "Perceptron" (Rose 1993, 82). The perceptron attempted
to model the brain's neurons by learning from possible experiences introduced into the
system and then changing the system's output as a result o f this learning. The system
behaved like the brain by learning, remembering, and adjusting—much like the neural
network systems currently used by post offices to read and sort hand-written addresses
automatically.
The capability o f the com puter for all o f its advanced com plexity, however,
remains rather sim plistic in com parison to the human brain and is not a substitute for or
representation o f the brain or memory. The interest in this study is with how these two
fields intertwine, affect one another, and shape culture both in research developm ents
and in the metaphors used to explain how each works. Constructing m etaphors using
the language and developm ents in brain research and technology to compare the
intricate workings o f elem ents within the two fields has been practiced since Descartes
created his hydraulic model o f memory. As earlier chapters here show, Rousseau
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claimed he possessed the ability to "call up" m em ories in a m anner sim ilar to the
electric telegraph which was em erging at the time, and Stein, who had, in fact, studied
the brain extensively at university, m ade the science and technology o f the day part o f
the subject and writing style o f her autobiographies. As brain research becam e a more
prom inent area o f study, the results o f that research inspired constantly changing
theories o f how memory worked, which avant-garde autobiographers tried to capture in
writing about the self.
As discussed in the previous chapters, hum an nature and nature have been long
compared, so when scientists note new ideas in one area, they usually investigate how
these ideas may also prevail in the other area. This is the case in point; As m em bers o f
the scientific community increasingly agreed that nature is prim arily nonlinear and
applied nonlinear equations to explain many phenom ena in nature, they also began to
investigate how hum an consciousness might, likewise, follow nonlinear order since
attem pts to explicate consciousness using N ew tonian linear equations had failed. While
these radical developments were taking place in science, a general acceptance o f
nonlinearity in nature and the existence o f chaos as an actual order was only beginning
to root and would not take hold until the 1970s, after postmodernism had peaked.
Avant-garde artists and writers, however, captured these shifts in the scientific
understanding o f nature and the se lf in their postm odern works, which eschew linearity
and classical ideas o f Newtonian order.
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Developments in memory research
The roots o f brain research are considered to be in biochemistry, a field which first
developed in the 1910s and 1920s. However, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
biochemist Henry M cllwain helped to bring about the emergence o f a new a re a neurochemistry—or, the biochemistry o f the brain (Rose 1993, 41). The research
conducted in the 1950s focused on brain disorders, such as Alzheimer's and epilepsy,
because it was easier for scientists to determ ine how the brain worked if they
experimented to correct an obvious abnorm ality. The processing brain during this era
continued to be described in m etaphors o f electric currents and waves, directly
reflecting the day's technology. Consequently, during the 1950s, the first invasive
experiments on the human brain were conducted to see what conscious subjects
experienced when parts o f the brain were stim ulated electrically by placing electrodes
on the surface o f the cerebral cortex (Rose 1993, 129).
Karl Lashley was also conducting invasive experiments on the brain during the
1950s. His work, however, involved removing various quantities o f cortex tissue in rats
in an effort to pinpoint which areas o f the brain corresponded to specific types o f
memories. After being unsuccessful in determ ining if any one area o f the brain was
responsible for specific memories, he concluded that "memory resided simultaneously
everywhere and nowhere in the brain" (quoted in Rose 1993, 281). Lashley's
conclusion about the brain and mem ory would ring familiar in the next decade as
postmodernism emerged with its notion o f the self—which is constructed through
m em o ry-as an assortment o f fragments lacking any distinct center but, instead, having
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m ultiple dispersed centers. Thus, according to postm odernists, the self, if it existed at
all, did so sim ultaneously everywhere and nowhere specifically in one's mind, therefore
allowing for num erous com binations o f possible selves to be recalled or constructed.
Aside from invasive experiments in mem ory research, the 1950s saw the
beginning o f a new branch o f science-A rtificial Intelligence, commonly known as AI.
Like every science, dialogue within the AI com m unity itself is diverse, sometimes
contradictory. In his text. The Emperor's N ew Mind: C oncerning Computers, Minds,
and The Laws o f Physics, m athematician Roger Penrose points out that the strongest
proponents o f AI compare the mind to a serial computer, or Turing machine. He writes:
There is an input (like the Turing machine's input tape on the left) and an output
(like the machine's output tape on the right), and all sorts o f com plicated
com putations being carried out in between...when one simply thinks, calculates,
or m uses over recollections o f the past. To strong AI supporters, these activities
o f the brain would sim ply be further algorithm ic activity. (Penrose 1989, 379)
This m etaphor adopted by strong AI supporters echoes Beckett's K rapp's Last Tape
(1958), in which m emories are recorded on and represented by the spools o f tape that
feed from one side o f the m achine blank and wind around the other full o f recollections.
Beckett's m etaphor o f the tape recorder, which is rich in layers o f mem ory and meaning,
is merely an audio version o f the electronic com puter Turing machine. As technology
changes, so do the metaphors used to describe brain processes; and as the computer age
emerges along with developm ents in science, com paring the m ind to electric wires and
currents becomes an insufficient metaphor. Scientists have found the brain to be much
more com plicated and, thus, use some o f the sam e m etaphors as AI proponents in
describing the brain's neurons and "logic gates," which are necessary to memory
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(Penrose 1989, 394). The sharing o f language and m etaphors reinforces the influence o f
com puter technology and AI on brain studies.
As further scientific research revealed that the brain functioned nonlinearly (a
theory that was proposed at the turn o f the century), the com parison o f the brain and
serial com puter becam e obsolete. In the early 1960s, AI supporters who believed that
linear equations m ight not suffice for conscious, living entities tried to develop a
nonlinear m athem atical model to represent the mind (Penrose 1989, 294-295). Other
m em bers o f the AI com m unity, such as Penrose, had problem s with this theory because
they believed that consciousness or awareness relies on the progression o f tim e—much
like what we have seen again and again in the autobiographies in this study: the self
develops in time.
W hile Penrose thinks the nonlinear mathematical model is inadequate, he
maintains a belief that science, specifically quantum physics, is the key to understanding
more about the mind and self. He explains that, according to classical physics, because
our bodies and brains are part o f the physical world, they, too, evolve like other
elements in the physical world, i.e., they are fixed by precise classical mathematical
equations (1989, 226). However, these classical equations fail to account for the
phenom enon o f consciousness. Therefore, he offers quantum theory as an explanation
o f consciousness. He clarifies that quantum descriptions, while different from classical
ones, are ju st as precise and are necessary to explain many properties and phenom ena in
nature, such as the existence o f solid bodies, chemistry, colors, and freezing and boiling.
Likewise, he believes that the phenom enon o f consciousness, which cannot be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124
understood entirely in term s o f classical physics, must be explained in quantum terms
because "Perhaps our m inds are qualities rooted in some strange and wonderful feature
o f those physical laws which actually govern the world w e inhabit, rather than being
ju st features o f som e algorithm acted out by the so-called 'objects' o f a classical
physical structure" (1989, 226). Classical physics alone is not sufficient to explain how
everything in the world works but m ust be considered with quantum theory, and that
combination, Penrose writes, "forces us to change our view o f physical reality" (1989,
225). With a change in perspective o f physical reality com es a change in view o f the
mind, as Penrose says, and that affects how we define and construct the self. So, as we
have seen num erous times, a shift in perspective in science affects the theories
governing the self, which then enter the discourse o f various disciplines.
In the 1960s and 1970s, memory research in general suffered setbacks as
experiments turned into catastrophes, seriously harming the validity of, and advances in,
the field. Various studies involving biochemical exchanges in the brain or even
physical isolation o f brain sections attempted and failed to answer the questions o f
where memory existed and how it could be transferred (Rose 1993). The rejection o f
any belief in the physical transfer o f memory, however, eventually led to a theory in
which memory is considered to be a property o f the brain affected not only by chemical
changes in the body and brain, but also by which cells and synapses undergo chemical
changes (Rose 1993, 201). This whole-body approach, in which mem ory depends on,
as Rose says, "a m ultitude o f specific neuronal circuits," (1993, 204) raises the question
o f the possibility o f transferring any memory meaning at all. Because every individual

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

125
body is so distinct in its chemical m akeup and interaction with the nervous system,
producing the same m eaning in two separate people seems impossible.
As previously addressed, the struggle to translate the inner experience to the
exterior world by way o f language has been a frustration for writers for centuries. In
chapter three we saw how Stein tried to address this problem by separating the two,
which, ultimately, she could not do. Antin's perspective on the same issue is that "there
is no such thing as a perfect medium thats why they call it a medium because its in the
middle so to speak its between it mediates a transaction and deflects it" (1984, 56).
However, at the same time that the scientific com m unity began to understand ju st how
distinct the individual is, postm odern writers not only acknowledged the futility in
trying to transfer m eaning, but they saw that the problem existed beyond the limits o f
language: it began at the level o f the physical com position o f the body.

Developments in art
As we saw with the m odern period, avant-garde artists responded to and perpetuated the
ideas prevalent in culture. Likewise, postm odern artists and writers captured in their
work the constructs o f culture. Avant-garde works o f the period concentrated on the
increasingly problem atic role o f the individual in society and on the effect that
technology had on the individual and art—very often glorifying technology or m aking it
the subject o f a piece. Wliile the art com m unity saw the arrival and passing o f
numerous movements inspired by technology, it also experienced a newly found social
and commercial acceptance because o f its incorporation into everyday life and o f an
improved American economy.
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In the 1950s, modernism remained, as avant-garde artists continued to represent
the internal experience o f the self through their work. Because translating the internal to
the external was inherently problem atic and because the se lf was changing its definition
in response to culture, attempts to represent the internal or evolving self resulted in
more ambiguous styles o f abstract expressionism , action painting, and gesture painting,
where representation and interpretation were key to understanding the art (Sandler 1988,
17). However, as the 1960s approached, technology and economics altered art
significantly. After World W ar II, the econom y o f the United States improved so much
that the gross national product doubled from 1955 to 1965 (Sandler 1988, 82), allowing
broader access to technology and education. By the late 1950s, m ore than forty million
Am erican hom es had a television, as opposed to ten thousand a m ere ten years earlier
(Sandler 1988, 81). For the first time in history, people could turn on a switch and
instantly view wars, natural disasters, political events, and the daily routines o f others.
Also, with the improved economic status o f the country, many people who could not
attend college in the past now could, and they were there exposed, often for the first
tim e, to contemporary art and literature courses. A continued interest in the arts
beyond college requirements led to a greater popularity o f art in general. The increased
interest in art, coupled with artists' attempts to appeal to mass culture, contributed to the
changing style and production m ethods o f art.
The presence o f technology continued to depersonalize many aspects o f culture
while it also provided people ways with which to watch and scrutinize world events
m ore closely. At the same time, art, because it is o f culture, reflected the effects o f

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

127
technology on the individual. Postm odern art evolved through several phases—
including m inim alist sculpture and painting, pop art, optic (op) art, process art, earth art,
and conceptual art. W hile these m ovem ents were each unique, their com m onality was
that they all stressed the external object over the internal experience. A rt critic Irving
Sandler, in his text Am erican A rt o f the 1960s, distinguishes the avant-garde o f the
1950s from that o f the early 1960s as "instead o f the hot, dirty, handm ade, direct-fromthe-self look o f fifties art, sixties art looked clean, m echanistic, and distanced from the
s e l f (1988, 60). Clearly, this w as the general m otivation behind works o f artists who
strove to achieve mechanical reproduction o f objects, geom etric shapes, and other
m aterials external to the self. Andy Warhol w ent so far as to say, "I think somebody
should be able to do all my paintings for m e...The reason I'm painting this way [with
silkscreens] is that I want to be a machine" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 8). That an artist
would want to be a m achine contradicted every traditional conception o f what an artist
should be—original, distinct, cerebral.
W hile postm odern artists may have striven for m echanical depersonalization in
their w ork to reflect the increasing role o f technology encroaching on the individual in
society, the mark o f the individual artist still m anaged to prevail to some degree. Just as
we have seen in past works, the idea or style that originates within an individual reveals
itself in that person's approach to and form o f work. W hile the works o f Frank Stella,
Robert M orris, and Carl Andre, or o f Andy W arhol, Roy Lichtenstein, and James
R osenquist may initially seem indistinguishable in either their geom etric presentation or
silkscreen, cartoon-like reproduction, the artists each actually use painstakingly
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meticulous methods to produce what appear to be spontaneous, commercially
manufactured pieces (Sandler 1988, 149). On the production and creativity o f his
commercial art, W arhol com m ents, "I was getting paid for it, and did anything they told
me to do. If they told me to draw a shoe. I'd do it, and if they told me to correct it, I
would...I'd have to invent...after all that 'correction,' those com m ercial drawings would
have feelings, they would have a style" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 9). This style,
invented from within W arhol, is what makes his work uniquely and unm istakably his—
even in its m achine-replicated form. The mark o f the individual artist, even in the face
o f technology and the dissipating existence o f the traditional self, rem ains in
postmodern culture, despite all claims to the contrary.
In its aim to capture the pulse o f culture, postm odern art generated shows with
revealing titles, such as "9 Evenings: Theater and Engineering" and "Technology for
Art's Sake" (Sandler 1988, 236). The infusion o f technology into the m indset o f culture
in the 1960s forced artists to find a new way to express them selves because, as Richard
Estes points out, "All the things I was trained to paint—people and trees, landscapes and
all that—I can't paint. We're living in an urban culture that never existed even fifty years
ago" (quoted in Sandler 1988, 217). With people and landscapes being replaced by
computers and skyscrapers, many artists saw a responsibility to fuse art and everyday
life, especially since art was m ore popular than ever due to its extensive use in
commodities such as fashion, television, and advertising. John Cage, like many artists
and critics in the past (such as Stein and Picasso in the last chapter), believed that art
could both reflect and lead culture. He asserted that "if the new teclinologies were
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central to contem porary life, then they and art ought to merge. The purpose o f art was
to sensitize the public to the radical changes taking place in their life" (quoted in
Sandler 1988,236).
If one purpose o f art is, indeed, to sensitize people to radical cultural changes,
then postm odern art aimed to prepare the public for "radical" ideas that had actually
been developing since the time o f Rousseau—that the representation o f the internal
experience is doomed to failure, that the notion o f a unified self is unrealistic, and that
nature is nonlinear and chaotic. W hereas modem artists acknowledged these ideas but
did not use them extensively (if at all) in their work, postmodern artists em braced them
wholeheartedly. In general, the work o f the period aimed to reconstitute the object, the
external, as art itself and not as a representation or m etaphor for som e internal
experience or m editation. Increasingly, artists and writers viewed the se lf as incapable
o f being a whole, cohesive entity. And as they more than ever considered nature to be
nonlinear or chaotic, they tried to reflect these ideas in their work by em phasizing the
ongoing process over the finished product. This is seen in works such as those o f Philip
Pearlstein, whose painting seems arbitrarily cropped, showing that any slice o f reality is
as worthy o f being presented as another (Sandler 1988, 208)—an approach that David
Antin takes in his postm odern autobiographies as well.
Furthermore, in stressing their belief that nature is nonlinear and that the self is
not a cohesive concept, artists, such as Robert Smithson with his earthworks, used the
outside natural environment as a way to juxtapose the human construction o f geometry
against the chaotic com position o f nature (Sandler 1988, 333). By taking the artwork
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out o f the conventional m useum space, avant-garde artists also exposed a greater
population o f people to art and dim inished the long-held view that art was high-brow
and incomprehensible to the masses. Also, in using geometry, m odules, grids, and other
mathematical or technological them es in their works, artists reinforced the idea that a
cohesiveness was possible in work, but only if the work was o f nonhum an quality, i.e.,
an invention or machine that can be m anipulated and controlled. These works did not
show a human mind in action; they showed a lifeless object that existed strictly for
consumption by humans.
Performance art and interactive exhibits also emerged during the postm odern
period. Live performance gave an immediacy to art, and because o f the nature o f the
form, changed in response to its audience. This is m uch like Antin's idea o f the self,
which he believes takes its shape by colliding with and responding to external factors
(1993, 98). Performance art, then, possesses the capability o f presenting a m ore
accurate perspective o f a self than any other art form because it is tem porary, constantly
changing or adjusting its shape in reaction to external influences, yet com posed o f the
same basic material at its core.
W hile performance art has the potential to be highly interactive, the postm odern
period also saw the introduction o f nonperform ance interactive m useum exhibits.
Pieces such as these usually depend upon technology, such as recorders, film, lights,
and sound equipment, to m otivate viewers to participate in the exhibit and then to
incorporate their contribution into the piece. This extremely technologically busy
approach to art did not appeal to Antin; however, interactive work as a m eans to
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enhance the viewer's experience o f m eaning did. Therefore, in one o f his 1960s art
exhibits described in tuning ( 1984, 252), he arranged tape recorders in various rooms o f
a m useum and allowed participants to listen to stories told by other museum visitors. If
inspired, they could then tell, record, and incorporate their stories into the exhibit. If not
inspired, they could sim ply leave silence. In doing this, Antin hoped to infuse art with
m eaning for viewers who now had a personal investm ent in the piece, which was never
possible in conventional art forms.

The debate over the emergence of postmodernism
Academ icians and theorists have varying view s on the emergence, definition, and even
the existence o f postmodernism. To begin, depending on the critic, postm odernism
em erged sometime between the 1940s and 1970s (Best and Kellner 1991). However,
the m ajority o f critics—including Fredric Jam eson (1991), Andreas Huyssen (1986), and
Steven Best and Douglas Kellner (1991)—trace the appearance o f postm odernism to
som etime near either the end o f the 1950s or beginning o f the 1960s (which coincides
with the technological developm ents discussed earlier) and see its wide acceptance (in
the world o f artists and critics, that is) as occurring in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Just as it is difficult to pinpoint an exact date for the emergence o f
postm odernism , it is even m ore difficult for critics to decide if it actually emerged (or,
was m erely a continuation o f m odernism ), and, if it did, then why. To them I say look
at the world. Regardless o f what that period in history is called, som ething undoubtedly
changed in American culture between 1940 and 1970. Ihab Hassan acknowledges the
debate over postm odernism in The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory
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and Culture. He writes, "postmodernism suffers from a certain semantic instability:
that is, no clear consensus about its m eaning exists am ong scholars...Thus some critics
mean by postm odernism what others call avant-gardism or even neo-avant-gardism,
while still others would call the same phenom enon sim ply m odernism " (1987, 87).
The debate over the existence or non-existence o f postm odernism com plem ents the
argum ent o f the decentered (or non-existent) self. This period in time especially is
marked with the upheaval o f cultural truths regarding coherence, order, hierarchies in
nature, and society. Therefore, it is feasible to view the m ercurial quality o f
postm odernism as an extension o f the sam e quality o f the self. That is, the inability to
pinpoint or define cultural change during this period reflects the same difficulty in
locating or determ ining the existence o f an identifiable self w ithin this changing culture.
General instability at the time put everything and every concept on shifting ground.
Instead o f debating whether modernism or postm odernism is superior, this study
focuses more on the concrete actuality that they are working toward different goals.
While both m ovem ents share characteristics, such as m ultiple perspectives and
nonlinear narrative, they ultimately split in opposite directions. W hereas in modernism,
the aim was to take m ultiple perspectives and create some sem blance o f a unified self or
whole, postm odern artists revel in knowing that the fragm ents can never be put together
again to create a traditionally recognizable self.
In his text. Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic o f Late Capitalism, (1991)
Fredric Jam eson explicates the significant differences between what he terms
postm odernism and high modernism. Generally he describes postm odernism in terms
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o f flatness; superficiality; m ultiple surfaces; fragmentation o f the subject; pastiche;
the waning o f affect, feeling, emotion, and subjectivity from a work; the end o f
individual artistic style resulting from the em ergence o f mechanical reproduction.
Beyond describing the characteristics o f postm odernism , he focuses on why he believes
postmodernism em erged and writes, "what happened to culture may be one o f the more
important clues for tracking the postmodern" (1991, 16). Jam eson's assertion is correct,
if not obvious, and is the reason why examining what occurred in culture between the
late 1930s and the late 1960s is critical to this study.
Ihab Hassan and Andreas Huyssen express views sim ilar to Jameson's. Like
Jameson, Hassan sees m odernism and postm odernism as two very distinct movements.
In addition to fragmentation, multiple surfaces, and lack o f unity. Hassan recognizes
other, more strictly postm odern, characteristics, including an em phasis on process,
performance, absence, anti-narrative, play, and the signifier (1987). Huyysen, in line
with Jam eson and Hassan, sees the rejection o f unity and the decentering o f the self as
markers o f postm odernism (1986). However, he rightly emphasizes the role o f
technology in his definition o f the postmodern. He believes that mass culture depends
on technology, and that m odern technology allows for and encourages mass
reproduction (thus echoing Warhol's comments on art and machines).
Like Jameson and W alter Benjamin, Huyssen sees the results o f m odem
technology manifest in collage, montage, and photom ontage, i.e., art forms that can "not
only be reproduced, but are in fact designed for mechanical reproducibility" (1986, 9).
As we have seen in the previous section, Huyssen's assertion is supported by
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postmodern artists' works and philosophies. Huyssen and Jam eson, like m any artists
and critics, argue that m ass reproduction destroys the individual artist's identifying
brushstroke. However, as countered earlier, the signature o f the artist remains even in a
culture with advanced technology because technology merely provides the art tools; the
individual is still responsible for creating a work with those tools. This is why, in
theory, anyone can produce a work exactly like Warhol's. But, in practice, when I view
a four-panel work o f Queen Elizabeth II in London's National Portrait Gallery, I know it
is a Warhol without looking for his signature. It is also why the postm odern poems o f
Frank O'Hara, Ted Berrigan, John Giorno, or Allen Ginsberg are distinguishable.
Individual style continues to em erge from the mind, despite m achines, technology, or
postmodern classification.
Two critics who also focus on the role o f technology in society and literary
theory are Steven Best and Douglas Kellner. In their book. Postm odern Theory:
Critical Interrogations (1991), they divide postm odern theorists into tw o groups: one
believes that technology and changes in the socioeconomic system have produced a
postmodern society; the other believes postm odernism developed out o f the global
homogenization that resulted from widespread capitalism. According to Best and
Kellner, both o f these processes produce "increased cultural fragm entation, changes in
the experience o f space and time, and new modes o f experience, subjectivity, and
culture" (1991, 3). As the previous chapters and sections on technological advances
demonstrate, technology, economics, global homogenization, and capitalism (or the
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quest to dominate) are all very m uch intertwined and cannot realistically be separated as
Best and Kellner would like to categorize.
However, in continuing to present their argument, Best and Kellner see the
em phasis o f postm odern theorists on plurality, fragmentation, m icroanalysis,
individuality, and singularity as a rejection o f totality, collective struggle, and the
system (1991, 222). In rejecting the system, postm odern theorists tend to map
fragments and to ignore the system ic features that help us to see how elem ents either
work or do not work together in our culture. On this point. Best and Kellner seem to
possess an understanding in com m on with theorists who study chaos. Going beyond
Best and Kellner, I believe that presenting fragments in writing dem onstrates that the
fragment is the only com m onality o f the whole; therefore, the fragmentation, in its
attem pt to reject, actually recognizes and is a part o f the totality after all. The totality
may not be attainable using conventional approaches, but it did exist in some form once
and the concept remains as a goal for artists and theorists who succeed postmodernism.
Perhaps what is most intriguing about Best and K ellner is that they go to great
lengths to explore the various concepts in the discourse o f postm odernism only to reject
any acceptance o f its existence in the end. They offer two possible definitions for the
prefix "post": one as signifying a rupture from what came before it, and the other as
indicating a continuity with or dependence on what preceded it (1991, 29). Ultimately,
after they explore the claims o f num erous postm odern theorists, they find that none
offers significant empirical support for the theorized rupture in society. They conclude,
"We thus argue that no adequate analysis o f the imputed break between modernity and
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postm odem ity has yet been produced, nor is there an adequate account o f the allegedly
new postm odern society" (1991, 274). I am inclined to agree with Best and K ellner in
that I see society, in general, desires to achieve a type o f unity and coherence. But, I
also see that to m eet this desire, society is w illing to look beyond conventional ideas to
consider different types o f unity (such as chaos models) and coherence (as with
nonlinearity). However I m ust em phasize that the defining difference between
m odernism and postm odernism is that m odernism works to restore some sem blance o f
traditional or Newtonian ideas o f unity and coherence, whereas postm odernism rejects
the attempt to impose or create a traditional unity (unless it is a nonhum an entity such as
geom etry or a toilet) out o f apparent fragments.
The postmodern embracem ent o f fragm entation and nonlinearity is directly
related to and is a reflection o f the technology in postmodern society. For example,
imagine recording the landscape and dialogue in a situation where someone is driving in
her car on a busy city street while, at the sam e tim e, she is having a telephone
conversation and sending a fax. All o f this is now possible and common (if television
com m ercials are to be believed) because o f technology; and because this scenario has
become common to us, we may not immediately see its incoherence in conventional
terms. Avant-garde artists who try to capture "reality" in their works have dealt with the
changes in perception brought on by technology and shifts in cultural constructs o f
truth, as we have seen with Stein in the preceding chapter and as we will see with David
Antin in this one.
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David Antin's postmodern problem: what is this piece?
David Antin opens his 1993 collection o f autobiographical essays or sketches, what it
means to be avant-garde, with a quote from Denis Diderot: "Foreigners because they
never have enough w ords to express their ideas, often invent remarkable new m odes o f
expression. Poets are all foreigners." That Antin places this quote at the beginning o f
his book in interesting because Antin's work itself defies classification, as he says in one
o f the book's pieces:
i have a publishing problem with publishers I used to have difficulty convincing
new directions that they shouldnt list m e in the poetry section i could never
convince them. ..people pick up my book expecting to find some kind o f verse in
it and not finding verse in it theyre afraid they havent found poetry which is not
so much o f a problem for me but it is for a publisher i f he starts to get returns
because this som ebody says "this is not poetry take it back" (1993, 125)
N ew Directions, incidentally, lists this book as poetry. Furtherm ore, Antin refuses to
categorize him self as any particular type o f artist. In an attem pt to describe his creative
technique, he refers to him self as several things, including poet, perform ance artist, talk
poet, and language artist.
Like Diderot's description o f foreigners and poets, A ntin invents new m odes o f
expressing his ideas by refusing to adhere to w hat has by now been established as
coherent, traditional, or expected, m ethods o f writing autobiography. His early work is
postmodern or avant-garde or on the fringe. But how can A ntin create what are
considered to be postm odern autobiographical works when the very construction o f
postm odernism is one which, supposedly, debunks subjectivity, authorship, coherence,
history, and unity? Since the publication o f his first book. Autobiography (\961), A ntin
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has incited debate over the genre o f his texts and even over the classification o f h im self
as a postmodern writer. W herever one finds herself in the Antin debate, he is certainly a
writer with whom to be reckoned, if not for his monstrous body and bald head, then for
his abilities to incorporate his theories into his creative texts and to provide insight into
how technology, science, and culture have shaped the individual and relocated the self.
T he p arad o x o f p o stm o d ern au to b io g ra p h y
As the previous chapters have shown, autobiography reveals m uch about the culture in
which it is written. W riters sim ultaneously make conscious decisions and follow
subconscious tendencies that are ingrained in them by the society in w hich they live.
They are parts o f the system regardless o f how they may try to observe it objectively
(which is not possible). These decisions regarding content, narrative structure, and
writing style, as we have seen with Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein, reflect the society
o f the time. Therefore, autobiography during the postm odern period should be expected
to support the characteristics o f postm odernism —among them superficiality, m ontage,
simultaneous com m unication o f inform ation, and complete loss o f center and unity.
Some critics, am ong them Fredric Jam eson (1991, 16), argue that autobiography
cannot exist under the conditions o f postm odernism . The short-sightedness o f this
view is that these critics are using traditional methods o f evaluation to study postm odern
writing. Whereas traditional autobiography cannot exist within the constructs o f
postmodernism, resituated autobiography can. As Antin in "Autobiography 2" writes,
"the terrible thing Gadaliah said would be if all our ideas o f reality were based on the
evidence o f 200 years o f experim entation and m easurem ent and the constitution o f the
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universe was changing all this time" (1968, 45). Because our ideas o f "truth" constantly
shift with culture and discoveries in science, we must adjust our understanding o f reality
to fit the current cultural frame. Likewise, as culture changes, writing that represents
that culture also changes, and we must also adjust our m ethods o f reading new texts.
For a critic to state that postm odernism is all about a break from the conventional and
then to use conventional expectations to evaluate a piece o f postm odern writing is
unreasonable. For critics w ho insist on using outdated tools to examine contem porary
writing, it is easy to say that if postm odernism entails the disappearance o f the subject
then autobiography cannot exist in the postmodern period. However, critics, including
William Epstein, Jonathan Culler, Stanley Fish, and Sharon O'Brien (ed. Epstein 1991),
argue that postm odernism does not preclude autobiography, but is about accepting the
disappearance o f the traditional or conventional idea o f self. The self cannot completely
disappear from this world; that is not possible. Its role or how it is perceived, however,
can change, as we have observed in earlier autobiographies, particularly Adams' and
Stein's.
In her essay, "Feminist Theory and Literary Biography," O'Brien questions
whether or not biography is possible in deeonstruetion and Lacanian psychoanalysis (ed.
Epstein 1991, 125). She proposes, "Leaving aside the question o f language and
representation, how can any genre purport to give us the 'presence,' 'essence,' or
meaning o f a self? Is not biography then inevitably naive—if not downright dangerous—
insofar as it promotes the outm oded and bourgeois ideology o f the individual" (quoted
in Epstein 1991, 125). To a degree O'Brien plays both sides o f the fence here, as she

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

140
immediately follows with an example that addresses these questions. She discusses
David Nye's "anti-biography" o f Thom as Edison, which she says abandons chronology
and linearity, challenges the notion o f a unified self by presenting num erous Thom as
Edisons rather than one definitive Edison, and refuses to synthesize ideas for the reader
(Epstein 1991, 126). Arguably, while N ye's attempts are characteristics o f
postm odernism , they are not all new. These writing strategies, as we saw, are present in
Stein's and Adams' modern autobiographies. The difference between these m odern texts
and Nye's biography is that he, in writing a postm odern text, presents m ultiple views
and fragments o f the self to challenge the idea o f a unified self, whereas Stein and
Adams present m ultiple views o f the self in the attem pt to create a unified subject.
Nye's account o f Edison is one example o f postmodern biography. However, beeause it
is biography, it does not have to account for issues associated with autobiography, i.e.,
how the subject, who is also the writer, can disappear (not ju st write from another
person's perspective as Stein did) from the text and still produce what is considered to
be an autobiography. David Antin addresses the paradox o f postmodern autobiography,
as I will show in the remainder o f this chapter, as well as the role o f the self after
postm odernism , which I will discuss in the following chapter.

Representation of culture in David Antin's Autobiography and "Autobiography 2"
In the same way that the introduction o f the airplane and telephone into early twentiethcentury society increased the speed o f com m unication and access to all parts o f the
world, television and satellites in the late 1960s when Antin's autobiographies first
appeared were bringing together previously unfam iliar cultures by broadcasting into our

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

141
living rooms im m ediate coverage o f events such as the Vietnam conflict, the 1968
Democratic convention and riots in Chicago, and the U.S. expedition to the moon.
Daily montages o f chaotic war-related events, interspersed with commercials and lighter
stories during our evening m eals may have been shocking initially, but ultimately
worked to desensitize the effects o f the war on viewers. Additionally, pictures o f
Vietnam and the m oon—far-away places that may have been either unknown or
unimaginable to m ost Americans prior to television broadcast—made a very large,
remote world easily accessible via satellite signal. As a result o f this onslaught o f
com m unication and information technology, concepts o f immediacy and coherency
were com pletely revised at this time. Once unrelated events and information gained a
new type o f coherency, a "radical coherency" as Antin refers to it, that would have
never existed in any other situation had it not been for the technology o f the day.
In addition to these changes, the role o f language was also being challenged
during the postm odern period. The way language functions in society ties together
political and cultural studies and literary theories and practices—all o f which Antin is
familiar with, as his writing to com e will indicate. In The Order o f Things: An
Archeology o f the Human Sciences, Michel Foucault theorizes about the changing role
o f language in society from the Classical period to the present. At length he fully opens
the dialogue concerning concepts that have been sim m ering since the eighteenth century
regarding the conflict between the order o f nature and the order o f human nature and
how these ideas o f order have affected language. H e explains that "nature, through the
action o f a real and disordered juxtaposition, causes difference to appear in the ordered
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continuity o f being; hum an nature causes the identical to appear in the disordered chain
o f representations, and does so by the action o f a display o f images" (1970, 309). This
statem ent sum m arizes what we have seen addressed by philosophers, scientists, and
writers since Rousseau's period; nature inherently possesses a random disorder that
hum an nature works to structure and order. In the attem pt to organize the jum bled
elements in a m anner that is com prehensible to the mind, to establish a pattern in what
may otherwise be considered noise, hum ans have arranged language in a linear
sequence that allows all the com ponents to be processed one at a time because we have
not learned how to absorb everything as it is actually presented in nature, i.e., all at
once.
Foucault's reasoning supports accepted theories o f language and processing
because it works with how we have been taught to read. H is argument, however, does
not recognize what writers o f the tim e are attem pting to do, which is present multiple
elem ents sim ultaneously, even if they can only be read one at a time. In saying that
hum ans process thoughts linearly, Foucault neither considers the possibility that this is a
trained skill nor that it may not at all be com pletely "natural." It is no accident that
writers who are trying to recreate their thinking in process produce very little o f what
resembles a strictly linear text. As previously revealed, the modernists tried to represent
thought processes through stream-of-consciousness and fragm entation encased by
repetition or circularity. Postm odernists, in contrast, use fragm entation that refuses to
meld in the end in order to show thought processes in a high-speed-inform ation world.
To represent the working mind accurately, the style o f writing, or the structure o f
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language, needs to reflect process as it occurs in society. A ntin com m ents on this
concept in his 1976 book, talking at the boundaries. He writes:
all
these considerations are based on this mans way o f talking about his
way o f seeing theres no way around it a report is a report
it has the problem o f adequacy
its not only a question o f
whether the report is true but w hether its adequate
whether his
way o f talking is an adequate way o f representing his way o f
seeing
and w hether his way o f seeing is an adequate way o f
representing the way
something is happening (123)
In describing how he believes the telling o f som ething should represent how it is
coming to and tlorough the mind, A ntin illustrates his philosophy because the
description seems to come straight from his mind and land on the paper, no time even
for formal punctuation, which is not present in the thought process.
As sim ultaneous com m unication or distribution o f inform ation became more
prevalent in postm odern culture, the dem ands o f an increasingly fragm ented and fasterpaced society impacted the individual. The effects o f society on the individual have
caused significant division o f the self since secularism took hold, and, whereas
modernism stressed the need to m aintain individuality, as w e saw with Stein,
postmodernism emphasizes the loss o f the individual to society (Hassan 1987, 92).
Antin's autobiographies show the absorption o f the individual into society to the degree
that the individual Antin is not discernible in his own life story-em phasizing the point
that he exists merely because, and only as a sliver, o f his family and social schema.
This movement away from the self-im portant "I" as the only driving force o f one's life
story began to emerge in Stein's work as she included stories o f numerous friends in her
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books. More substantially in V ladim ir Nabokov's Speak, M emory (1947), Nabokov
stresses finding his place in the ongoing pattern o f his family's history. W hile these
writers show the changing role o f the individual, from one o f absolute center to one that
is increasingly a part o f a social structure, they continue to em phasize that the self is,
ultimately, the absolute authority and controller o f one's life story. Antin, in the
postmodern period, yields his position o f absolute center, authority, and controller when
he produces two autobiographies that refuse to identify voices, stories, or tim e lines.
His collection o f snippets reflects his culture's pace and technology. Like avant-garde
writers before him, he uses the technology o f the day as a metaphor for how the mind
works as dem onstrated through the presentation o f the text. In this case, Antin's texts
are like a television set and rem ote control, where the viewer/reader continues to hit a
button, flipping through the various channels o f David Antin's relatives, friends,
acquaintances, and overheard conversations to date. All o f these snippets com bine to
produce the story o f "David Antin," even if he is not necessarily present in them
because, in keeping with the postm odern cultural construct, he is lost or absorbed into
society and, therefore, not the center o f his own story.
Even though Antin does not limit his autobiography to one set o f people o f one
particular time period, his texts, like Stein's, Rousseau's, and Augustine's before him,
include references specific to his postm odern culture. To begin, he starts
Autobiography (1967) by introducing his mother as a woman with the desire, and, more
importantly, ability to leave her husband repeatedly. While this may seem innocuous,
almost humorous, to readers today, the idea o f a woman leaving her husband six times
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is allowable only in a society where all w om en (not only the economically privileged
like Stein) are considered as more than property or dependents, where they are viewed
at least as independent, free-thinking hum ans like their male counterparts. Such a
society, unfortunately, did not begin to take form in the United States until the latter part
o f this century. Other more blatant indicators o f popular culture in Antin's texts include
driving high-speed vehicles; talking o f naked wom en and diaphragms and condoms;
and referencing the National Football League, science fiction stories, and transvestites.
Sim ilarly, "Autobiography 2" (1968) refers to hitchhiking, the invention o f electric eyes
on advanced m achinery, extensive interest (approaching paranoia) in C om m unists and
the Secret S ervice-all o f which are markers o f the 1960s.

Narrative structure in Antin's autobiographies: fragmentation as reflective of a
culture that has shattered and absorbed the individual
As previously noted, evaluating a postm odern text using the same criteria traditionally
used to evaluate conventional texts is unreasonable and impractical. Antin's splintered,
nonconventional autobiographies force readers to find new ways in which to locate and
evaluate the self in these texts. One way that Antin proposes we approach both texts
and the self in today's culture is to consider the self in terms o f narrative and story
(1993, 95). He believes the two are specific and distinct, and that story is the
"configuration o f events or parts o f events that shape some transformation," (95)
whereas narrative, which defines the self, is m ore o f a psychic function involving a
paradoxical collision. More reductively, he is saying that story is what occurs
externally to cause a transformation, and narrative is the internal change that takes place
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because o f the transformation. Once again, the distinction between representing the
internal and external arises in the thinking o f the avant-garde. In this sense, narrative
defines what the self is and what it is capable o f assim ilating into its structure or schem a
o f coherency.
Like other avant-garde texts, A ntin's autobiographies break from the established
popular convention in both narrative structure and writing style. However, because his
approach to autobiography is particularly postm odern, these features become even
farther removed from convention as they take form to support the radically changing
role o f the self. Narrative structure is perhaps the m ost im mediate property o f
Autobiography and "Autobiography 2" to strike readers as completely different, even
from the fragmented modern texts o f Stein. To begin. Autobiography is only 12-pages
long, by far the shortest autobiography I had ever encountered until 1 read
"Autobiography 2," which is just over nine pages. "Autobiography 2," included in Code
o f F lag Behavior, was, according to Antin, com pleted a couple o f m onths after the first
autobiography but could not be included in the original Great Bear pamphlet because o f
a lack o f space (1991, 15). The two autobiographies are quite distinct from one another
(apparently affected by even a couple o f m onths separation) and, therefore, actually
work better as two separate texts. Aside from the shocking lack o f length, the
autobiographies possess other anomalies, such as strings o f unrelated paragraphs,
unattributed quotes, incomplete sentences, and a biographical sketch.
The first autobiography consists o f an assortm ent o f story pieces and quotes that,
for readers coming to Antin's work for the first time, lack any sense o f coherence.
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narrative, or meaning. F or example, the text typically presents a quote (which may or
may not be A ntin) followed by a brief story (which may be, but usually is not
obviously, related to the preceding quote) followed by a part o f a sentence (which often
sounds like som ething heard on the television). A representative series reads:
"You know what's the most dangerous animal alive?—Wolverines. They fierce.
We goin up to Connecticutt and hunt em with bows and arruhs."
in high school I used to visit the offices o f the Cannonite wing o f the Trotskyite
party, where we were greeted by a lecturer who began each session with the
words 'what are the contradictions in the world pattern today, comrades?'[...]
—the tree was smaller, the dogs were older and Getzler didn't have the grocery
anym ore— (1967, 5-6)
To begin, the quote that opens this block is not attributed to anyone, even though Antin
sets it o ff in quotation marks. The speaker's relation to Antin, and in particular to his
life story, rem ains a mystery. The section that follows also concerns an unidentified "I,"
who may or may not be Antin because the speaker is recalling m emories o f communist
rallies in an unidentified location. He follows the story o f the Cannonite rally with a
sentence, not set o ff in quotation marks, that sounds like a sentimental reminiscence o f
an aged adult returning home after a very extended absence.
As already stated. Something Else Press calls these informal recollections by the
poet; however, many o f these "recollections" very well may not b e -a s the Cannonite
example demonstrates and Antin's later writing attests-A ntin's at all. In talking about
autobiography in what it means to be avant-garde, Antin proposes that the genre should
go beyond the first person and should, instead, aim to address the truth (1993, 163).
Apparently, to Antin the idea o f tm th is more difficult and im portant to determine than
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establishing who is speaking. Providing an accurate representation o f the culture that
defines him (finding the contradictions in the world pattern today) is m ore critical and
valid in autobiography than knowing who is saying what. This philosophy is almost
alien to the centralized, egocentric works o f previous writers, including the modernists
who addressed the shifting role o f the individual in a global society while still
attempting to m aintain some construction o f self, and seems contradictory to the very
definition o f autobiography.
In presenting the various voices that define who he is, A ntin borrows from the
postmodern art com m unity by creating a collage o f text com parable to photomontage.
The collage is assembled without transitions to link the fragments m eaningfully for the
readers. Sometimes the relationship between, or at least the leap to, fragments seems
clear. For example, in "Autobiography 2," several o f the passages contain common
elements, sueh as references to sport jackets or teeth. These ties, however, are not the
smooth, recursive them es that emerge in the modernist writings to bring together
various ideas that form a satisfying picture in the end. Instead, in m any cases, they
seem to repel any attem pt to form a complete picture. The images bounce o ff o f one
another, taking the piece in a new direction each time, usually never to return to a
previous idea in the way that Stein's and Nabokov's pattern-driven texts do. For
instance, consider the following string o f text from "Autobiography 2":
he asked me if I was a Jew and told me they were the greatest people in the
world. They invented the sport Ja c k e t-
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Kneeling in a sugar drift beside the stalled m achine—taking in the little girl
leaning idly against the gum racks—Honey colored hair, brown eyes lighting into
a welcoming grin. She had no teeth.
She went to the clinic because she had a toothache and the dentist w as a young
guy so she told him how she was Rimbaud going up in smoke and they wouldn't
let her out (1968, 43)
and then five sections later:
he disappeared into a room in his parents' house and came out w ith a sport jacket
and a w ife who had five children (1968, 43)
These fragments apparently are related only in that they contain some o f the same
words. For the most part in the autobiographies not even this connection between
sections is evident. The second autobiography, although written only m onths after the
first, has many more transitional phrases and, at times, what could be considered
legitim ate or blatant cross references. However, these transitions and recursive images
reinforce the spontaneity o f the text, which contrasts to Stein's writing, in w hich they
indicate what is to come. For example, in one instance Antin describes what he calls,
"the only image o f my father" (1968, 39). However, soon after, he returns to his train o f
thought in m id-sentence with, "another/carefully fitting together the corners o f
cardboard boxes" (1968, 40). The m anner in which he returns to the m em ories o f his
father creates a sense that the poem is being written as a recorded conversation, or as the
reader turns the pages. This is a way that Antin builds a feeling o f process—which is
key to postm odernism -in his work.
In presenting incom plete passages w ithout regard for time or apparent
relationship or ranking o f importance, Antin's work reflects and perpetuates the way
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information is presented in his culture. His autobiographies may seem absurd in what
they include at tim es and in the jarring juxtaposition o f images; however, Antin
believes, in retrospect, that the works are still too connected thematically and are not
"quite arbitrary enough to represent our Am erican fate" (1991, 18). W hile the second
autobiography at times possesses some connective tissue, the first autobiography seems
connected only in that it contains inform ation that som ehow was channeled through
Antin. His disappointment, then, can only be in his inability to determ ine "the
contradictions in the world pattern today" by conceding more than he would like to the
hum an desire to find patterns or cohesiveness in an apparently random world.
In keeping with his creation o f a nonconventional narrative structure to represent
the changing position o f the self in postm odern society, Antin includes a biographical
inform ation section at the end o f the first autobiography that provides som e o f the life
details that readers usually expect to find within the body o f the text, but do not come
across in this case. Antin's inclusion o f a nontraditional feature in his autobiography,
however, is not new. Nabokov's Speak,

published in 1947, serving as a

transition between the modern and postm odern periods—contains an index. W hile the
index itself is unexpected, some o f its listings are even more surprising, particularly
those for "Nabokov, Vladimir." In approaching autobiography, especially that which
precedes postmodernism, readers generally expect every page o f the text to be somehow
relevant to the author/subject. Yet, by including his own name in the index, N abokov
both indicates his life story is in partnership with all the other names that surround his
and foreshadows the postm odern construct that the self is not the absolute or constant
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center o f one's life story. The expansion o f what is considered to be appropriate for
autobiography during and after the m odem period, however, was ju st that—an
expansion. As Stein pointed out in Everybody's Autobiography, "Anything is an
autobiography" (1937, 3). In the postm odern period, writers do not merely build upon
w hat has preceded them. The ideas regarding autobiography do not expand to include;
they change and break radically, indicating that a new order is emerging to replace
conventional ideas which prescribe unrealistic and unattainable goals o f linear
cause/effect developm ent and completion. They present, as Antin does, some pieces o f
truths—no m atter whose—and then undermine publishers' and readers' expectations for
the genre by providing a sardonic look at the "facts" o f the writer's life that usually fill
out a lengthy book.
A ntin's biographical sketch concludes the brief collection that seemingly does
not reveal much, if anything, about the writer. M ade to resemble a com m on publisher's
biographical sketch, the paragraph com m ents on the futility o f the feature by presenting
both conventional and ridiculous information, such as, "At four he visited his uncle's
business in the garment center where he w ent out on the fire escape and looked dow n at
the people below. He also made two cardboard boxes. His first prose works were
published at age 9 (Kensington M agazine). [...] In after years he had his apartm ent
painted and is now considering moving" (1967, 15). Biographical sketches typically
conform to a boilerplate o f required facts and, therefore, neither reflect the individuality
o f the w riter nor reveal anything particularly insightful or unique. In mocking the
convention—and, in doing so, undermining its authority—Antin provides a better view o f
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his subject than m any autobiographies achieve in an entire text. His approach exhibits
his penchant for hum or and for challenging traditions, while reinforcing the postmodern
belief that a whole, cohesive s e lf does not exist.
A ntin's use o f the biographical sketch to end his autobiography achieves an
effect in com plete opposition to Stein's use o f photographs at the end o f her first
autobiography, and in doing so illustrates the difference between postmodernism and
modernism. W hereas Stein's photographs wrap readers back around to the beginning o f
the work, thus creating a circular, cohesive whole by m eans o f the book, Antin's
biographical sketch jars readers, making them even more conscious that the conventions
o f autobiography and life writing fail to provide a whole, "real" view o f the subject at
hand. It reminds readers that to reflect the individual within culture accurately, writing
cannot create or present a definitive self.
Although Antin's autobiographies aim to eschew any conventional, familiar
organizational structure and em phasize entropy over unity, they ultimately possess a
preconceived approach to form. I argue that nothing, not even the most daring
postm odern work, is created without some type o f organization, regardless o f how
difficult it m ay be to detect in the finished piece. As the next chapter reveals, new
approaches to order and organization become m ore evident as writers begin to apply
chaos models o f order to the seemingly random fragm ents o f postmodern culture and
writing. Antin certainly approaches his texts with ideas o f order in mind, even if his
aim is to produce a work that looks as arbitrary as his American culture (Antin 1991,
18). His autobiographies, which appear random, are actually reminiscent o f the very
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traditional poetic form, the ghazal, which dates back to the thirteenth century. The
ghazal consists o f a series o f unrelated couplets that are w ritten at num erous sittings so
as to ensure that the writer's m ind has been cleared. The final couplet contains a
reference to—or signature of—the poet, adding a touch o f blatant autobiography to a
genre that is already imbued with unacknowledged autobiography. Like the ghazal,
Antin's autobiographies possess a quality o f being written at num erous sittings after the
mind has cleared (as m uch as possible) the m em ory o f what was w ritten previously. In
the end, the arbitrary appearance o f the form som ehow m akes a type o f sense, if for no
other reason, because it is o f and shaped by the writer's unique m ind, and, thus, provides
a picture o f his character at the moment. This is the same feeling one gets after
completing Antin's autobiography. Antin, who is first and alw ays an extraordinary poet,
provides a sense o f who he is at the time, as shaped by everything acting upon him,
emerges, even if what he did in high school or how he decided to becom e a w riter does
not. As the next chapter shows, his interest in conveying the general shape o f the self
and how it changes across tim e becomes more evident in his later works, which present
ideas that support chaos m odels and challenge us to reconsider the genre o f
autobiography.
Unlike the modernists, Antin's earlier work is decisively more splintered,
refusing to help guide the reader through Antin's m ind and leaving it up to the reader to
construct a m eaningful narrative out o f the stories. After all, trying to convey Antin's
interior narrative would lead to failure anyway. It is this desire to infuse a piece with
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some type o f meaning that inspires the interactive works o f Antin's career, whether it is
his perform ance/talk poem s or audience-participation museum exhibits.

Emphasizing process: the influence of literary trends, science, brain research, and
communication on Antin's writing style as a reflection of the working mind
With David Antin, more so than with previous writers examined in this study, narrative
structure and writing style blend into the same discussion. W hereas Stein often changed
lines o f thought abruptly in her narrative structure to reflect the external com m unication
o f information in society, writing within individual sections remained fluid, lucid, more
stream-of-consciousness in style as a reflection o f the scientific theory that the mind
operates through the flow o f electrical impulses. Antin, however, uses both random
narrative structure to reflect the presentation o f information in culture and irregularly
punctuated, often incomplete, im ages and ideas to mirror the m ovem ent o f those ideas
through his mind. In m aking these structural and stylistic choices, he reinforces the
postmodern emphasis on process as perpetuated by developments in literary theory,
science, and technology o f the time.
Antin, much like Stein, uses present tense in his texts in order to capture a sense
o f process—o f the mind and pen reaching an understanding simultaneously. Unlike
Stein, though, Antin does not remind the reader that this is a written and edited text as
she does by mentioning what stories will come on later pages. In that sense, he achieves
a feeling o f spontaneity and process more successfully than Stein. According to literary
critic Ihab Hassan, one o f the characteristics that distinguishes m odernism from
postm odernism is that, whereas m odernism aims to achieve the finished art work or
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object, postmodernism strives to show process, performance, the occurrence as it is
happening (1987, 91-92). In Stein's work, she, too, was driven by the m otive to capture
a "constant present" as she called it in her writing. Her goal was to have her writing
represent the immediacy o f thoughts entering her mind, even if those thoughts were
recollections. Although Stein strove to capture process, ultimately her w ork followed a
plan, as evidenced by her alerts to readers that a particular story would com e later, and it
did. In doing this, she created what am ounted to a type o f false spontaneity. Antin, on
the other hand, because o f what his society's technology affords him that it did not for
Stein, is able to represent—particularly in his later works—a sense o f process, the
"constant present" about which Stein wrote.
This sense o f process is certainly what Antin spends his career trying to convey-first in his written texts and then later, when he finds writing to be inadequate, in his
perform ance pieces. He is more interested in how to go about doing som ething than in
what actually results from that endeavor. His preference for process over product is
closely tied to his discussion o f oral and written cultures and how these cultures view
art. In his book, talking at the boundaries, Antin argues that in oral cultures (which is
what American culture during the 1960s and 1970s postmodern era has been called),
process is privileged over product. To illustrate this, he points to the art o f pot making
in certain oral cultures, explaining that very often there are extensive and elaborate
routines for making pots as well as many other objects (1976, 192). The art in these
cultures, he states, is in the making o f the object, not in the finished object itself. He
says that he keeps this in mind because som etim es people will forget which stage is
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really the art and will rush to look at the pot to see the art, which is both wrong and
probably disappointing. Antin's autobiographies support his view that the value o f art
should be in the m aking, not in the end result, o f the work. H is texts are built from his
selection o f details and stories as told in the voices o f the people who have touched his
life (Antin 1991, 15). By preserving the voices o f these people in the present tense, he
achieves Stein's goal o f the constant present, o f the story in the making, because
distinguishing between details that have been related two days or forty years ago is not
possible.
Antin's penchant for process, as illustrated by writing style, reflects the cultural
shift toward orality with the widespread appearance o f television and other nonprint
m edia as primary sources o f inform ation and communication. However, it is im portant
to bear in mind that he, in breaking with convention, is actually following the tradition
o f being an avant-garde or forward-thinking artist. By incorporating the latest theories
and technologies into his style and subject matter, he follows in the vein we have seen
since Augustine, who used the popular tools o f his day, rhetoric, when writing The
Confessions. Like the writers considered avant-garde before him, Antin adopts the
cutting-edge approach o f his day that reflects the m ovem ent o f society as affected by
advances in science and technology. Also like the avant-garde writers before him , his
style is on the fringe, and, therefore, popular only within an eclectic group. The
majority o f writing remains what has up to this point become conventional,
comfortable, familiar to the masses. All things become mainstream in time. In Antin's
case, as with postmodern art in general, it may take 30 years before dissolution o f
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center, jarring juxtaposition o f images, and indeterminable jum ps in tim e become
com prehensible to the general audience, who will then probably think it is all new, even
though the roots o f this thinking are in m odernism at the turn o f the century.
The pace at which society functions increases with new com m unication
technologies, and this is especially true with the introduction o f computers and visual
media. The challenge for writers is to incorporate in their w ork the effects o f these
advances on the individual. W riters who try usually attem pt to have their writing style
mimic stimuli m oving through the mind. As previously discussed, since the advent o f
computers in the 1940s, the hum an brain and com puters have been compared and have
inspired research in each other's discipline. Changes in technology and science affect
how society is structured and viewed, which, in turn, determ ines how texts are created,
read, and discussed. Som etim es the effects are subtle, as previously illustrated by
military strategies ultim ately affecting what school children are taught; other tim es they
are m ore explicit, as with the corresponding work in brain research and com puter
technology. Gordon Shaw points out in Brain Organization and Memory: Cells,
Systems, and Circuits that, in some regards, brain research has been the leader in
cultural developm ents. As an example, he refers to psychologist Donald Hebb's 1949
work in brain organization, which the technological com m unity adopted alm ost
immediately to create a m athem atical model o f m em ory as a neural network and then to
incorporate this m odel into a com puter sim ulation (M cGaugh 1990, 301).
While biology m ay have been the initial inspiration or model for computers,
developm ents in com puters have led to a better understanding o f how the brain does not
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work (Rose 1993, 83). The belief that brains "carry out m any operations in parallel, and
in a distributed m anner, [with] m any parts o f a network o f cells being involved in any
single function, and no single cell being uniquely involved in any" (Rose 1993, 83) may
not have gained significant credence in the scientific com m unity until the late 1980s and
early 1990s; however, it has been a viable theory since the 1950s, when, through his
experiments on rats, Karl Lashley proposed that memory existed everywhere and
nowhere specific in the brain. This distribution o f memory throughout the brain as a
simultaneous processing o f inform ation directly corresponds to the transm ission o f
multiple pieces o f inform ation in postm odern society and how that inform ation makes it
way through the individual's mind.
Antin, who trained both as a linguist and an engineer, also draw s com parisons
between computers and brains while trying to capture in his texts the m ovem ent o f
information through his mind. In what it means to be avant-garde, he reveals his long
standing interest in com puters when he writes o f an interview he had for an editing job
early in his career. During the interview, he explained, "so far the m ain problem with
computers was the mechanical nature o f their m emories and here was a chance to
introduce a kind o f organic randomness into the system which was m aybe m ore like
human memory afterall" (1993, 13). Yet again, we are seeing the aw areness o f the
randomness prevalent in nature and in the biological processes o f hum ans (i.e.,
memory), who are, in fact, o f nature. Just as the postm odern art com m unity addressed
randomness in their works, the science and technology experts also incorporated it into
the focus o f their research when trying to advance the understanding o f the brain and
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im prove the performance o f com puters by taking their model inspirations from the
human brain. Antin, obviously current with developments in engineering, art,
linguistics, and the sciences, applied the latest theories to his craft, thus producing his
seemingly random selection and bom bardm ent o f fragments that he calls his
autobiographies.
As with the narrative structure and content o f the texts, the writing style o f
individual sentences and passages is also random, refusing to adhere to a pattern. The
length, tone, and rhythm o f sentences varies unpredictably from that o f the long and
fluid to the short and poignant, the drab, the poetic, the profound, the silly, the
incomplete, or the sometimes baffling. For example, his texts include long, poetic
observances o f "The water was warm and calm as glass. The jellyfish were out and you
could see them glitter when you'd dive. Everytim e we splashed the surface there was a
shower o f sparks" (1967, 13) as well as brief quips such as "they brought their problem s
to him and he always decided that both sides were exactly half right" (1968, 40). He
jum ps from poignant recollections o f "when he was a kid his father took him to the zoo
and forgot him there, he spent the whole night locked in the lion house" (1968, 10) to
incomplete messages or unexplained lists such as "Rinso/ Luxor/ Thebes" (1968, 43).
The break from pattern or predictability and embracement o f randomness reflects the
ideas o f postmodernism, as we saw in art, studies regarding human memory, and
computer advancements. These ideas stem from culture, where attention spans, thought
processes, and communication are very often interrupted—to be redirected either
temporarily or permanently—by an onslaught o f incoming stimuli all at once. The quiet
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m editation allowing for the introspections that Augustine, M ontaigne, Rousseau, and
even Stein record no longer is available to individuals in postm odern society.
Interruption has become the norm, and it is the postm odern writer's job to illustrate how
this constant interruption o f thought affects one's ability to look at, define, and construct
a self—if that is even possible at all.

"where are you": the role of the individual and relocation of the self in
postmodern autobiography
In his 1993 book, what it means to be avant-garde, Antin discusses his past work as he
responds to criticism that he had "suffered from a belief in the unitary self and had not
enjoyed the benefit o f french deconstruction which should have disabused [him] o f this
illusion" (93). To this comment, A ntin replies:
i have felt the french breath o f
deconstruction
unim pressed with it as i am
but i am
still interested in the self though i never thought i
believed in its unity in so flatfooted a way as all that
i always thought the idea o f the se lf was surrounded by
questions [...]
and one o f the questions im interested
in asking is what is the locus o f the source or ground
o f the self (93)
He continues in his reply to explain that it was this interest in the ground o f the self that
led him to arrive at a discussion for one o f his live talk pieces. Because he sees no point
in asking questions for which he already has answers, he posed the ancient and yet
unanswered question, "where are you," i.e., where is the self located? This questioning
o f the source, ground, or center o f self is evident in the autobiographies, as no distinct
voice pervades, or authority governs, the texts. Instead, his autobiography—Aü life
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story—em erges from a collection o f voices and ideas from people who surround and
shape him, i.e., his "family" in a m ost collective, expanded definition. Antin's opening
words, "it's a tradition in my family to write an autobiography," (1967, 3) indicate the
approach to and direction o f all his work. He is a w riter who refuses to be limited by
categorization. He says he follows tradition, and he does, but only on his unique terms.
He redefines what constitutes family, what determ ines one's own story, and what is
tradition. In doing so, he calls into question all notions o f center and relocates the self
am ong pieces whose locus is all o f society and culture.
To dem onstrate that one's life story can no longer assume a state wherein the
traditional self is the absolute center or focus, A ntin uses am biguous pronouns in
recounting stories both about him self and about others. Just as the first person "I" is not
always Antin, it is unclear w hether the second and third person pronouns that appear in
some o f the passages actually refer to other people or if they refer to Antin himself. For
instance, in one passage an unidentified "he" and "she" discuss how unhappy he is with
teaching and how he would like to return to school to study engineering (1967, 7-8).
The male here m ay be Antin because he is, am ong m any diverse things, an engineer.
How ever in light o f the rest o f the text, I would assert only with reservation that this
passage is absolutely about Antin. Antin's use o f am biguous pronouns ties with his
view o f the self and the absence o f a single, authoritative voice or subject. By
elim inating the authoritative voice and blurring the clarity o f pronouns, Antin shatters
the conventional notion o f a centered self, dispersing it alongside numerous voices, each
o f which carries an indeterminable weight in shaping A ntin's life. Every voice
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contributes to the act that, according to Antin, is perform ed by "a num ber o f actors
whose interaction we could call the s e l f (1993, 94). This com bination o f m ultiple
voices to provide various views o f the self or even various selves goes beyond the
m odem texts that paint different perspectives o f the self. Antin, like the avant-garde
writers before him , is consum ed with the idea o f representing the self truthfully, and the
conditions o f his culture force him to show the individual as a mere sliver o f the society
that contributes to what he is at any given time, and that he, in turn, also affects. Antin's
point and purpose is to show as much as he can all that has contributed to the defining
o f his self so that he can approach as accurately as possible a description o f who he is.
Ultimately, however, he draws attention to the belief that complete truth or accuracy is
not attainable. Because external readers cannot understand Antin's internal narrative, it
is o f no consequence w hether he includes a detail typically expected in autobiography or
an obscure list that seems meaningless. Both types o f inform ation are actually fully
comprehensible only to A ntin if they are only about him.
In presenting his succession o f memorable quotes and stories from his family
and the people with whom he associates closely, Antin captures the essence o f an oral
culture that defines itself by its stories and endures by passing them down. The
difference here, however, is that Antin preserves his oral culture by com m itting voices
and stories to paper. The stories o f others are a part o f Antin because he defines him self
only (not also, as with Stein and to a lesser degree Nabokov) in term s o f how he exists
in relation to others. This emphasis on the individual as it relates to the whole ties in
with developm ents both in social theory and in science and technology during the late
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1960s. Whereas m odernism stressed the attem pt to m aintain individuality, as we saw
with Stein, postm odernism em phasizes the loss o f the individual to, or its absorption
into, society (Hassan 1987, 92). For Antin, the self is m ade by the internal narrative,
which composes itself from factors more far-reaching and incidental in society than
even the modernists, with their extended considerations o f autobiography,
acknowledged. W hereas Augustine limited the self to its definition in term s o f the
Christian community, Rousseau was affected by the people in direct contact with him.
Later, Stein defined her life story in relation to people in her social circle, and N abokov
in terms o f his family history. In the 1960s, Antin saw the self as shaped by cultural
factors which may have been remote, yet affected him nonetheless, like a wave
travelling through water. This is not to say the self has no boundaries; in order to have
shape, boundaries are implied. Antin asserted strongly that the self m ust "survive the
collision or union with other things and endure it has to som ehow rebound and remain
distinct otherwise it is everything and nothing which is not a s e l f (1993, 98). Unlike
the modernists who portrayed the self as firmly defined, even am ong its influences,
Antin saw the self as a narrative at core that maintains its essential com position but that
is able to react with other factors. Likewise, during this time, research in science and
technology focused on the possibility o f m ultiple neurons and circuits working in
conjunction rather than alone to accom plish designated tasks (Rose 1993, 83, 281). All
o f these developments indicated a sim ultaneous shift in various disciplines away from a
single-unit and toward a m ulti-organism structure.
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In tuning, published alm ost 20 years after the autobiographies, Antin w rites that
in the 1960s he was interested in interactive work because incorporating other people's
experiences into his own work m ade his work more m eaningful to everyone ( 1984,
252). Although he is referring here to an interactive exhibit he had created for a
museum that responded to, and changed depending on, participant input, his philosophy
applies to his autobiographies, which are highly interactive as printed texts go. M y own
reductive description o f these books to someone who is unfamiliar with them is to
imagine walking with a tape recorder through various-sized rooms containing people
from different tim e periods telling personal stories. Because the room sizes are
different, the amount o f m aterial recorded from each speaker also varies. Some room s
are empty, and it is in these room s that you record some o f your own stories. The
hallways between rooms are silent, providing the gaps between story pieces. Once you
have travelled through all o f the room s, the autobiography is ready for transcription onto
paper. In a way the method is sim ilar to Stein's in Everybody's Autobiography in which
she provides stories about the people around her to show all that has contributed to her
life. Stein, however, never allow s her text to become interactive to the degree o f
relinquishing control o f the narrative; her voice directs every word o f the text. Antin,
on the other hand, allows the other voices to speak for them selves in his attem pt to
m aintain some form o f the "truth" about the stories that have created the narrative inside
o f him. In maintaining w hat he considers to be an accurate representation o f the
individual in culture, he shows the self as a participant—not the controller or focus—in
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the making o f the life story. W hat has becom e the ground o f the self is culture, wherein
the self is shattered and dispersed.

Language in postmodern autobiography; representing the inside to the outside
there is no such thing as a
perfect medium
thats why they call it a medium
because
its in the middle so to speak its between
it mediates
a transaction and deflects it (Antin 1984, 56)
In the Postmodern period, theorists, linguists, and academics in general continued to
debate at great length the nature o f language, particularly its capacity to represent
meaning. Common dialogues am ong the structuralist, semiotic, deconstruction,
poststructuralist, and feminist cam ps focused on the changing roles o f the signifier and
the signified, death o f the referent, and depoliticization o f language. U nderpinning all
o f these concerns, however, is the questioning o f language's ability to possess, carry, or
indicate meaning at all. The various theorists proposed that meaning was socially
determined, examined the cultural conditions that allowed for m eaning to arise in the
first place, and reevaluated the appropriateness o f that meaning in contem porary society.
While the social understanding o f language and meaning is undoubtedly o f trem endous
importance, the physical processing o f language by an individual cannot be ignored.
Antin, who trained as a linguist, is an expert in structuralism and semiotics, as
evidenced by his continued interest in conveying m eaning and understanding the role o f
social frames in that process. In what it m eans to be avant-garde he even devotes an
entire talk to the subject he calls "the structuralist." He also, however, sees the problem
o f conveying meaning as more specific than the generalized theories o f social
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constructs; he believes the difficulties or im possibilities begin at an even more basic
level—that which is physical and chemical in the body. To illustrate this idea, he
presents in definitions a m etaphor o f a beetle in a black box. The section reads:
each one carries a black box around with him in which he has a bettle and since
no one can look into any one elses box w henever anyone speaks o f his beetle
everyone looks into his own box and supposes all the other beetles are identical
with his it is possible to imagine everyone having a different colored beetle in
the box or some other kind o f insect or even nothing at all which he nevertheless
chooses to call a beetle (1967, 33).
Whereas literary theorists are debating what cultural conditions allow for a particular
black box and its contents to prevail or carry m eaning, Antin is arguing that the contents
o f the black boxes are possibly all different—or even empty; no one knows for sure
because we cannot see inside each other's box, so we ineptly and immaturely assume
what we have is the sam e as what som eone else has. Already subject to this level o f
miscom munication, any true understanding o f one another is not possible. W e can only
understand how som eone else's situation/story would play out in our narrative, so
meaning is presum ptuous and, m ost likely, incorrectly.
Antin's primary interest as a trained linguist is with the limits o f language.
Regardless o f what structural combination it is given, language is still com posed o f the
same basic material that has yet to evoke the same m eaning—and, therefore, translates
no real m eaning at a ll-in two separate entities across separate m edia (Antin 1993, 164).
While in tuning {\9?,A) he states stoically, or resignedly from experience, that language
is an imperfect medium, his autobiographies from alm ost 20 years earlier show
disillusionment with the shortcomings o f language. For example, in the first
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autobiography he includes a story about incurring for the first tim e the problems
inherent in translating between two media. O f som eone's, perhaps even his own,
charming childhood reminiscence, he writes:
I learned to read at an early age and had a firm grasp o f the color words before
entering public school. Red Blue even Orange. W hen 1 got there one o f the first
things i had to do was draw a picture o f my house. I lived in a two story red
brick house with green coach lanterns on the porch so i drew a firm outline with
a pencil and colored everything in with a red crayon but though the crayon was
red and the bricks were red the color o f the drawing was nothing like the house.
1 became suspicious and gave up art. (1967, 4)
The child here who carries in his head what he considers to be the accurate, true idea
(color) o f his house finds that any attempt to reconstruct or represent that idea by
translating it into another m edium (in this case a crayon drawing) produces an
insufficient image and, therefore, the child becomes cynical about the power and
possibilities o f art. Likewise, Antin, in the vein o f so m any thinking writers, finds that
the words we have to convey the interior does not m atch adequately at all. The
translation between the internal and external, narrative and story, "character and external
physiognomy" (Antin 1968, 45), emotion and language, image and paint, truth and
representation will always be inept because, in crossing the m iddle, the essence o f each
is deflected; "both sides [look] different" (Antin 1968, 45).
Because Antin never assum es a role o f authority in his autobiographies, he does
not write directly—as Stein, Rousseau, or A ugustine do—about the difficulties he has
representing his internal narrative in a different form, i.e., in words. His later
publications and talks do present his theories o f language and meaning, however, and
are helpful when considering the anecdotes found in the autobiographies as metaphors
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for his philosophy o f language and representation. W hen A ntin asserts that com plete
truth or accuracy is not attainable when trying to define the self, he is, to a large degree,
addressing the problem o f using language to represent one's internal narrative. As we
have seen in this study, writers since Augustine have wrestled with language—both as an
excellent translator and an inadequate tool for representing what has been term ed
everything from em otions, to inner experiences, to the internal, to narrative. The
ineffectiveness o f language to translate the internal experience to the external world has
been a thorn in the sides o f all the autobiographers discussed here. Antin, like most
postmodern writers, on one level chooses to abandon the attem pt in his early texts
because failure is inevitable every time. That is, he does not directly try to convey the
effect that events have had on his inner self. However, some o f his anecdotes
intentionally serve as m etaphors to allude to a philosophy shaped by the experience
described.
In the second autobiography, Antin relays a hum orous account o f being in an ice
cream shop. The story also reveals his thoughts on language as representation. The
section reads:
they asked if he w anted an ice cream and he said he'd like a creamsicle. But
they supposing dixie cups were healthier said they didnt have any. He pointed
to the overhead fans where bright green and orange images o f cream sicles were
hanging from the switchstrings, reasoning they wouldn't advertise what they
didn't stock. They couldn't stop laughing—"those aren't creamsicles, they're just
pictures." (Antin 1968, 42)
Up to this point in time, writers were obsessed with conveying some m eaning through
language, "reasoning they wouldn't advertise what they didn't stock." That is, although
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they knew the translation w ould not work fully, they still tried, perpetuating the
misguided notion that achieving adequate meaning was possible—the challenge was to
find a way for the words or advertisem ent to correlate with the m eaning or stock.
Hoping to reconstruct com plete meaning was as much a naive goal as contriving a
complete self in text, although a definitive self certainly did not exist in reality. Antin,
like his postmodern colleagues, reevaluates language and the self in respect to reality
and concludes, "those aren't cream sicles, they're ju st pictures." Language is pictures,
words, representations—« 0 / reality. The meaning that the writer intends never
adequately coincides with the meaning that the reader expects or finds, so in a way no
m eaning is present at all. Therefore, the writer may as well cease the futile, fraudulent
approach o f making it appear that meaning exists but no one can convey it properly.
Perhaps meaning, like the cream sicles, does not exist at all, but is merely a fiction like
the single, cohesive self.
As the postm odern artists earlier in this chapter show, because m eaning m ay not
have been possible—as a result o f the inability for two entities, media, or people to
connect com pletely—they abandoned the attempt to represent meaning. Instead, they
made objects (toilets, dust pans, and such) the subject and purpose o f art. In response to
the disorderly order o f nature, they imposed human constructs o f linear order (such as
geometry) on the environm ent to elevate viewers' consciousness about order and reality.
As with art, where the paint does not stand for anything—it is just paint—A ntin tells us
that words are just words and pictures are ju st pictures, not creamsicles, not inept
representations o f some stored away reality.
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Because an interpretation o f one's internal narrative, which defines the self,
cannot be conveyed through a m edium to an external entity, Antin says, "its tim e we got
rid o f this fantasy o f understanding you have to go a fair way with som eone to com e to a
common knowing or at least some way o f knowing" (1984, 141). Any true
understanding o f another person's narrative or self is not possible; therefore, the details
o f one's life in an autobiography are merely inane and superficial. The reader does not
leave the text with any knowledge o f the subject's self; she leaves only with the
subject's story, which then m ust be interpreted into her ow n schema, never to arrive at
the writer's intended meaning. Undoubtedly inspired by W ittgenstein, Antin's m etaphor
o f the beetle in the black box addresses the idea that because we each have individual
experiences and a unique biological com position we are inherently limited in our ability
to know or understand what exists inside o f someone else. Using this metaphor, Antin
challenges the structuralist argument that the reality or meaning o f language exists in its
intellectual—as opposed to physical—processes. While the m eaning o f language
certainly depends upon the cultural frame, Antin asserts that, if the physical structure
within each o f us is unique, then w hat is signified in each o f us by a com m on signifier is
also unique and, therefore, cannot possibly be the same.
His theory regarding the inability to transfer meaning or signify the same thing
is supported by developments in the scientific com m unity in brain and m em ory research
during the 1960s. At this time, scientists determined that each individual has a distinct
chemical make-up that interacts with the cells and synapses o f the nervous system;
therefore, no two people can experience the exact same chemical reaction in their bodies
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(Rose 1993, 201). Because the brain and m em ory are now believed to function in term s
o f chemical interactions specific to the individual's biological composition, it would
seem im possible for language to evoke the sam e m eaning or effect in two people when
differences originate at such a basal level.

Relocating the self in postmodern autobiography using memory and writing style
to reflect cultural constructs
In contrast to the lengthy introspections found in the autobiographies o f Augustine,
Rousseau, and Stein, only one passage o f Antin's autobiographies addresses the se lf and
identity. In the first text he writes:
looking into the dark oblong mirror into which a triangle o f light had fallen
through partially open doors as into a pool o f w ater I somehow became
convinced o f my identity with that lum inous figure. We were both com pletely
empty, devoid o f properties and totally lucid (1967, 4).
For Antin, the self, which is situated retrospectively and, therefore, through mem ory
(1993, 107), takes its shape in glimpses, slivers o f light falling tlirough cracks in the
door and colliding with, partially filling, the mirror. It is a collision, once again as we
have seen in all o f the previous cutting-edge autobiographies, o f the external and the
internal. However, unlike the previous autobiographers who combined the internal and
external to create a whole self, Antin sees the two as interacting at that precise m om ent
to create a very specific and ephemeral com position, which he considers to be only a
glimpse or piece o f the self because to pretend a whole picture is possible would
perpetuate a false construction o f reality. Like the light in the mirror, the self is
intangible and always changing form in response to other factors, such as doors m oving
or objects travelling through its path. It hovers about, distributed among m any different
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things—its presence known yet unrestrained. However, because it exists in space, it
does have a shape with specific boundaries at a given moment. W hile the basic
com position o f light rem ains the same, what it illuminates in the m irror depends upon
the angle at which it lands and w hat else is reflected in the m irror, contained in the room
at that particular moment. We see many parts, pieces, fragm ents, yet they do not add up
to a whole. The whole is partially in the parts, but the parts do not contain the whole.
To put forth this idea o f the self, Antin creates autobiographies that attempt to
capture a sliver o f the self as it exists in space at a specific mom ent. In this way he can
portray what he considers to be an accurate representation because he tries to show both
that a glimpse o f an entire self is not possible and that the self is not autonom ous. To
show the se lf accurately, he provides a view o f a piece o f the self—like a single page or
two out o f a diary—as it exists w ithout the value assessed through retrospection. To
accomplish this he writes in present tense, elim inating any sense o f tim e passing, and
includes the stories o f other people with whom he has collided and reacted. These story
pieces are written in a fashion that reflects the culture that allow ed them to arise and
come to Antin in the first place. His use o f memory and writing style illustrates the fast
pace at which inform ation bom bards the individual; reinforees the futility o f attempting
to transfer m eaning from the internal to the external through language; and emphasizes
the postm odern constructs o f process over product, the absorption o f the individual into
society, and the acceptance o f entropy over linear conventional order in nature.
Although the autobiographies provide a sliver o f w hat com poses David Antin at
a particular m om ent in time and, therefore, are random in the sense that any material
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defining any m om ent could have been included in the books, this idea o f seeming
disorder—what actually reflects reality -d o es not tend to agree with the hum an desire for
linear order. Antin's postmodern texts, and the works o f other postm odern artists,
emphasize the reality o f nonlinearity or what was, at the time, considered to be disorder
in nature. However, other artists o f the period, as we saw earlier with the earthworks o f
Robert Smithson, opted to portray the human desire for order as im posed on, and in
stark contrast to, nature. The desire for order remains, and despite the postm odern
embracement o f entropy over order, a general trend toward a different, larger view o f
order would emerge as developments in science and m athem atics led to
interdisciplinary theories regarding concepts o f order and patterns and how
consciousness functions in such systems. Unlike his early postm odern autobiographies,
Antin's later texts (which have yet to be given a convenient literary label) continue to be
on the fringe as they work toward some type o f coherency, what he calls a "radical
coherency," that requires one to locate the self in a larger more tangentially and
disproportionately related system. This means that, in order to find continuity or
Antin's place in the historical pattern, all o f Antin's work must be considered as a
system wherein pieces o f Antin exist. Only by taking in his entire body o f work can the
reader begin to achieve a sense o f the pattern that refers to Antin. Yet because the self
is constantly evolving, a complete whole is still not possible: only m ore o f the picture
pieces are.
Just as Antin's work evolves to reveal more o f who he is, it also, in doing so,
brings to light the increasingly interdisciplinary nature o f current culture. As the next
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chapter will discuss, Antin, as a linguist, engineer, poet, art critic, and philosopher,
addresses ideas in art, math, literary theory, science, philosophy, and sociology. These
ideas concerning coherency, identity, and consciousness in an expanded system lend
themselves well to discussion in term s o f developments in neural networks, chaos
theory, and quantum physics, which have affected the way in which the self is evaluated
and defined. Antin believes that the self has a definite shape in space and, therefore, has
boundaries. His later works will track his move away from the postm odern idea that the
self can be both everywhere and nowhere simultaneously because, for him, that would
make it nothing. Instead he continues to relocate the self as a dispersion o f pieces (as he
did in the early autobiographies), only now among a larger scale that has many levels.
The dispersion o f pieces is specific and nonlinear, reinforcing his claim that he is not a
globalist (1984, 55) and supporting ideas o f chaos. For Antin, this is a way in which he
is able to locate a ground for the self and maintain some sense o f distinctiveness in what
otherwise appears to be an increasingly homogenized, global society.
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CHAPTER 5. BEYOND POSTMODERNISM:
FROM THE FRAGMENTS OF SHATTERED TRADITION EMERGES
A NEW ORDER IN DAVID ANTIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WORKS
Significant cultural developments between the late 1960s and 1990s
Finding that the constructs o f postm odernism elim inated the possibility o f a location
w here the self could exist, writers and scientists interested in determining ju st such a
place began to explore new ideas and theories. B eginning in the 1970s, cultural
developm ents leaned toward m ore global or expansive answers to age-old questions
concerning order, nature, and consciousness. However, these ideas—while a return to
pre-postm odern notions o f pattern and order—were unique because the concept o f order
was radically different from the linear order o f convention or even the linear geom etric
order used by postm odern artists to contrast with the nonlinear order o f nature.
Em erging sim ultaneously at this time in the various disciplines was an understanding
that m uch o f what had been dism issed as disorder or randomness was actually part o f a
very precise nonlinear order or pattern inherent in nature and humans. For a lack o f
nonconventional and, therefore, geom etric language with which to describe this concept,
this new understanding o f order exceeded our previous notions o f scale, overlaying a
grid beyond our universe and quantifiable m athem atical formulas.
C om ing together to explain concepts o f order and pattern, while also satisfying
the hum an desire for some type o f order (which postm odernists dismantled and exposed
for its superficiality in its conventional form), ground-breakers in science and
technology as well as in art and literature proposed radical explanations which, if not
com pletely accepted as absolute, are at least fam iliar term s in today's culture and are
175
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plausible argum ents in philosophical and theoretical dialogues. An emerging field made
possible by cultural developm ents but also serving as a catalyst in philosophical and
theoretical debates is the relatively new area o f study known as chaos theory. This new
field o f chaos theory, which actually applies to num erous fields, including physics,
com puters, m em ory research, art, and literary theory, suggests concepts that, while they
are distinct to particular areas and languages, share a general tendency to search for a
new idea o f order that m akes organization and sense possible.
In his book Modern Conditions, Postmodern Controversies, Barry Smart
discusses how recent technology has transform ed culture by affecting the scale on and
m anner in w hich society interacts. He argues that the new electronic technologies
decentralize com m unication o f information, changing the "scale, structure, and pattern
o f hum an activities and relationships" (Sm art 1992, 116) to that which is global,
nonlinear, and highly interdependent. These changes have proven to be problem atic for
W estern cultures because, as Smart points out, we tend to view anything that is not
linear or continuous as irrational (Smart 1992, 116), and our new technology allows for
exactly those "irrational" conditions to reveal them selves as typical rather than as
exceptional in nature and culture.
To build upon what Smart presents, it is critical to note that the seeming
irrationality is actually necessary for us to allow for a new type o f order to emerge, one
w hich is nonlinear. The traditional view o f the world has been dism antled during the
postm odern period, forcing us to rebuild our understanding o f nature and order as
som ething significantly different from what is conventional and comfortable. Because
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these ideas and theories resulting from chaos theory and continuing developments in
quantum physics, are such a radical break from conventional knowledge and
perspective, they appear irrational or senseless upon introduction. However, as history
has shown repeatedly, as science and technology advance, m ore evidence supporting
these theories surfaces to answer questions and to provide understanding o f ju st what
patterns and order exist in nature and how the hum an consciousness or view o f the self
fits into that pattern or order.

Developments in science, mathematics, and technology
As Western culture im mersed itself in the electronic age, com puters emerged as the
standard technology. In the 1970s and 1980s, com puters becam e more widespread and
sophisticated, providing scientists and m athem aticians the m eans for in-depth study o f
concepts such as com plex dynam ics, quantum theory, chaos theory, and neural
networks, which were previously beyond the scope and capability o f the available
technology (Briggs and Peat 1990, 23-24; Hayles 1990, 2). Since scientists in the late
1800s began to acknowledge nonlinear order in nature and mathem aticians then in turn
began to develop nonlinear equations for studying such phenom ena as explosions and
winds, nonlinearity has increasingly become recognized as the rule rather than as the
exception in nature (Hayles 1990, 144). This wide acceptance by the scientific
community is relatively recent and directly correlates to im proved technology which has
allowed for more advanced mathem atical interpretations tlirough applications o f
complex dynamic equations, including those used by physicists and chaos theorists.
M athematician R oger Penrose points out that the developm ent o f quantum theory was
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used by scientists and m athem aticians to explain properties and phenom ena that
classical physics could not answer, such as "the very existence o f solid bodies, the
nature o f chemistry, the colours o f substances, the phenom ena o f freezing and boiling,
[and] the reliability o f inheritance" (Penrose 1989, 226). Penrose argues that, while
classical physics does explain much o f our complex universe, the very precise
descriptions o f quantum theory are necessary to explain other still unanswered
questions, particularly those regarding the physics that underlie our thought processes or
consciousness (Penrose 1989, 226). This argument seems reasonable because if we are,
in fact, o f the universe, it would follow that we, too, should follow the same laws o f
nature or the universe. To view the hum an being as something separate from the
universe seems either naive or arrogant. The science o f quantum theory, then, could in
part provide a fuller understanding and new perspective o f the world, m uch as scientific
developments in the past clarified many o f the mysteries which at their tim e were
attributed to God or viewed as beyond the scope o f hum an comprehension.
Quantum theory, much like other recent theories and fields o f study in the
sciences, is a return to find some order in nature, a concept that we saw dism antled in
the postmodern period. The search for pattern, to place ourselves in the structure o f a
larger cosmos, however, did not merely appear with the sudden em ergence o f quantum
theory, fuzzy logic, or chaos theory. The early twentieth century works o f Albert
Einstein regarding relativity and curved space as an alternative to Euclidean geometry,
Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty principle addressing a particle's mom entum and
position, and Kurt Godel's responding proof all paved the way for contem porary
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scientific thought outside the realm o f linear order and geometry (Hassan 1987, 56-59).
Establishing the m atrix for all o f these contem porary ideas is Kurt Godel's 1930 proof
which proposed that even m athem atical structures have limits o f com pleteness and that,
while no structure can ever be com plete, it is nonetheless part o f an even larger or
stronger—yet still incom plete—structure (Hassan 1987, 59; Briggs and Peat 1990, 75).
In other words, while a pattern m ay be incomplete, therefore seeming to be random or
lacking order because its linear continuity is broken or absent, the pattern is, in
actuality, present; it is merely difficult to see within the scale o f its present system . If
the scale is increased, the pattern can be seen to exist as part o f a larger system or
structure. This concept o f order or pattern across m ultiple systems on global scales is
what scientists, m athem aticians, and other theorists who were left unsatisfied w ith the
constructs o f postm odernism built upon in the 1970s when technology advanced enough
to perpetuate the search for mathem atical theories that might explain how the universe
works.
In his text. Fuzzy Thinking: The N ew Science o f Fuzzy Logic, Bart K osko—who
has degrees in mathem atics, electrical engineering, philosophy, and econom ics—argues
from the stance that all things are not, as we have been taught to categorize, either true
or false (1993, xv). Instead, all things are a m atter o f degree, i.e., fuzzy, vague, or
inexact. From this fundamental assum ption, Kosko develops ideas regarding fuzzy sets
that reside in our brains, allow ing us to group things loosely according to these sets and
to look for connections (Kosko 1993, 123). He extends the use o f fuzzy sets to the
developm ent o f com puter system s known as neural networks that supposedly function
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m ore like the human brain than regular com puters do and which will be discussed in
m ore detail later in this chapter. W hat is im portant to note at this point is that the
advances in technology in current culture have allowed various branches o f science to
further their investigation o f theories that were previously impossible to explore. Fuzzy
logic, quantum theory, and chaos theory all support general tendencies to establish
patterns in larger systems that are not linear and were previously limited by
com putational capabilities.
Perhaps one o f the most popular and culturally influential developm ents in
science since the 1970s is that o f chaos theory, which has seeped into our cultural
subconscious as evidenced by its presence in discourses involving science, philosophy,
econom ics, politics, and the arts. At one time, the term chaos evoked only thoughts o f
random ness, chance, confusion, or general disorder. However, this view began to
change when, in the late 1800s, French philosopher, m athem atician, and physicist Henri
Poincaré drew attention to problems in the attem pt to explain all natural phenom ena in
term s o f closed N ewtonian systems (Briggs and Peat 1990, 26-29). That is, the
tendency to focus on individual units and to follow these units through time with the
assum ption that all the individual actions will add up to the system's collective behavior
proved to be inadequate when open system s were in question. These problems, which
scientists, including Einstein, Heisenberg, and Godel, addressed with theories on
nonlinearity in the early twentieth century, inspired the beginnings o f what is now
considered to be chaos theory.
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M odern-day chaos theory provides an alternative view o f order—one that is not
based on linear. Euclidean geometry where everything is plottable on the traditional x-y
axes relative to time and that forces us to view the world from a new perspective. M uch
like quantum theory which, Ihab Hassan suggests, requires that we view the universe
"not as a collection o f physical objects, but rather as a complicated web o f relations
between the various parts o f a unified whole" (Hassan 1987, 61), chaos theory also
supports the belief that the universe is a very interconnected structure. Strongly
dem onstrating this proposed interconnectedness is the aspect o f chaos theory known as
turbulence. Turbulence, which traditionally has been viewed as proof o f fragmentation
or disorder, actually exists because the pieces o f the system are related; m ovement o f
any one piece causes movem ent o f the others (Briggs and Peat 1990, 52). Turbulence is
not plottable using Euclidean geometry, but, instead, is represented by fractal geometry
in the form o f self-perpetuating feedback that exists in the dim ensions intermittently
somewhere between that o f a point (one dim ensional) and a line (two dimensional)
(Briggs and Peat 1990, 105). In fact, Briggs and Peat argue that the breakup o f order
into turbulence is actually "a sign o f the system 's infinitely deep interconnectedness...of
its wholeness" (1990, 52). The notions o f interconnectedness and a unified whole
contrast sharply with the constructs o f fragm entation and decentralization put forth by
postm odernism and provide the possibility o f determ ining a locus or ground for the self
that accom m odates a culture in which m eaning seem s tangential and ephemeral at best.
The view o f chaos changed more radically because o f scientific developm ents in
physics and cultural changes discussed in the previous chapters. During the 1960s,
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postm odernists and deconstruction theorists were breaking apart conventional ideas o f
order and hierarchy. In the m idst o f postm odernism , critics and scientists began to
reevaluate chaos now that the world was being understood as dynam ic and nonlinear.
Because this was a tim e during which the definition or perception o f chaos was
changing to accom m odate new views o f the world, different disciplines used the
principles o f chaos for dram atically different emphases. As Hayles points out:
Literary theorists value chaos prim arily because they are preoccupied with
exposing the ideological underpinnings o f traditional ideas o f order. They like
chaos because they see it as opposed to order. Chaos theorists, by contrast,
value chaos as the engine that drives a system toward a more com plex kind o f
order. They like chaos because it makes order possible. (1990, 22-23)
As we move away from the unrelated fragm ents o f postm odernism in search o f a new
order, chaos provides a theory whereby order, and perhaps wholeness, is possible. The
current m ovem ent in science is to see life and order as possible because of, not in spite
of, entropy (Hayles 1990, 100). Scientists are now using the laws o f chaos to explain
and understand for the first time the working processes o f nonlinear system s, including
the human heartbeat and thoughts, the aging process, storms, the structure o f galaxies,
and perhaps even the origins o f life (Briggs and Peat 1990, 14, 71). These chaotic
systems are considered to be "locally unpredictable but globally stable" (Briggs and
Peat 1990, 74) because, while they are constantly undergoing change—as with weather
and the total recycling o f proteins and cells in the human body every seven years—
overall, the system rem ains essentially the same (Briggs and Peat 1990, 68, 74). By
studying such chaotic system s, we can see how even m inute events affect the dynamics
and change the shape o f the whole system, contributing to the m aintenance o f the
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system's overall stability. If chaos can provide answers about hum an thoughts and the
evolution o f life itself, then perhaps it, as well as quantum theory, may also lead to
insight regarding ideas o f the se lf and where consciousness is located.
Because chaotic systems are so sensitive to even the sm allest changes, they urge
us to view the world qualitatively as opposed to quantitatively, a concept that
proponents o f linear equations. Euclidean geom etry and space, and clear-cut
cause/effect relationships m ay find difficult to embrace. The attem pt to interpret chaotic
systems quantitatively produces w hat is considered to be noise or randomness because
the fluctuations o f chaotic system s are sporadic and do not lend them selves to
conventional linear explanation. Instead, they require a different set o f rules, so to
speak, in order to be interpreted. Dem onstrating the different approaches to thinking
with quantitative and qualitative m athem atics, Briggs and Peat explain:
In the old quantitative m athem atics the m easurem ent o f a system focuses on
plotting how the quantity o f one part o f the system affects the quantities o f the
other parts. By contrast, in qualitative m easurement, plots show the shape o f the
system's m ovem ent as a w hole. In a qualitative mode, scientists don't ask. How
much o f this part affects that part? Instead, they ask. W hat does the whole look
like as it m oves and changes? H ow does one whole system com pare to another?
(1990, 83)
The implications o f qualitative m athem atics are far reaching. In term s o f viewing
autobiography, we no longer feel required to determ ine or trace the path o f how every
incident in a person's life caused or eventually led to another incident. The writers who
are examined in this dissertation and who preceded A ntin thought in predominantly
quantitative ways. First Augustine saw every occurrence as the natural unfolding o f
events on the path to God. Then Rousseau felt he must recount the direct connection o f
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incidents to his behavior to the public's m isperception o f his true self. N ext Stein
wanted to show how her actions (such as telling Picasso to give up writing and return to
painting) directly affected other people and improved society.
Breaking from quantitative thought in search o f something that at the tim e had
not taken shape are Antin's two early postm odern autobiographies, which do not define
relationships between events but which do exhibit the beginnings o f the "locally
unpredictable but globally stable" (Briggs and Peat 1990, 74) thought behind chaos
theory. It is important to clarify here, however, that this does not m ean A ntin is a
globalist; he would very m uch object to that categorization (Antin 1984, 55). Rather,
Antin illustrates the idea that the self as a system, while constantly colliding with forces,
maintains its overall basic essence. The shards we see in Antin's early autobiographies
may be random and unpredictable; however, the core material o f the self overall
remains the same, survives the collision—as Antin refers to it-w ith these random events.
The shape o f the sy stem -in this case, the self—while pliable, remains essentially
recognizable. The quest for A ntin at this time, though, was to determine ju st what the
core o f that system looked like and where its boundaries lie.
Thinkers like Antin who were not satisfied with the unanswered question o f
postm odernism —if the self exists, then w here—searched new territory necessary to map
out for the self a possible location at a tim e when such a location had becom e
unchartable using the available tools o f society. Antin reinforces with the closing poem
o f his 1968 text, code o f flag behavior.
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there must be a sense
in this madness
only
he was not in a position
to discover it (65)
The order o f logic, o f coherency, for understanding the world and his place in it is not
attainable using the strategies currently available; he m ust leave his current position or
way o f thinking and seeing in order to find where sense or coherency is possible.
Discussions in chaos theory focusing on open systems, or "autopoietic structures," echo
the later writings o f Antin (particularly what it m eans to be avant-garde 1993, 98),
wherein he speaks o f the self as interacting with society while also m aintaining its
boundaries, its definition. Autopoietic structures are paradoxical because they are
simultaneously autonomous and interwoven within a larger environment (Briggs and
Peat 1990, 154).
Antin's idea that the self has definitive boundaries that hover about as it collides
and interacts with factors in society reads like the description o f autopoietic or self
organizing and self-renewing structures, which Briggs and Peat point out include
Jupiter's Red Spot, whirlpools, and even ourselves (1990, 154). Each open
system has an internal organization that continuously adjusts to the environment. As
they explain, "Each autopoietic structure has a unique history, but its history is tied to
the larger environm ent...autopoietic structures have definite boundaries, such as
semipermeable membrane, but the boundaries are open and cormect the system with
alm ost unimaginable complexity to the world around it" (1990, 154). Using this
explanation o f open systems that chaos theory provides, we can begin to understand
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how an individual may be able to m aintain a sense o f se lf while also actively
participating in our very com plex society. The self, as an open autopoietic system,
hovers, expands, and collides with other elements, continually undergoing change while
m aintaining its individual sense o f definition through self-renewal and self-organization
o f a pattern o f individual pieces, not necessarily the individual pieces themselves, which
are interchangeable (Penrose 1989, 25).
Many aspects o f chaos theory are also found in the principles o f neural
networks, a teclinological field that operates on the concepts o f feedback and self
organization. The developm ent o f neural networks began in the 1950s when computers
in general were developing, and the aim was both to understand better how the brain
works and to em ulate it (Fausett 1994, 1). U nlike regular serial- or parallel-processing
computers that both operate on linear circuits, however, a neural network is an entire
system o f neurons and weights com m unicating across num erous layers, much m ore like
the human brain than parallel or serial computers ever could em ulate. In the same way
that chaos theory stresses the interconnectedness o f structures and quantum theory
emphasizes patterns throughout increasingly encom passing systems, neural networks
consist o f m ultiple layers o f neurons that com m unicate with each other to complete
patterns o f information through the system o f neurons with unique associated weights
(Fausett 1994, 3).
Neural networks were originally m odelled after the hum an brain and, therefore,
are capable o f mathematically mimicking many o f the sam e characteristics. However, it
is important to note that while all neural networks are not constructed for the purpose o f
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studying human cognition, the attem pt to model biology may lead to better mechanical
computational capabilities (Fausett 1994, 7). Furthermore, mathem atical models that
have been developed to explain neural dynamics and pattern generation o f the brain
have radically affected how scientists view the w ay our brains work. Particularly,
Skarda and Freeman point out, as a result o f neural network technology, biologists now
view the brain as a physiochem ical system that is highly self-organizing as opposed to
being purely reactionary to outside stimuli (ed. M cGaugh et al. 1990, 377). In this
approach, we see the mutual influence that these two disciplines have had on each other
and which will also emerge in the dialogue o f current experimental autobiography
writing.
In her introduction to neural networks, Laurene Fausett describes these networks
in sim ple terms as a system o f layers which house a large num ber o f processing
elem ents referred to as neurons, units, cells, or nodes (1994, 3). She goes on to explain
that "[e]ach neuron is connected to other neurons by means o f directed com m unication
links, each with an associated w eight. The weights represent information being used by
the net to solve a problem" (Fausett 1994, 3). As the system gains experience and the
neurons send signals to other neurons in the system, the strength o f the neuron's
associated w e ig h t-o r synapse betw een it and another neuron—strengthens. In keeping
with biological models, it is within these weights or synapses, not the actual neurons,
that long-term memory resides (Fausett 1994, 5-6). The existence o f a w orking long
term memory is what makes it possible for neural networks to store, classify, group, and
recall patterns (Fausett 1994, 3). This advanced ability to recognize patterns connects
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the system's individual neuronal layers, allowing the system to function as ju st that—a
system, a cormected whole. Furtherm ore, because the system is so advanced, as weights
or synapses gain experience, they, like their biological models, become better able to
recognize patterns and can also teach them selves to group more efficiently, even when
the information provided to the system is noisy or incomplete (Kosko 1993, 39). The
system uses its patterning skills to com plete or at least approximate what the total
information would look like (Subram anya 1994, 9). The echo here with Godel's proof
o f incomplete structures within other incom plete structures and with chaos theory in
which pattern generation as a system feeds into itself results directly from cultural
undercurrents in various disciplines, all searching for a way to establish order in a very
fragmented culture.
Because the network's interconnectedness and design to search for patterns make
the entire system sensitive to changes in any layer, the network also needs to possess
fault tolerance sim ilar to biological neural networks in order to be useful or reliable
(Fausett 1994, 7). It must avoid the inefficient crashes or slowdowns associated with
serial or parallel computers that encounter system damage or excessive data input.
Describing this fault tolerance com m on to both biological and artificial neural networks,
Fausett points out:
In spite o f our continuous loss o f neurons, we continue to learn. Even in cases
o f traumatic neural loss, other neurons can sometimes be trained to take over the
functions o f damaged cells. In a sim ilar manner, artificial neural networks can
be designed to be insensitive to small dam age to the network, and the network
can be retrained in cases o f significant damage (e.g., loss o f data and some
connections). (1994,7)
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The com parison o f biological and artificial networks that Fausett describes is supported
by other scientific research, such as that found in Stephen Rose's text, The M aking o f
Memory: From M olecules to Mind, wherein R ose recounts the results o f work with
trained chicks that com pensated for brain dam age by either rerouting information or
reconstructing incom plete data patterns by relying on m em ory o f the information or
patterns (1993, 278). Unlike regular com puters that can perform only tasks that they are
programmed to do and that cannot self-renew or survive system damage and, therefore,
crash, neural netw orks dem onstrate more hum an survival or repairing capabilities. This
is not to say, by any means, that they are o f hum an quality or any near substitute beyond
computational and mechanical machinery.
Although many o f the m ysteries o f how the hum an brain and mem ory work
remain in question, m any scientists and com puter enthusiasts believe that understanding
more about how artificial neural networks behave may, indeed, provide insight
regarding biological neural networks (ed. M cGaugh et al., 1990, 350). Following up on
this approach, scientists in the 1980s began to experim ent directly on real neural
networks in the brain, whereas models o f neural networks have been around since the
1950s (ed. McGaugh 1990, 377). The hope is that advances in this technological field
will guide researchers who are interested in the learning and memory processes. Work
in both o f these fields has affected the approaches that some writers take and
particularly the way in which they try to represent the construction o f the self in current
society.
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Developments in memory research
As advances occurred in science, m ath, and technology, and as new inform ation about
the brain arose, theories regarding how m em ory works also shifted to reflect these
developments. M em bers o f the m em ory research com m unity representing different
research areas proposed various id eas-o ften conflicting—o f how w e rem em ber and
where the seat o f m em ory and consciousness exists. Regardless o f the area o f study,
however, theories generally resem bled ideas prevalent in other disciplines, again
reinforcing the trends seen throughout history for cultural ideas to develop
synchronously across m ultiple disciplines.
As stated in the previous chapter, m em ory research during the 1960s and 1970s
struggled as a result o f num erous failed experiments. W hat did em erge from these
failures, though, was the rejection o f any belief in the physical transfer o f m em ory,
despite the residual and m isleading use o f this idea by the science fiction publishing and
movie m aking industries. The beginning o f theories that viewed m em ory as a property
affected by chemical changes to the whole body—its brain, cells, and synapses—became
the new focus for scientists and researchers. Im provem ents in technology have allowed
scientists to image and record chemical fluctuations in the brain as it is stimulated.
However, it is im portant to keep in m ind that technology may not autom atically answer
all questions about the brain and memory. As Rose warns, "Showing that a brain region
is active when a person is learning o r remem bering is not the same as showing that the
memory 'resides' in that part o f the brain" (1993, 133). Quite contrary, m ost scientific
research has, if anything, discredited the notion that m em ory can be assigned to any one
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part o f the brain. Instead, even though the hippocampus has been determ ined to play a
vital role in transferring short-term memory to long-term or perm anent m em ory, this
region is not where the m emories are stored (Penrose 1989, 379-380). Penrose believes
that they are actually stored sim ultaneously in many places within the cerebral cortex.
This vague explanation and assignm ent o f where memory resides is about as clear as
our understanding currently gets.
Since the 1980s, som e m em ory research has been performed, none o f which has
produced concrete answers. Some studies include a return to classical conditioning o f
simple reflexes, such as eye blinking in rabbits, where neural circuitry is then m apped;
a biochemical focus to determ ine which proteins may affect memory; and w ork with
molluscs to see how neurons and the nervous system work (Rose 1993, 214-215). All
three o f these areas share an interest in observing changes to the neuronal structure in
the brain and how this, in turn, affects memory. Rose presents studies o f m emory
(including the experim entation by Ken Lukowiak in 1988 and by M ary C hen and Craig
Bailey in 1990) that support work with neuron circuitry and distribution o f memory
across many neurons and cells as opposed to any single identifiable cell or neuron or
synapse (1993, 226). Similarly, Kosko believes that "learning and m em ory lie in the
great tangled webs o f synapses" (1993, 206) in our brains; and, as we learn, the
synapses change, allow ing us to store the patterns we distinguish with our brain's fuzzy
sets in whole fields o f neurons and synapses.
Also supporting the ideas o f the brain and memory as being nonlinear sets or
webs, o f neurons and synapses are chaos theory proponents Briggs and Peat. They
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support Ilya Prigogine's argument that the brain, as part o f a nonlinear world, needs to
be irregular in order to function properly (Briggs and Peat 1990, 166). Furtherm ore, the
brain as irregular or nonlinear contains fluid patterns o f neurons within a network, and it
is within these patterns o f the network that memory, such as for making a finger move,
resides (1990, 171). This web o f m em ory, as opposed to any localization, explains how
a hand can relearn to function even after severe damage to certain cells or neurons or
even after the loss o f an appendage. They argue that "[a] memory, like a sensation, is
not an isolated bit; it is a pattern o f relationships" (1990, 173). In terms o f studying
autobiography, this theory can be applied to assert that our own life story or
construction o f self is not a series o f isolated incidents merely linked together, but is a
general pattern that emerges over tim e within our individual fuzzy sets or webs, raising
the question o f what is necessary to see the self-o n e book, one genre, one body o f
work?
The focus o f note here is that memory research currently follows the prevailing
trends in culture, just as it has in the past. Theories that attem pt to pinpoint specific
cells or neurons responsible for specific m emories have given way to new theories that
support systems or webs o f neurons, across which mem ory is spread. This shift reflects
the disillusionm ent or rejection o f postm odernism 's fragm entation as the answer to how
the world works. Instead, theories now prom ote interconnectedness o f our mem ory
structure, and, in doing so, suggest some type o f wholeness is attainable, even if that
w holeness is not definable or tangible. W hen Penrose discusses consciousness and
individuality, he points out that because electrons are all exactly the same, regardless o f
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whether that electron is in a brain or in a brick, "W hat distinguishes the person from his
house is the pattern o f how his constituents are arranged, not the individuality o f the
constituents themselves" (1989, 25). Determ ining a pattern that identifies an individual
is what has interested academics in various disciplines studying the self and has inspired
a shift away from postmodernism. Likewise, the pattern that distinguishes an individual
from his house also distinguishes him from other people, m aking autobiography and the
assertion o f the self as unique possible once again. As humans, Kosko argues, "our
brains are full o f fuzzy sets" (1993, 123) that we manipulate into loose groups where we
can look for connections. These connections are the same as patterns, giving meaning
and forging some type o f order out o f the noise o f inform ation that we encounter.
A lthough we m ay all experience both unique as well as sim ilar events in our lives, the
way we can com m unicate how those experiences have helped forge an individual in an
increasingly hom ogeneous society is by determ ining the pattern or shape o f that
person's system known as consciousness or self.
The network approach to memory, in addition to reflecting developm ents in
other disciplines, has led to a new set o f m etaphors for explaining how m em ory may
actually work. While these m etaphors may not appear in the denoted autobiographies o f
writers exploring their mental mem ory and writing processes as we saw in the past with
Augustine, Rousseau, and Stein here, the m etaphors do provide a new frame on which
to view autobiography and the self as m ore diffuse and independently organizing than
previously considered.
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As a reflection o f the culture, current m etaphors for explaining m em ory com e
out o f the technological fields o f com puters and neural networks. The com parison that
began in the 1940s w ith the advent o f com puters and developed through various stages
o f serial com puting and then parallel com puting is now evolving further with neural
networks, even though it is now generally understood by scientists and technology
experts that "the conscious mind cannot work like a com puter, even though much o f
what is actually involved in m ental activity m ight do so" (Penrose 1989, 448). The
m etaphor during the 1970s and 1980s o f m em ory working like a parallel-distribution
com puter proved to be insufficient, because while parallel com puters increased the
speed or efficiency o f processing in computers by distributing several bits o f
information at once, this does not reflect the hum an brain (Penrose 1989, 398).
Although we may be bom barded by a variety o f information sim ultaneously, we are still
only capable o f processing and o f remem bering one piece o f that inform ation at a time.
If it is possible to process or learn m ore than one piece at a time, we have yet to teach
ourselves how to do so. In Daniel Dennett's succinct com parison "conscious human
minds are m ore-or-less serial virtual machines im plem ented—inefficiently—on the
parallel hardware that evolution has provided for us" (1991, 218).

Proponents o f

Artificial Intelligence (AI), who are very much in opposition to proponents o f neural
networks, provide m etaphors in line with Dennett's explanation o f how the m ind works.
AI developers see the m ind as a type o f processor that works with sym bols m uch in the
same way that conventional com puters operate with strings o f Os and 1s—a very
traditional linear m ovem ent o f cause and effect throughout a system (Kosko 1993, 287).
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In the 1980s, the AI com m unity believed that the hum an brain with its parallel hardware
could, however, carry out num erous operations at the same tim e (Rose 1993, 83). The
problem with this theory is that, ju s t as Dennett points out, we cannot carry out more
than one conscious thought at any one time. Sure, we can perform num erous separate
actions such as counting, walking, and snapping our fingers sim ultaneously, but these
acts are not the same as trying to rem em ber consciously m ore than one thing at a time.
For the most part, in order for sim ultaneous actions to occur, these actions are learned
and then become sub- or unconscious actions.
Despite our frenetic society, we are still limited, o r perhaps preserved, by our
ability to possess only one thought at any instant, even if it is a very brief instant.
Despite the schizophrenic pace o f postm odernism , the hum an consciousness, as part o f
the cosmos, aspires to attain wholeness, and this is reinforced with m etaphors o f neural
networks. As with all metaphors used to describe the brain and memory, neural
networks must be seen as ju st that, a metaphor, not an actual accurate model o f the
complex human being, whose intricate workings to some degree continue to escape the
understanding o f scientists. Even w ith their extraordinary capabilities to learn, neural
nets are a very long way from being able, if ever, to serve as a realistic model o f the
human brain (Penrose 1989, 397-398).
When Rose conducted his experim ents on chick brains in the late 1980s, he
found that if he trained the chicks, tracked the path o f learning, and then dam aged that
normal path, the chick's brain would redirect information to circumvent the damaged
area and complete the flow o f information (Rose 1993, 282). He and his colleagues
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determ ined that "the brain doesn't function as a set o f simply connected little boxes but
as a richly interacting, functional system" (Rose 1993, 282). Rose asserts that brain
functioning includes nerve cell activity, which is electrical and which flows through the
brain "in patterns as sim ultaneously regular and varied as the waves o f the sea" (Rose
1993, 131). While Rose's discovery does not acknowledge how brain functioning might
relate either to neural networks or to chaos theory, the similarity o f findings and shared
language cannot be disregarded. He m ay choose to avoid these m etaphors in explaining
his findings, but others interested in understanding consciousness and the brain
(Penrose, Pribram, Skarda and Freem an, Briggs and Peat, and Kosko) em brace them.
O ther than Rose's theory o f rerouting, another possible explanation for the
brain's capacity to recall inform ation even after it has incurred damage has been
proposed by neurophysiologist Karl Pribram. Pribram, like m any scientists, argues that
memory is "delocalized" across the entire brain (Briggs and Peat 1990, 170). However,
he also believes that m em ory is stored this way because it converts infom iation to
waveform s that he says:
create interference patterns which can be stored either at nerve cell synapses or
in 'phase space' all over the brain...similar to the way information in a hologram
is stored by the interference pattern formed when laser waves are brought
together on the holographic plate. (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171)
To retrieve the image, the view er shines a laser having the same wavelength either
through the plate for a clear replication or through p a rt o f the plate for a fuzzier version;
regardless o f the method, the entire image is conjured. Pribram uses the hologram
m etaphor to describe how the brain can also recall infom iation even after large sections
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o f the cortex (as with Rose's experim ents) have been removed. The only requirem ent is
that a waveform sim ilar to the desired m em ory's waveform must pass through the brain.
Although neuroscientists have not been able to confirm Pribram's theory, it nonetheless
serves as an accessible m etaphor for understanding the holistic nature o f the brain and
has inspired further research in this area (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171).
O ther scientists who also argue for some type o f holistic model o f m em ory are
W alter Freeman and Christine Skarda. Their w ork with the olfactory bulb o f rabbits
revealed results sim ilar to Pribram's claim , i.e., "the lim it cycle 'memory' for a particular
smell m ay be stored [holographically] in the whole bulb's low-level chaos or fractal
pattern...because each local region o f the bulb contains the whole limit cycle encoded in
each o f the local region's oscillations" (Briggs and Peat 1990, 171). The patterns o f
memory for the rabbit's olfactory bulb, as well as for all memory that Freeman and
Skarda investigate, are self-organized w ithin the brain and require the "prior existence
o f unpatterned energy distributions which appear to be noise, but which in reality are
chaos" (ed. M cGaugh et al. 1990, 377). A ccording to Freeman and Skarda, the patterns
that identify m emories are continually feeding back into themselves, collapsing back
into chaos, and then emerging as a new form o f order each time (ed. McGaugh et al.
1990, 377). Their explanation also com plem ents the neural network model o f m emory
currently favored by scientists, in which "memories m ust arise as relationships within
the whole neural network—a sort o f phase space o f memories" (Briggs and Peat 1990,
171).
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These m etaphors for understanding m em ory lend themselves well to defining the
self and interpreting autobiography. The self can be seen as possessing a base o f
unpattem ed energy which continuously reorganizes, allowing for the individual to
collide w ith many objects, thus changing shape—som etimes radically—but at the sam e
time rem aining stable in composition. The patterns that emerge as one interacts with
the environm ent, not necessarily the underlying energies that are com m on to everyone,
are w hat identifies the individual as unique. Likewise, autobiography can reflect this
change in energy, with new orders o f patterns em erging each time, but at the same time
acknowledging that, while a particular autobiography m ay present a picture o f a
particular order or pattern which contains what com poses that individual, another order-in the form o f another text or genre—is also a legitim ate or "truthful" picture o f that
individual. Like the hologram metaphor, any particular text or genre m ay be a fuzzy
replication o f that person, but it is, nonetheless, that person. Perhaps the only way to
approach a clearer, continuous picture o f that person is to consider that person's entire
body o f w ork—regardless o f when its discrete pieces are written, its genre, or its
purpose.
By accounting for a writer's entire body o f work, we obviously get a greater
scope o f the writer's developm ent and emerging order or sense through time, which is
limited in a single text or view. However, even a com plete body o f work does not
translate into a com plete reconstruction o f the self. A m ajor source o f the problem with
conventional ideas o f order when viewing autobiography is that many people, according
to Foucault, confuse m easurement and order (1970, 53). Foucault explains that
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m easurem ent and order are the only two forms o f comparison. M easurement
presupposes that a w hole at one tim e existed and has been broken into parts, which
many people tend to want to collect together w ith the aim o f reconstructing or totalling
the whole once again. Order, however, does not depend on an external reference that is
necessary to fulfill for successful completion. The difficulty arises when people
mistake their inability to measure or total up a whole version o f the self for the inability
to order the self. M easurement, tied to the Newtonian paradigm , focuses on individual
particles or units with the assum ption that if these particles or units are tracked as they
correspond to one another, a picture o f the whole system will emerge (Hayles 1990,
169-170). It is not difficult to see how this theor>' would be a convenient way to present
an individual in an autobiography. However, as previously discussed, we now know
that Newtonian paradigm s do not accurately describe most o f what occurs in our
nonlinear world.

Developments in art
Recently I attended a Pop Art exhibit at the Contemporary Arts Center in N ew Orleans
which, although small, was representative. The show, however, was highly criticized
by a local art critic because o f his bias toward m ore traditional/classical conceptions o f
art. The writer, who seemingly had a strong background in studio painting, understood
how to talk about painting—its com position, balance, and so forth. Oddly, though, for
an art critic, he did not seem to com m and a knowledge o f art history, and, therefore, did
not provide a clear interpretation to the newspaper's readership o f the period's intended
mechanistic and technological purposes. The critic, while dismissing the works o f
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W arhol, Lichtenstein, and Rosenquist (whose piece, among other things, incorporated
the gallery's wall as the view from a painted car's window and w as my personal favorite
in this show), touted the sculptures o f currently producing artists because these works
did more than elevate everyday objects to art status; they, like painting, again, had
qualities o f balance, line, composition. In frustration, I crum pled up the review.
What the critic did bring to light, even if only incidentally, is the shift in the last
25 years away from the depersonalized works o f the 1960s and toward pieces that
demonstrate the interconnectedness o f the individual and the world—be it family,
com m unity, politics, or environment. In the 1970s, the art world experienced a period
o f increased funding for extending art beyond the boundaries o f the m useum and gallery
walls out to public places (Sandler 1996, 186). The work that had previously been
initiated by earthworks artists such as Robert Smithson and that aim ed to contrast the
linear order o f geometry against the nonlinear order o f nature continued to bring art to
people who may have otherwise never considered viewing art. N ow , with cuts in
government financial support for the arts, museums are making efforts to be more selfsupporting by attracting more first-time visitors. This trend continued as many
museums, including the recently unveiled Getty M useum in Los Angeles, made strides
to attract new visitors by making the museum less formal and more interactive, with
gardens, restaurants, gift shops, and hands-on learning centers. These spaces have
altered the traditional museum atmosphere to attract people who m ight otherwise not
visit, and, in doing so, have done much to change people's attitudes toward experiencing
art. In the 1980s, however, the earthworks gave way to environm ental w orks, such as
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Elyn Zimmerman's architectural sculptures that incorporated the natural environm ent
into the artwork itself, with the purpose, as Sandler points out, "to change people's
relationships to their immediate surroundings in order to foster their interest in larger
environmental issues (1996, 180). W orks that emphasized the individual's
interconnectedness with and responsibility to the surrounding world were not limited to
outside environmental pieces; gallery installations and live perform ances also stressed
political and social interdependency. Reflecting trends in other disciplines, art
prom oted ideas that showed us as part o f the cultural pattern and inherently cormected—
an abrupt tum from the shunning o f history and continuity in early postm odern works.
As art m oved beyond the depersonalized, m echanical work that reflected the
culture and technology o f the postm odern period, painting that was obviously painting—
i.e., m eant to look like painting—once again gained credibility in the art community.
Painters who were leading the way now were using the canvas to show relationships o f
people across many generations and situations. Describing the 1970s paintings o f Philip
Guston, Sandler writes:
Many o f his images appear to refer not only to his own life—his m em ories o f his
father's death or that o f his brother from gangrene after an autom obile accident
in which his leg was crushed—but to world events—the Holocaust. Piles of
severed emaciated limbs, shoes, and decapitated heads are rem inders both o f his
brother's legs and o f the rem ains o f Nazi death camps. (1996, 197)
W orks such as Guston's, which he considers to be highly autobiographical, show the
connection between ourselves and our world while also expanding the definition o f
what is considered to be the boundaries o f the autobiographical or self-referential.
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O ther conventional art pieces (and by this I mean works intended for show in
galleries and museums) during the 1980s and 1990s continued to blur the line between
the autobiographical and cultural. Jonathan Borofsky's extensive installations aim, as
Guston's painting did, to cross the personal and the public. He considers each
installation to be a com plete work that can be broken into many pieces—each a work in
itself—and then sold randomly or stored aw ay (Sandler 1996, 211-212). Borofsky's
emphasis on the art work as a com plete whole that can be split into parts is not the
interesting factor here. W hat is, instead, is that once this work is sold o ff in parts or its
remaining pieces stowed away or exhibited elsewhere, the original whole is no longer
the piece and may never return to its original shape again. So, while pieces o f the
original installation may come together again at any given time, they are, indeed, the art
work, and the place where the m issing pieces originally existed holds the m em ory o f
those m issing pieces. However, the new art work, while appearing to be a different
work, is actually only in a different phase o f existence; its m atter or spirit remains
constant regardless o f which o f its pieces are together or absent at any given time. W hat
Borofsky originally viewed in terms o f m easurem ent—or a divided whole—ultim ately
works more in terms o f order—or making som e type o f sense without "adding up" to a
previous established value or composition. This installation as a representation o f the
personal or self undulates with the global or environm ent, changes shape and
appearance, but remains constant in m atter and underlying energy, much like the way
Antin describes the self and its boundaries.
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W hereas technology inspired m echanical reproduction during the early
postm odern period, widespread use o f com puter and video technology shaped, and was
used, in art during the 1980s and 1990s. Strengthening the com parison o f the brain and
the com puter, some artists used computers as a new way to show process and m ental
activity—m uch the same approach that Cézanne took to capture movem ent or process in
his art. Sandler writes o f Jenny Holzer's incorporation o f technology into art with her
late 1980s installation o f LED signs in Times Square which flashed "truisms" she had
collected from herself and the American unconscious (1996, 398). 1 do not believe that
those two entities actually can be distinguished from one another. Her truisms, which
included statements, such as, "Protect me from what I want " and "Money creates taste,"
flashed and paused rhythm ically to reflect a voice, m aking the exhibit seem like "a big
brain displaying insights" (Sandler 1996, 398). N ot only was the definition and
placem ent o f art being challenged, but so was the line between personal and cultural
thought as well as hum an and machine. Was the point here just to demonstrate the
advances in technology, or was it also to em phasize how removed the individual had
become from her own sense o f personal thought? Had we all become computers
spouting cultural clichés without thinking for ourselves? If so, what would now
constitute autobiography? How do we see the individual in such a global-thinking
society? Do w e become com pletely insignificant?
As technology allowed for installations such as Holzer's to bring art directly to
the general Am erican public, it also opened new avenues for artistic expression.
Probably the one form o f art that is most accessible to popular culture and, therefore.
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characterized the 1980s and 1990s is video, specifically music video (ed. Gitlin 1986,
112). M usic video is a com m odity that com bines the functions o f being a creative work
while also prom oting itself and the music it represents for sale. As an art form, music
videos are created for show on television, which is arguably the m ost accessible forum
for gaining inform ation or view ing art in American culture. Some music videos are
legitimate artistic expressions in that they, like more conventional tactile forms
discussed, reflect the current culture and the struggle o f the artist or individual to
establish identity in that culture. Pat Aufderheide argues that in today's fast-paced and
splintered society which is "dotted with shopping malls but with few community
centers...music videos play to the adolescent's search for identity in an improvised
community" (quoted in Gitlin 1986, 118). In a society that is not only secular but also
global, that we have seen over the centuries m ove away from any semblance o f distinct
center or focus for personal identity within that society, this art form reflects the
individual's sense o f confusion and lack o f coherency or even cohesion as the videos
tend to present a m ontage o f information and images that are loosely (if at all) tied to
the song's lyrics (ed. Gitlin 1986, 113).
As in other areas in culture, video pioneers are now also turning away from the
decentered, seemingly random , barrage o f images and information o f the postm odern
and are searching for new forms o f order and coherency in their work to reflect their
expression and culture. Just as we have heard the partial patterns o f an underlying
rhythmic energy emerge from the trademark noise and feedback loops o f the Jesus and
M ary Chain on tracks appropriately named "Never Understand" and "The Living End"
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in the late 1980s, we have seen some artists visually pull together a new type o f order,
as well. In his 1997 extended video form at called Destination Anyw here, Jon Bon Jovi
does more than make a 30-m inute film w ith a soundtrack, does m ore than visually retell
an album. Both the film and the music are integral to m aking sense o f each other. The
songs that overlay the action do not m erely enhance or accompany the visual experience
presented on the screen (and this video was made specifically for television). They
provide the understanding, meaning, or sense for that part o f the film. W hat B on Jovi
has done in this video is erase the boundaries between genres o f film and m usic to
create a space wherein a com plete story o f a young couple's struggle to recover from the
accidental death o f their daughter is revealed through m usic and dialogue, visual loops
and flashbacks, m oving video and still shots, and glim pses into the personal psyche and
public perception o f events. The com bined media works better than a single form in its
attempt to com m unicate a view o f the se lf as affected by external and internal forces.
Combining media, blurring genres as Bon Jovi does with the technology available to
him, is possible because o f the w ork done by earlier perform ance artists such as Laurie
Anderson and Patti Smith. Anderson and Smith challenged the boundaries assigned to
their art forms by m ixing autobiography and public issues in their perform ances which
included poetry, music, and physical movem ent.
More closely identified with the literary world in the early 1970s—after he had
written his first two autobiographies—David Antin m oved into a new phase in which he
is credited for creating the "talk poem" (ed. Hoover 1994, xxxvii). According to Paul
Hoover, poet and editor o f Postmodern American Poetry: A Morton Anthology, Antin's
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perform ances "returned poetry to its com m unal roots [and]...implicitly challenged the
preciousness o f the page and the concept o f a poem as a closed system" (1994, xxxviii).
By em phasizing that poetry—a highly autobiographical form—is an open system, Antin
allows for the exploration o f the self, its boundaries, and its definition to interact and
change with the surrounding environm ent while it is being formed during performance
and again later when it is translated and transformed on the page for publication. Antin
and other performance artists show the self as having core ideas or truths that act on an
audience but that are also m odified by the audience, as he dem onstrates in his 1976 text,
talking at the boundaries: "i consider m yself a poet but im not reading poetry as you
see i bring no books with m e though ive written books i have a funny relationship to the
idea o f reading if you cant hear i would appreciate it if youd com e closer" (211). His
interacting with his audience determ ines the length and content o f his talks, as he
m easures events in terms o f "energy" (1976, 191) and, therefore, shifts topics or closes
perform ances according to energy surges, lapses, or exits. From reading the
transcriptions o f his performances, 1 suspect Antin's live explorations o f the self,
philosophy, politics, and culture are captivating. However, even working w ith only the
texts o f these performances provides a sense—albeit limited—o f the atm osphere created
by Antin and his audience in this construction o f a self. The melding o f various art
forms and literary genres in current culture furthers the argument for the existence of
underlying connected structures o f patterned energy in nature and culture supported in
the discussions o f chaos theory', quantum theory, and neural networks.
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The search for a new order in literary analysis
The early autobiographies o f David Antin are very m uch in the postm odern mode,
which is to say they are, as previously discussed, collections o f seemingly unrelated
fragm ents that can neither be attributed to any positively identifiable voice nor construct
a definitive person or subject o f the texts. Antin's avant-garde texts o f the late 1960s not
only follow the cultural pattern o f the period as determ ined by an atm osphere o f politics
in upheaval accompanied by an onslaught o f inform ation technology, but they also
perpetuate that cultural pattem by presenting the shape or structure o f individuality or
self possible in such a climate. As chapter three discusses, during the 1960s and 1970s,
there was a cultural shift "toward local, fractured system s and modes o f analysis"
(Hayles 1990, 2).
In the m idst o f postmodernism, literary theorists addressed the difficulty o f
autobiography in the 1960s. Spengemann and Lundquist, like many theorists and
philosophers, held the view that a writer must "identify the T which writes all his past
experiences. I f he does not, his life will seem to him fragmented and incoherent, and its
story will appear to us pointless and confused" (1965, 515). This inability to identify a
single "I" that directs all o f our past experiences is, o f course, the very point that avantgarde writers such as Antin make by presenting fragmented texts. The single view o f
the self has long been discarded by cutting-edge writers, who have adopted num erous
experim ental writing styles with which to try to locate and represent the self. However,
as Spengemami and Lundquist ask, because any attem pt to define the se lf is a
convention that emerges from the culture, what does a w riter do when "none o f the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

208
conventions satisfies an autobiographer's need to order the details o f his life?" (1965,
515). What does the experimental autobiographer, like Antin, do when the fragmented
nature o f postm odernism leaves him searching for a better way to understand his
possible place in the world and to make sense o f how it fits in with history, therefore
attaining a type o f coherency? He searches for a new order, a new way o f
understanding the events and pieces that in conventional perspective appear senseless or
without order.
The understanding that current hierarchies and organizational structures did not
adequately satisfy either cultural needs or physiological phenom ena often became the
focus o f academ ic debate. A t this time, deconstruction theory emerged, questioning
social and intellectual hierarchies, among other things. This seems logical, for the
cultural clim ate at the time was one o f international turm oil with actual and cold wars,
as well as political movem ents o f m inority groups (specifically African Americans and
women), which produced a society constituted increasingly o f isolated pockets. These
pockets o f society, particularly those involved in political m ovem ents in the United
States, demanded rightfully that their position in the social and political hierarchy be
questioned and that their own historical pattern be tracked. Because to live as a
postmodernist is, as Hayles describes, "to live as schizophrenics are said to do, in a
world o f disconnected moments that jostle one another but never form a continuous
(much less logical) progression...to have no sense o f history" (1990, 282), some
intellectuals sought out a theory that would provide an alternative to living without
history, to living like a "schizophrenic." Deconstruction was intended to break the
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boundaries established by conventional structures and thinking; and, in doing this, in
producing fragm ents, it opened system s that had been arbitrarily closed for centuries by
the m en with pow er (Hayles 1990, 176). This opening o f system s extends anywhere
from gender roles to political ideology to literary genres. W hile deconstruction theorists
questioned the prioritization o f ideals based on traditional hierarchies and rejected the
possibility o f a conventionally cohesive whole being achieved, this measure seems very
necessary; for as we know now, there is no one definitive view or story or history.
Deconstruction theorists wanted to break from truths that were validated only by
historical longevity; so, to initiate this break, they fragmented currently established
structures. Likewise, proponents o f nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory also broke
from the arbitrary boundaries o f classical systems. However, these fields, unlike
deconstruction, em phasized continuity-i.e., history (Hayles 1990, 176). For those who
found living within the constructs o f postmodernism and deconstruction unsuitable for
their need to situate them selves in a cohesive historical continuum and, therefore, to
establish some type o f order, chaos theory provided just th a t-a radical break from all
conventional orders, yet an order nonetheless. Briggs and Peat argue that "[o]n a
philosophical level, chaos theory may hold com fort for anyone who feels his or her
place in the cosmos is inconsequential. Inconsequential things can have a huge effect in
a nonlinear universe" (1990, 75). This attitude is different from that prevalent in
postm odern thought where the individual really has no significance in an increasingly
technological world—one in which machines can practically replace anyone, including
the artist.
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Drawing upon the previous discussion o f m easurem ent and order, it is easier to
see that the fragmentation associated with postmodern culture does not preclude order.
Certainly the fact that these are fragm ents implies they are o f something necessarily
larger that no longer exists in that it can no longer be reassembled or returned to its
original shape. However, ju st because the system 's one-time shape carmot be reached
again does not mean that the system also lacks order. An underlying pattem o f what
can be called energy or behavior o r attraction continues to interact with external stimuli
or information to generate new shapes o f patterns, all o f which are composed o f the
system 's same basic material. So, any particular text may present one or m ore
perspectives o f the self at the tim e o f writing, but the view o f the self in that text can
never be complete; it may possess order, but it will not "add up" to a definitive,
com plete picture o f the writer regardless o f how many perspectives are included. As
Gddel's proof explains, the system can approach but never attain completion; there will
always be some information in the structure's pattern that is different or m issing at any
given time. As Kosko points out, with system s such as the self, "the parts do not add up
to the whole. That is nonlinearity...You can study arms and legs and other parts and
still not know how a human behaves" (1993, 108). Likewise, you can see a piece o f
someone in an autobiography and still not have a complete picture o f who that person is.
What you see is merely a dot in the larger pattem o f that person's self, or the conflation
o f tim e to one moment. You m ust see all o f that person's work throughout various
periods o f his life to see how, together, they present an overall shape—which is not to be
confused with an overall complete or definitive view —o f that person.
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Following this theory, the more view s o f a particular w riter that we have over a
greater period o f time, the m ore we can see the writer's patterns (o f tendencies,
concerns, and so forth) change shape, providing more layers o f the writer's structure, the
self. Tracing those layers, we have a larger view o f the system which—while it can
never be complete because o f the nature o f measurem ent—more accurately presents a
way o f looking at that w riter and determ ining how his or her shape (or self) changed
with various experiences. A core pattern begins to emerge that w e can only see from
outside as observers over the course o f time and an ever-expanding scope.
Because a writer's self changes shape and ultimately is defined through m ultiple
texts and over time, many academ ics argue that no one text or genre can be considered
the definitive autobiography o f a writer. This seems logical in light o f relatively recent
understanding o f open systems. If the self is, indeed, an open system, then it makes
sense that any attempt to represent the self m ust also be open. For example, we may not
see in one text that a writer's b rief mention o f attending a rally for com m unism may
actually be a defining event for that person's life or place in history. However, this
seemingly inconsequential incident may lead to a fuller understanding o f that writer
once other books are considered in which we can then see a relationship o f events, such
as the connection between his family being uprooted from their Russian home and the
resulting disruption o f order, i.e., o f continuity or situation in history. In chaos theory,
retrodiction verifies causalities even though prediction is impossible. Situating the self
in one's historical pattem is easier to do externally, as opposed to internally, from within
the self. This is why academics, as opposed to the autobiographer herself, are in the
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position to exam ine the developm ents o f a w riter through her entire body o f work and
determ ine the relation o f pieces to one another in shaping the self. This is also why
m ore academ ics (for example, Olney 1997) now believe that constructing the self
requires looking at all works by an artist, regardless o f labeled genre or point in time
when written.

Examining David Antin's later autobiographical works as indicators of cultural
shifts in order and coherency
Since the publication o f the officially titled autobiographies in the late 1960s, Antin has
continued to produce highly autobiographical works, although they are not titled as
such. These texts address his views on art, academ ia, culture, politics, coherency, and
the self. As his work continues, it reveals cultural shifts in ideas o f order and coherency
through im mediately observable features, such as book titles and biographical sketches,
as well as through m ore contextual aspects, such as narrative structure, w riting style,
and the discussion o f these very ideas-i.e., order, coherency, h isto ry -in relation to the
self. His work, if anything, shows a constant concern with coherency and order and
with defining one's self, which for Antin requires that it be situated historically.
Trying to find some way in which to begin writing about Antin's work, I jotted
down a chronological list o f his titles. (I chose chronology because I am, for better or
worse, com pelled to follow my hum an instinct to see things develop in time.) The list
o f his books as well as the essay that first introduced me to Antin's work, reads as
follows: Autobiography (\967); Definitions (1967); Code o f Flag Behavior, which
includes "Autobiography 2" (1968); M editations (1971); Talking (1972); A fter The
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JVar (A Long N ovel With F ew Words) (1973); talking at the boundaries (1976); whos
listening out there {\919)\ tuning (\9 iA )\ "Radical Coherency" (1987); Selected
Poems: 1963-1973 (1991); what it m eans to be avant-garde (1993). The titles
them selves indicate a concern with order, with organizing principles that track Antin’s
search for a way in which to define and situate himself, as represented through his
autobiographical works. His initial autobiography, which, as discussed in the previous
chapter, presents num erous unidentified voices and story pieces, is a quintessential
postm odern text. What holds these seemingly random fragm ents together? According
to Antin, these w ere images and bits o f inform ation or conversations that he did not
want to forget (1991, 15). The reader is at a loss to com prehend order or meaning in the
text as she sees the random barrage o f inform ation in postm odern society reflected on
the pages in front o f her.
As society and Antin found the lack o f order and conventional historical
continuity prevalent in postm odern thought more than difficult to live with and maintain
sanity, his work explored new types o f order to replace those that had been proven
inadequate. Talking implies ju st th a t-a m ove away from preprinted text and toward
spontaneous perform ance, although this text is a m ixture o f both art forms. In talking at
the boundaries and tuning, Antin leaves behind the pre-scripted text to embrace
perform ance, in which he interacts or collides with his audience as he attempts to find or
fine-tune the boundaries that define the self. The 1987 essay, "Radical Coherency,"
presents a com pletely new way o f viewing one's idea o f order and personal narrative,
which for Antin is that which traces the path o f events or story inside o f one's mind and,
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therefore, imbues that story w ith sense and meaning. Breaking from conventional ideas
o f order in search o f a new order corresponds with developm ents in other disciplines at
the time, specifically chaos and quantum theory. Antin’s most recent books. Selected
Poems: 1963-1973 and what it means to be avant-garde, imply that Antin has distanced
him self from his past work so that he may situate him self historically by placing his
selected poems in a specific tim e frame and by defining who he is at one point in tim e which he says requires retrospection—once he is no longer a part o f the system that he
calls the avant-garde (1993). One carmot write effectively about what it means to be
anything—either an eight-year-old girl growing up in a small house w ith a big family or
an avant-garde artist—until tim e and distance perm it that person to have a less subjective
and single perspective o f the situation.
Over the m ore than 25 years that A ntin has been publishing, his work has
increasingly challenged established categories o f art genres. As pointed out in the
previous chapter, in what it means to be avant-garde, A ntin refers to w hat he calls a
problem because publishers want to categorize his work as poetry, but readers buy it,
find no verse, and return it thinking they have not found poetry (1993, 125). Antin's
poetry no more resembles traditional poetry than his autobiographies resemble
conventional autobiographies. In much the sam e way that his poetry and
autobiographies defy those very established literary genres, his entire body o f work—
writings and perform ances—blurs the traditional boundaries o f what is labeled
performance, art, fiction, philosophy, and autobiography. In his appropriately titled
book, talking at the boundaries (1976), Antin uses higher-level m athematics, physics.
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philosophy, and history to explore the definition or boundaries o f the self. H e writes
that "as soon as you take a position very forcefully youre im m ediately at the boundary
o f that position which lets you look directly over the boundary to the other side" (215).
Pushing at the boundaries o f the self—how it is defined and where it is located (and,
therefore, it certainly exists)—in his written accounts o f im prom ptu talk perform ances
breaks from all ideas o f conventional genres. This blurring o f categories reflects, and is
possible because of, the culture in which technology has invaded every aspect o f daily
life, connecting and com bining areas that were once distinct, such as the art w ork and
the art viewer or the legal proceedings o f a court trial and the theatrical perform ance o f a
television program. No longer is the individual shaped only by her interaction with the
immediate environm ent but, thanks to satellites, televisions, and com puters, also by her
exposure to, perhaps even interaction with, global and universal phenomena.
In keeping with his continual challenge o f boundaries and genres, Antin also
turns the biographical sketch inside out and back again. However, as Antin
progressively explores new ideas o f coherency and order by disrupting and melding
conventional art and literary genres, the biographical sketches that accom pany his texts
become increasingly traditional, perhaps as a sign that he has abandoned the attem pt to
convince publishers o f the futility o f such sketches and has allowed som eone else to
construct them. As discussed earlier, Antin's first autobiography includes the baffling
biographical sketch at the end o f the book that leaves the reader as confused as the
fragments that comprise the main text do. His comments, "Said 'suppositories' before
he was two...W rote his first poem at age 9...In after years had his apartm ent painted and
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is now considering moving" (1967, 14) show irreverence for these publishing
requirem ents which are generic boilerplates and, therefore, meaningless because they
present facts that could describe anyone.
He continues to dem onstrate his disregard for the required sketch in his 1971
text M editations, in which he provides a photograph o f him self with his arms
outstretched as if to embrace the reader but w ith his head turned away in his usual
fashion o f contradiction. This tim e he includes more historical inform ation such as
when he was born, where he was living when the United States entered W W II, and the
exact street location where he was standing the day the sm og began in 1948. His
sketch, while being very different from what one expects in a biographical inform ation
paragraph, is humorous, poignant, irreverent, but also historical in the sense that it does
provide very specific details o f A ntin's developm ent-or at least placem ent—in a
historical context. W hile this sketch is far from being traditional, it does possess m ore
conventional traits than its predecessor in that it strives to give a glimpse o f the author
in a historical context, thus helping to construct a view o f the self that has m eaning for
the reader.
Turning abruptly from the sardonic early sketches that Antin obviously penned
him self, the biographical inform ation sections o f his recent books. Selected Poem s
(1991) and M'hat it m eans to be avant-garde (1993), are very conventional and most
likely written by someone other than Antin. These sketches describe the different
phases o f Antin's art, the areas in which he has worked professionally, his previous book
title, and where he and his wife are currently residing and working. Interestingly, Antin
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is a professor o f art, not English, at the University o f California, San Diego (1991),
again reinforcing his breaking o f boundaries, genres, categorization, and expectations.
Antin's expertise in multiple disciplines—art, poetry, linguistics, engineering—itself
reflects a shift in culture away from the single career for life toward various interests
and num erous career changes prevalent today. Furtherm ore, Antin's teaching position
in the art departm ent o f a university reflects a shift after the postm odern period during
which influential artists and writers were thought always to w ork outside o f the
academ y—0/7 the fringe. Now, it is com m onplace, even expected, that an artist, but
especially a writer, train and work within the university system.
The concepts that Antin has investigated as a result o f his m ultiple interests
perm eate his works, particularly his later pieces that derive from his talks. The texts
reflect and perpetuate shifts in ideas o f coherency and order as reinforced by the
narrative structure and writing style. In his 1967 book, Definitions, he presents an
exhaustive list o f fragments and extended passages defining particular concepts, in this
case, those o f pain and loss. As with his first autobiography and second one which was
to follow the next year, the relationship between blocks o f text is often a mystery to the
reader. However, something very interesting that D efinitions provides, in addition to
many insightful and poignant glimpses into A ntin's psyche, is a section that raises some
o f the sam e issues as chaos theory. Section four, "the roads," is a series o f stanzas that
attem pts to look at a hypothetical situation involving a man travelling in straight lines:
he walks in a straight line in any direction
he turns through any angle whatsoever and walks
the same distance also in a straight line and keeps
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on repeating this process what is the likelihood that
he will arrive at some point some distance from
his starting point or
he rides in a straight line any distance turns
through any angle rides the same distance also in
a straight line and repeats this process any num ber
of times w hat are the odds that he will arrive at some
place som e distance from his starting point or
[...]

suppose he encounters a wall (1967, 36-37).
Antin's reiteration o f language and ideas in this piece at first seems rem iniscent o f T.S.
Eliot’s Four Quartets in which Eliot stops and starts over, saying, "That was a way o f
putting it-n o t very satisfactory," ("East Coker," II, 18) referring to his discontent with
the inability o f language to convey intention. Even though "the roads" is a poem and,
therefore, very concerned with precise language and m eaning, the way in which the
poem turns into itself structurally to m irror the content's concern with the man travelling
and turning in angles is what lends it to study in term s o f ideas in chaos. An o b je c teither a man or a poem or a mathematical equation—that continues to feed back into
itself quickly changes form and does not arrive back at the point o f origin. When that
object encounters som ething foreign to its system, such as an audience or a wall or a
new point, the object must readjust in order to continue.
M uch like Antin's fragmented texts that seem random and without order or
structure but actually resemble the poetic form o f the ghazal, this piece, in addition to
presenting ideas that will surface in chaos theory, also possesses the feel o f another
poetic form—the sestina. The sestina originated in the 16th century and is a highly
structured form containing six end words that rotate positions, creating a scheme as
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follows: 123456, 615243, 364125, 532614, 451362,246531, 12/34/56. The last end
word o f a stanza becomes the first end word o f the next stanza, and the other end words
are intricately woven back into the poem following the very rigid structure. This
process o f reiteration in the sestina is much like the concept o f feedback loops or
functional iteration in chaos theory, in which a plot o f a point on the x-y axis is
reiterated by having the y variable become the x variable o f the next point (Gleick 1987,
61). A trace o f the original point always remains, although its presence becomes more
residual as reiterations occur. Returning to the original point is not possible, but
approaching that original point, like the man travelling in angles but always ending
some distance from his starting point, is. In the last stanza o f a sestina, the end words
return to their original order; however, the stanza has only three lines, each o f which
contains two o f the end words, preventing it from taking the shape o f the first stanza.
This is the co-existence o f m easurem ent and order that Foucault asserts that people
often confuse. The reiteration over time will show itself as an order or pattern.
However, m easurem ent will never reach absolute recurrence o f the original whole; it
will only approach the original point because measurement always allows for a smaller,
more precise increment, which, in turn, precludes a return to com pleteness. The sestina,
much like chaos, presents a rigid determined form that allows for freedom within the
structure. Because o f its dem ands, the form alm ost forces the writer to produce a wild
narrative within in the attem pt to meet the constraints o f the end lines. W hat emerges,
usually, is an uncontrolled wandering o f the writer's psychological connections to a very
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controlled, constrained order o f specific words. Sestinas tend to be entertaining, taking
the reader on a journey that often seems like the rantings o f a lunatic.
With all o f his scripted tex ts-th o se that did not originate as live perform ances—
Antin uses collage in varying degrees to structure his work. He does this to point out
the lack o f cohesion in postm odern Am erican culture (Antin 1991, 18). However, quite
different from m ost postm odern writers, he has never denied that he structures his texts
very m eticulously to reinforce their purposes—whether it is to rem em ber people and
conversations (1991, 15) or to show the arbitrary nature o f American society (1991, 18).
In Code o f Flag Behavior, which is one o f his last solely written texts, he again presents
a collage o f fragments, mainly found pieces from various sources. Even among the
fragm ents o f his arbitrary culture, he searches for a structure, an order, a history, as he
writes, "In this house nothing was ever throw n away. Theyd found a m ass o f doctors
prescriptions pinned together in separate sheafs, some from twenty years before. The
familys medical history could have been pieced together with the help o f these scraps"
(1967, 29). Antin's interest in history, in coherency, is evident even in this early work.
M uch as he believes the family's medical history can be assembled with the help o f
random, seemingly unrelated scraps, the history o f his culture and the se lf can also be
constructed with the help o f the seem ingly unrelated fragments he has collected in his
books. When he writes later in the same book, "There m ust be sense/ in this m adness/
only/ he was not in a position/ to discover it," (1967, 65) he insinuates that eventually he
will be in a position to see the sense. That is, as the principle o f scale in chaos theory
proposes, once enough time has passed, Antin will be able to have the perspective and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

221
retrospection necessary to situate and construct a self imbued with meaning. He will be
in a position that allows him to step back, to see a larger scale or section o f the system
wherein a pattern emerges o f which David Antin is a part.
In the 1970s, Antin continued his search for a coherency that represented the
American mind, and in doing so, moved m ore and more toward live perform ance as
opposed to reading a text written in isolation. In Talking (1972), he com bines scripted
and spontaneously added text. Physically on the page, the text combines regular,
italicized, and bold print spaced irregularly to indicate changes in speakers as well as
time elapsed between comments. Antin effectively creates a text that closely replicates
the rhythm , duration, and energy o f the actual radio performance. By beginning with a
script that he and his wife Eleanor performed extemporaneously on the radio and
incorporating the new material into the transcription for publication, Antin injects an
element o f disorder into a pre-existing order. However, he does not create noise or
chaos or disorder but, instead, a new order or structure reflecting the relationship o f
Eleanor, himself, the text, and the context o f the radio station on that particular day.
The text that Antin and Eleanor develop addresses concerns ranging from the war in
Vietnam to the discussion o f artists who claim to have no interest in history or one's
place in history. Antin reveals the contradiction o f attempting to live in the world while
rejecting history when he discusses postm odern artists who claim that they are not
interested in historical vaults known as museums. Antin believes these artists are not
convincing anyone that they reject history or museum s because they make oversized
paintings that can only fit and be supported by walls in museums. Therefore, the artists'
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goal, stated or not, is to get into a m useum, into the historical continuum (1972, 158159).
W hile Talking illustrates, as well as print m edia can, the mental processes o f
Antin and Eleanor interacting with each other and the text, Antin truly captures the
sense o f the present, o f the processes o f the brain at work, in his oral, or talk, pieces.
Once he abandons text for performance, a new coherency em erges-one that has
m eaning because it arises out o f a very particular context and interaction with that
environment. Because one o f the most difficult things to do is understand someone
else's narrative (internalization o f a story or event), trying to duplicate the context and
interaction o f the situation that produced the narrative is the closest we can get to
translating that experience and, hopefully, conveying its significance. The human
consciousness or narrative creates a radical coherency (Antin 1984, 197-198), and Antin
tries to convey this coherency in his performances.
A marked departure from the fragm ented early books, the talk pieces progress
sm oothly all the way through w ithout interruption by formal punctuation. His structure
m im ics the m ovem ent o f the mind as it travels along, collides with factors (such as
people moving in the audience), changes direction, and finally arrives at its end-w hich
means all the energy is expended. An interest in the present, in process-w hich we have
seen in previous chapters with Stein and with Antin's earlier work—is characteristic o f
m odem and postm odern writers. Antin's ability to capture the feeling o f the present
unfolding as the reader scans the page is im peccable. He defends his preference for the
im m ediacy o f perform ance over script when he (ironically) writes:
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talking for m e
is the closest i can com e
as a poet to thinking and i had wanted for a long
tim e a kind o f poetry o f thinking
not a poetry o f thought
but a poetry o f thinking
since getting so close to the
process o f thinking was what i thought the poem was (1993, "the
river" 123).
and;
im m uch less
interested in revision and polishing than in the difference
between print and perform ance
now both are available and
interesting for the representation o f experience
perform ance is attractive for its im mediacy and power
print for its continuing availability
which is a
convenience though sometimes delusory
because it seems to
prom ise so much clarity and duration
and i have an
attraction to clarity though not so much to duration
but
i have a much greater attraction to performance
to the
m om ent (1993, "durations" 65).
Antin's interest in the present, as he intimates, is in understanding the narrative that
arises within a particular context. His decision to omit formal punctuation and to use,
instead, spacing as an indicator o f the performance's time, rhythm , and energy makes
the reader an active participant, not ju st an observer, on the ride through the experience
and ideas presented on the page where both the subject and reader arrive at a place, an
understanding, a narrative coherency together. A ntin's teclmique and purpose are
different from that o f m odern texts, such as Jam es Joyce's Ulysses, in which the
spectacular concluding section tracks the mind o f Molly Bloom in a style so fluid and
lucid that even without any punctuation it is arguably the easiest part o f the book to
follow. Both Joyce's and Stein's texts aim to m im ic the m ind as it works in the moment.
Their writing, however, does not take the subject and the reader on a blind journey; the
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authors always rem ain in control, directing the text and leading the reader. Antin's
texts are neither fictional nor m eticulously scripted; they are extem poraneous
explorations {very lightly edited for print (Antin 1993, 124)) o f self-definition, politics,
family, philosophy, and science, am ong other things, that reinforce the current
developm ents in neural networks, as well as in chaos and quantum theory.
Very different from his early fragmented texts, A ntin's talk pieces possess a
physical and contextual cohesion that is sim ilar to current technological m odels in
neural networks. W here his early texts reflected the em erging technology o f the day,
conveying the feeling o f som eone clicking the rem ote control through num erous
television channels ("channel surfing"), so, too, does his m ost recent w ork reflect
contem porary technology—with key words such as "webs" and "nets." The concept o f
our world becom ing increasingly interconnected through the technology o f the internet
and world wide web, which individuals can access from their own hom es, is certainly
more than an intriguing convenience. However, the area o f com puter technology that is
o f interest here because o f its tie to biology and m ental processes is neural networks.
As discussed earlier in this chapter, neural networks are a system o f layers composed o f
neurons, units, cells, and nodes that com m unicate with each other across layers by way
o f links called weights or synapses (Fausett 1994, 3). It is believed that the system's
long-term memory resides in these weights or synapses, which change and adjust as the
system gains experience. Therefore, the synapses connecting the system 's layers o f
neurons allow for m eaning within and give the system cohesion.
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The role o f the scenarios that A ntin includes in his later books resem bles the
synapses in neural networks because the scenarios function both to situate the piece that
follows and to bridge all o f the talks so that the reader knows exactly who is speaking,
when, where, and what it means. In providing the story o f what happened after one
performance, consequently leading the reader into the next performance, Antin achieves
a clarity and cohesion in his m ost recent w ork that his early texts eschew. He gives both
story (the telling o f events) and narrative (the internal experience o f those events), and
the story helps the reader get to the narrative. This is not to say that neural networks are
the model for Antin's writing. In actuality, they vary significantly in that, with the
neural network, meaning is in the connection links between information. Conversely,
Antin's texts provide the m eaning in the talks and the information in the links that
connect the transcriptions o f experiences or narrative. Nonetheless, the basic concepts
behind the technology indicate a cultural shift toward an interconnectedness that is
evident in talking at the boundaries, tuning, "Radical Coherency," and what it m eans to
be avant-garde.
Aside from the physical presentation and narrative structure, Antin's later works
demonstrate an awareness o f cultural shifts with the topics o f talks often addressing
ideas o f coherency and order, as well as o f locating the self, which will be explored later
in this chapter. One o f the strongest illustrations o f Antin's (and contemporary
society's) move toward a new type o f order is found in the essay "Radical Coherency"
(1987). Although this piece is (as far as can be determined) an essay written for a
magazine and not a transcription o f a perform ance, it still possesses the feel o f process.
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if not o f the present. The reader still gets the impression that Antin is speaking into a
tape recorder or writing as ideas enter, develop, and then exit his mind, giving way to
yet some other topic, but that he has uncharacteristically started thinking through his
original question before he turned on the recorder. The essay grows out o f m agazine
editor Don W ellman's question regarding Antin's move from collage to talk pieces, to
w hich Antin sets up the rest o f the essay with:
but i wanted to think about what i was
doing and what i used to do in the light o f the notion of
coherency which i specifically wanted to think
about the idea o f what we consider coherent why
we consider it coherent and the different ways
o f thinking things are coherent that are based on
different organizing principles (1987, 183).
Different organizing principles, or ideas o f order and coherency, drive the different
stages o f Antin's work and correspond with changing cultural ideas o f order. That he
wants to view these organizing principles in the way that they connect his past and
current work further supports his move away from the random or arbitrary
fragmentation o f postmodern ideas and toward the interconnected nature o f chaos.
Antin began his work in the 1960s w ith collage in an attempt to make interesting
the "usually continuous things you would consider coherent" (1987, 183) by taking
pieces from these m any different and varied continuous discourses and putting them
next to each other to see what new text em erged. He typically pulled from sources such
as aeronautics manuals, Jehovah's witness magazines, travel guides, and philosophical
reflections. While this proved to be entertaining for awhile, Antin says that eventually
when he heard the fragments coming in his readings he would recognize the original
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continuous discourses from which he had taken them. Because this was o f no interest to
him, he decided to m ove on from collage. An aspect o f collage that he did like,
however, was that he realized his audience w as probably unfam iliar with some o f the
sources he used in his work because he did use texts from such a wide range o f
disciplines. For A ntin, im agining what organizing principles his readers used to make
sense o f the poem s was fascinating, and he equates the way in which his audience
probably views his collage with the way readers approach language poetry or the way
his m other approaches going to a shopping center.
W hat ensues with this shift in Antin's narrative is an extensive retelling o f his
journey with his 76-year-old m other tlirough Sears, which, like the entire shopping
center, is organized around the system o f collage. The juxtaposition o f uru-elated
sections in Sears is like the arbitrary collection o f shops in the mall, each o f which is
separated by boundaries, such as the terrazzo flooring, which are often unnoticeable or
which quickly disintegrate into other sections. Each section has its own system o f
organization; if that fam iliar system o f order breaks d o w n -fb r example, when shoes are
tangled together in piles instead o f arranged on shelves—then it becomes difficult to
make sense o f what is there. For Antin's m other, this m eans "she couldnt see any shoes"
(1987, 187) even though there are probably hundreds in front o f her. Because the pile in
front o f her does not possess an order with w hich she is familiar, she cannot
comprehend or "see" it, much like linear or classical views o f order cannot see order in
the barrage o f stimuli in postm odern society. A ntin recognizes this as a problem not
with the pace o f society but with society's view o f coherency, as he says, "i keep
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thinking/ shes going to figure this out" (1987, 191). C rossing the boundaries o f the
store into a new section which has its own com pletely different idea o f order, however,
is "a tough voyage" (1987, 192) for his m other who is afraid and who does not figure it
out and who retreats into the safety o f familiarity with, "cant we ju st go home?" (1987,
192) even if it does m ean that she will leave the store w ithout getting w hat she needs.
Her apprehension tow ard new systems o f order in the Sears store certainly is not merely
Antin's com m entary on the disarray or daunting structure o f a departm ent store; he is
com m enting on the sam e apprehension that m any scholars have toward approaching
new ideas o f order that he term s radical coherency.
Before he m oves into his explanation o f radical coherency, he addresses a
coherency he found interesting in the departm ent store. H e refers to a "fully articulated/
system o f hosiery" (1987, 193) that has been established but that "whatever the system
contained at this/ particular m om ent all that is left o f the system / is whats left on the
shelves" (193-194). Antin's point is that there is a definite system o f order in place, and
at any given tim e different parts o f the system are m issing, which may seem like
disorder, but the order is, in fact, there. The reader can see the hosiery system , which
itself is incomplete, as part o f a larger incom plete system (Sears), which is also part o f a
still larger incom plete system (the shopping center). H ow disordered the system
appears at any given tim e depends on the scale at which the system is being viewed:
the sm aller the increm ent o f scale, the more difficult it is to see the recursive pattern and
the more likely the system will seem random or unrelated. This, as Foucault has shown,
is a problem w ith m easurem ent and not with order—increase the m easurem ent and the
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order will emerge. Antin's understanding o f an incomplete system nevertheless
containing coherency echoes Godel's proof; likewise the levels o f system s within the
shopping center incites ideas o f scale and fractals in chaos theory. W hile these areas o f
study are currently topical, A ntin is interested in ideas that account for m ore than either
restoring the missing parts o f a system or juxtaposing unrelated fragm ents (1987, 195),
which he sees as "threatening to assemble itself into a fairly dull fam iliar thing" (1987,
195). For Antin, there are other types o f organization that he finds interesting—
specifically the movem ent from and toward coherency (1987, 196).
Again, as it has always been with Antin, the fascination is with process (the
movement) and not product (the arrival at order). He writes o f a professor who at one
time is part o f a conventional coherency but who begins to becom e less coherent to
observers as he acquires bizarre articles o f clothing piece by piece (1987, 196).
However, as time passes and the professor acquires additional clothing, he again
becomes more coherent to observers who m ake sense o f his new attire. He approaches a
new type o f coherency; then he acquires a walking stick and disappears. The
movement away from and toward different types o f coherency is like the reiteration o f
an image in chaos theory; the professor once had a certain shape which fed back into
itself, producing image after im age that did not resemble the original form and was,
therefore, incoherent. Eventually, and suddenly, a reiteration approaches something
recognizable as the professor, yet not exactly what he was originally, and then
disappears just as quickly.
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M aking sense o f this professor's actions is difficult because trying, as Antin
says, " to formulate a/ kind o f sense out o f som eones m ost conventional/ narrative ju st
to try to make sense o f it/ appears to produce a radical coherency that i had/ never
anticipated" (1987, 197-198). He illustrates this with the story o f his grandm other's
death. During her final days, her words were incomprehensible ramblings to her family
because they could not follow her narrative and, therefore, could not m ake sense o f
what she was saying. Antin writes o f trying to reconstruct her narrative so that he could
follow the order o f her thoughts, allowing him to see the sense and coherency in her
yells of, "give him some money," "put it in the can" and "theres not enough room / go
away" (1987, 198). He thinks that the way the mind actually organizes things is far
more interesting and radical than any m echanical attem pt (such as cutting up text or
making collage) to model the random ness in nature (1987, 197). Because he is
fascinated with the way the hum an m ind creates such intricate narratives, he is suiprised
to learn how very little scientists actually know about the working mind (1987, 197).
Because the human mind is so m uch more com plex than any machine built to model it,
any comparison is not only reductive but naive. The preference for the natural
complexity o f the mind over any randomness constructed by a m achine or technique is
the reason Antin shifts his focus strictly to tracking the human narrative (1987).
Trying to understand som eone's narrative is alm ost impossible if you are unable
to account for the introduction o f elements that send the narrative spinning in an
unexpected direction. In the way that chaos theory allows us to understand that a
butterfly flapping its wings in Japan may ultim ately be related to a rainstorm in South

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

231
C arolina, it also allows us to see how "theres not enough room" is related to an orthodox
Jew collecting m oney w ho will not get out o f the bed and, subsequently, Antin's
grandm other's death. There is a clarity in this seeming nonsense o f a narrative that
presents a radical coherency and illustrates interconnectedness as a very com plex web
that is not linear but is definitely logical and, therefore, possesses order.
In his work that follows "Radical Coherency," Antin continues to explore the
interconnectedness o f the narrative he identifies with the self. In Selected Poem s and
M’hat it means to be avant-garde, he looks back on his work, reflects, and situates it
historically with the distance and perspective to see it on a different scale, one in w hich
patterns emerge and which "will show som ewhat more loosely and truly the body o f
w ork that I did then and its clear connection to the apparently very different work I am
doing now" (1993, 13). His m ost recent w ork considered along with his past work
unveils a developm ent o f A ntin's understanding o f how and where the self can be
constructed. Only in viewing all o f his w ork can the reader see the connections that
wind through Antin's texts, ultimately revealing a clearer, though still incomplete, view
o f his narrative or self.

Constructing and locating th e self in a world of w ebs
In his m ost recent talk pieces, A ntin may not use metaphors borrowed from current
technology to explore his thinking or w riting processes the way that Augustine,
Rousseau, Stein, and even he to some degree in his early written texts do. However, he
does use extended metaphors when discussing the construction and location o f the self.
These metaphors reflect his experience in disciplines such as engineering and linguistics
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as evidenced by his knowledge o f advanced m athematics, literary theory, and sociology
regarding language. In trying to define and address questions regarding the self, he
situates h im self as a leader in the now current trend to look to other disciplines,
specifically m athem atics (which takes in chaos and quantum theory and nonlinear
dynam ics) for an understanding o f the self.
Although 26 years elapsed betw een Antin's first autobiography and what it
means to be avant-garde, his ideas o f the self in the eleven books written during those
years do not change significantly. In all o f his w ritings, he portrays the self in term s o f
family, history, boundaries, and, m ost em phatically, narrative. As we have seen, the
form he uses to present these concerns changes radically from the fragm ented early texts
to the fluid talk pieces. N onetheless, his belief in the se lf remains constant despite
criticism from deconstruction and structuralist academics. As chaos theory has entered
academic dialogue, Antin's now 30-year-old ideas about the self reflect the current
cultural shift in thinking toward our interconnectedness on not only a global, but a
universal scale.

Talking his way out of explaining: Antin's move to performance as an
alternative to trying and failing to represent the internal experience
"and like
spiders we poets are all beneficiaries and victim s o f our
language
there are limits to what we can do w ith it as we
m ove around in it" (Antin 1994, 164)
Like every autobiographer discussed in this study, A ntin is consumed with the idea o f
translating the m eaning o f his internal experience to an external audience. In trying to
convey that experience, we have seen the writers try both to m imic and to explain the
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process o f thinking, the experience o f m oving through the mind and acquiring m eaning
for the individual. Tim e and time again, writers have tried and have to some degree
failed in frustration. A s an alternative to representing the internal experience
inadequately by attempting to re-create events and describe their effects on or
significance to the writer, A ntin chooses to make the event and the meaning the same by
m oving to talk pieces because he sees talking as the closest he can get to thinking and
the process of thinking (1993, 123).
Antin's claim o f talking as thinking makes the talk and, therefore, the thinking,
the prim ary experience within a very particular context, i.e., the room where and
audience to whom he is speaking. Because the event is the creation o f the m eaning and
is unfolding at the very m om ent that A ntin verbalizes his thoughts, there is no need later
to attempt to translate the internal experience o f that event; the meaning or experience
is the event right there, alm ost verbatim in real time with spaces to indicate speech
pauses, Antin successfully (and ironically) preserves his talks, which he says he never
works on in advance (1993, 124), in print by tape recording them and then making a
version in writing. The text is not exactly the same at the talk, as he explains:
o f course it sometimes changes as it goes onto paper
because whatever winds up on paper is never exactly like
whats in the air although what i want to do is bring an
image o f talking out o f the air and onto the page
to make
the claim o f speech to make the claim o f thinking
within
the frame o f the book (1993,124).
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Antin's method for showing thinking in the text is not perfect; he is still the beneficiary
and victim o f language, but he is, like all cutting-edge writers, trying to find a new way
to move within it and spin a new web.
His strong preference for perform ance over traditional writing, however,
coincides with his disillusionm ent with structuralists who he sees as externalists
interested more in story as a social production than in narrative. He believes that, in
trying to understand meaning, structuralists produce plots that fail, as he says:
because they begin from texts instead o f tellings
and
even if they come out o f tellings they come out o f m ore or
less ritualized occasions that tend to obliterate the
narrative centers that arise from human social experience
but stories that arise from ordinary social occasions
are always narrative because they arise out o f a
circum stance in which you are talking and trying and
failing to m ake some kind o f sense (1993, 110-111).
Antin recognizes that any m edium for creating or translating m eaning is doom ed to
some degree o f failure. However, he does see that starting w ith the narrative, the talk,
he can create and capture the journey o f the mind, which is necessary for any am ount o f
knowing or understanding.
Tracking som eone's narrative is the only way to come to some understanding of
a self. A com plete understanding is never possible, both because all system s o f nature
are incomplete, and because the self is constantly changing shape. Although the self is
never fully recognizable as either the same or complete, a degree o f understanding at a
particular moment in a particular context can be attained by creating the narrative, the
meaning, showing the self at that point. A ntin sees this approach in talk as the most
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effective way to use language to convey m eaning and create a view o f the self. In light
o f our limited scientific knowledge concerning how the m ind works and our different
physiochem ical com positions, his talks, his presentations o f narrative, are the closest a
reader can come to m aking the mental journey through its twists and jum ps w ith the
autobiographer.

How is the self constructed and where is it located?
Antin's use o f the talk as a fram e wherein he can create a shared m eaning with the
audience provides a narrative in progress, and for A ntin, narrative, while it is not the
same thing as the self, is at the core o f the selfs structure (1993, 92). That is, narrative
defines the shape and com position o f the self. This shape, as previously discussed,
hovers and is constantly changing in response to external stimuli, such as the audience,
which has the ability to change the direction o f Antin's talk as he says, "what poem there
is here will be built around w hatever happens" (1976, 214). The audience certainly
contributes to the shape o f the talk (the narrative), in the same way that all o f our
collisions with the environm ent affect who we are. However, it is im portant to keep in
m ind that for Antin, in order for a self to endure, it m ust survive these collisions and
unions by rebounding and rem aining distinct (1993, 98). The self has definite
boundaries wherein lies its basic essence or com position: when foreign elem ents are
introduced, the self either recognizes and assim ilates that element as part o f its narrative
or it does not (it collides and repels), allowing the self to rem ain distinct. W hether or
not the self assimilates an experience into its narrative is determ ined retrospectively
(1993, 107) when the autobiographer looks, or loops, back on his life to determ ine
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w hich elem ents contribute to the pattern he recognizes as the developm ent o f his self.
In this sense, the self is clearly a construction that can only occur with retrospection
(which is a feeding back into one's self), m aking history and memory absolutely
necessary to the existence o f any view o f the self—an idea rejected in postm odern
thought.
In talking at the boundaries, A ntin uses extended mathematical m etaphors to
w rite about the developm ent o f narrative in the construction o f the self. His m etaphors
equate life events to num bers, which are all contained in boxes. Because num bers are
infinite, so, too, are the num ber o f events in someone's life depending upon how one
chooses to m easure and look at an event. He can pull from the boxes any possible
order; the num bers do not have to be consecutive. So, although the events are
determ ined, the com binations and, therefore, forms that emerge are not. The appearance
or shape o f the self can change, but the basic composition remains unique to that person,
distinct. W hat is in his boxes is his and no one else's. Furthermore, as he m akes
different combinations, he still recognizes him self in those com binations because the
sam e experiences or prim e num bers from formative years will continue to be a part o f
higher num bers as he gains experience in life. As Antin explains:
a prime num ber is a num ber that is divisible only by
itself and one thats an irreducible whole
and you can
im agine that beginning a life all events are prim e because you
have no past into which to reconstitute it that is it wouldnt be
divisible into other recognizable integral factors...
... six? not prim e you can remember
three you have nostalgic m em ories o f three and two (1976, 254).
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U sing this m etaphor, Antin shows how our past and rem em bering our past contribute to
our developm ent and how we construct the self. W hatever he associates with his
num ber three or five will continue to be a part o f his later events because these num bers
or experiences are at the core o f what distinguishes him from someone else who has
different associations for three and five.
While A ntin may have extensive ideas regarding how a se lf is constructed and
defined, he continues to have questions about where the self may be located or
grounded. The autobiographers covered in this study have looked inward in the search
for the locus o f the self, only to find that it was not possible either to find one, linear,
distinct self or to determ ine where the multiple selves could be centered. In response to
this tendency to continue looking inward, as people com m only say, "Look inside o f
yourself," Antin asks what does that mean? Are we really looking inside? For him,
again, talking is the best way to arrive at som e notion o f narrative, meaning, and self.
He writes:
its a funny idea i
mean the idea that the self is inside
is itself a funny notion
whats inside? and inside o f what?
i mean im not even inside
o f myself...
... what do i see as my self? the part
that comes out?
see
i cant get out o f saying out (1976, 241).
His m ocking o f his own inability to avoid referring to the self in terms o f "in" and "out"
o f the body does actually make the point that, until there is narrative, an understanding
o f m eaning, the self cannot be recognized. A lso, a shift away from centuries o f looking
inward to try (and fail) to locate the self is now being pursued in quantum physics and
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chaos theory. So, even though A ntin and many theorists are now trying to locate the
self and consciousness som ewhere outside o f the body, this is still an area in need o f
trem endous study—m eaning a very dark place in desperate need o f light.

Is a cohesive, continuous self possible?
W hen I first began working on this m anuscript years ago, a colleague asked me if I
believed in the idea o f a continuous selfhood. At the time, I was heavily entrenched in
postm odem reading and thought that a b elief in continuous selfhood certainly was
outdated in light o f the fragmented nature o f our society and the perception o f m ultiple
selves that it produced. However, the more I was exposed to ideas and chaos and
quantum theory and the more I read Antin's work, I began to see that a cohesive,
continuous self was, indeed, possible—i.e., as long as cohesion and continuous were not
necessarily synonym ous with linearity.
Antin's talk pieces are fluid narrative that are also filled with pauses as he
grapples for his thought and with interruptions from the audience. These gaps and
interruptions, however, are not seen as breaks in the narrative. As pointed out earlier,
Antin acknowledges the other stimuli in the room and their ability to change the
direction or shape o f what is taking place because everything in the room, not just
Antin, is part o f w hat will make the poem being created at that m om ent in that context.
The gaps and interruptions are not seen as breaks in selfhood but as contributing
influences to its shape, direction, and development. Even though what we might
recognize as the se lf does not exist in those gaps or interruptions because they lie
somewhere outside o f our fam iliar conception o f linear developm ent and do not contain
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a part o f what we view as ours, they still relate to and in som e way affect the overall
developm ent and shape o f the self.
To illustrate how m any very different selves can actually possess cohesion and
be continuous—although not linear—Antin again uses a m athem atical metaphor, this
time comparing the ratio o f prim e num bers to that o f our various selves. The language
o f his m etaphor bears sim ilarity to ideas that develop m ore fully in chaos theory
regarding fractal dim ensions as a way to determ ine the level o f irregularity o f som ething
that does not fit into our straight-forward dim ensions o f zero (a point or set o f points),
one (a line or curve or edge), two (a wall, tabletop, or piece o f paper), and three (space)
(Briggs and Peat 1990, 94). In talking at the boundaries, Antin addresses his
"confidence in the coherency" (1976, 252) o f his life, w hich he sees as connected to a
past and unfolding in time. A t this point, however, he introduces the idea o f different
kinds o f tem poral consistency, which is where he argues that perhaps the self does not
necessarily unroll like a rug, i.e., linearly, but instead like a sequence o f numbers pulled
from boxes o f rational, irrational, imaginary, and (on occasion) transcendental numbers.
This is the point at which he presents his ideas on how the self may be constructed,
which is discussed in the previous section here. As he m oves on to illustrate how the
self may, in fact, possess a coherency w ithout being linear, he compares prime num bers
to life experiences, assigning each number to an experience. He uses this comparison as
a spring board to the m ore com plex concept o f ratio as a way to understand how two
very distinct view s o f his self can actually be viewed as continuous. He explains that,
when someone com pares two events (prim e numbers) in his life, he expresses this
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comparison as a ratio, and w ith ratios, one num ber is divided into the other. In other
words, the mem ory o f one experience is com pared with the other experience, which is
why the memory o f formative experiences or prime num bers influence later
experiences; they are factors o f those larger, later numbers.
Antin informs the audience that after the first two prime num bers—one and tw o—
the ratios o f successive experiences will bounce around but never be as small as one or
as high as two, and he says, "whatever kind o f oscillation theres going to be in this life
o f successive prim es is going to bounce between two and one and never reach either
again" (1976, 256). The experiences can approach the original state o f wholeness or
irreducibility but never reach it, m uch like the numerous references in this chapter to
systems and the se lf approaching, but never reaching, com pleteness o r wholeness.
Furthermore, he uses the ratio m etaphor to show how he could hold in his mind and
compare two very different versions o f his self—one when he ran a scientific publishing
company and another when he was adventurous and collecting unem ploym ent
insurance. He can hold the two in his m ind, compare them, and see their relation to
each other in term s o f how the ratio oscillates between one and two.
This irregular, though not discontinuous, developm ent o f the self as described by
Antin resembles Briggs and Peats' explanation o f fractal dimensions in chaos theory
(1990, 95). Fractal dim ensions, which always fall between 1 and 2, are used to
determine the degree or irregularity for things, such as a coastline or a ball o f string, that
do not fit into our definitions o f conventional (0, 1 , 2 , 3 ) dimensions. The closer a
fractal dimension is to one, the sm oother its surface is because it is closer to a line; the
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closer it is to two, the more irregular or chaotic it is because tracing its points requires
m ore twists that produces what looks m ore like a plane than a line. Briggs and Peat
provide an example involving rice grains to illustrate this concept:
Imagine scattering grains o f rice uniform ly across a map. There may be, say,
10,000 grains and this collection could be said to characterize the two
dimensionality o f the map. A straight line drawn across the page passes through
only 200 grains, so only 2 percent o f the grains lie on the line. The vast m ajority
lie in other regions o f the plane. But suppose now the line twists and curves so
that it passes through m ore and m ore grains o f rice, reaching not only the grains
o f rice but even the individual points in the plane. As more and m ore o f these
points are crossed it becomes clear that the dimension o f the line lies closer to
that o f a plane (two) than a line (one). In fact, twisting fractal lines have
dimensions that are fractional, such as 1.2618, 1.1291, 1.3652, and so on. The
coastline o f Britain has a fractional dim ension o f 1.26 (1990, 95).
Like determ ining the fractal dim ension o f rice grains or a coastline or a ball o f string,
trying to see cohesion in a linearly disjointed self could be said to produce a fractal
dimension closer to two than to one because the self is irregular and chaotic in sm aller
scales or increments o f its existence. It is im possible to capture any significant portion
o f a dynamic self-w hich cannot be described in terms o f conventional dim en sio n s-o n a
straight line with the intention o f determ ining the cause and effect o f linear,
chronologically arranged events.

Antin's ideas of the self as reflective of cultural shifts in autobiography
Antin's ideas regarding the construction and cohesion o f the self indicate that a fastpaced, seemingly disjointed society m ay actually possess a cohesion and order. In light
o f developments in technology and science that indicate the mutual influence o f
apparently remote and disconnected elem ents, events, cultures, and ideas, the fragm ents
o f postmodern culture are now being viewed as interrelated. Antin's use o f
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m athem atical m etaphors to explain the construction o f the self reflects his experience in
engineering and indicates a general shift in current studies to explore the self and
consciousness using math and physics. Likewise, his com parison o f prim e num bers or
experiences as a ratio further puts the discussion o f the se lf in the mathem atical realm.
In term s o f autobiography studies, although it intim ates that two versions o f the
self or two autobiographies that may appear very different can, and should, be
compared. For example, when Antin's first autobiography is com pared with his m ore
recent books, the books appear to have been written by two different people. However,
there is a relation between these works, a connection between his early texts and where
he is now. Antin asserts that "no art that elapses in tim e can be looked at all at once
unless it is terribly short" (1976, 187). Likewise, no life or self, which develops in time,
can be looked at all at once in one book from one perspective o f writing. His proposal
that views o f the se lf be compared and an entire body o f work be evaluated in order to
see as much o f that changing, incomplete system known as the self as possible is the
current trend in academia, which is calling fo r life studies instead o f autobiography. To
see how each work fits into the pattern and affects the shape o f the self calls for the
work to be seen as interconnected (not necessarily a serial cause/effect relationship) and
contributing to the shape o f the autobiographer.
With a m ove toward viewing all o f a writer's work in order to grasp some notion
o f the self, the question is how to pull all o f those different perspectives together and
find a locus that can be called the self. This question remains unanswered, but studies
now are looking toward math and physics to determ ine where the self and
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consciousness lie, w ith the logic that since we are part o f nature we, too, must be part o f
a collective, cosm ic world. H ow scholars will continue to investigate this very plausible
theory is yet to be seen. However, Antin certainly provides support for looking outward
to determ ine the ground o f the self, as he illustrates with a story about a woman with
m ultiple personalities, each o f which is able to form a coherency in relation to its
mem ory o f the psychiatrist treating her (1976, 230). W hat is interesting here is that
coherency can only be m aintained in relation to som ething external; the self is not
centered in any one o f the wom an's personalities but instead hovers somewhere outside
o f her. Likewise, the various works that cover an autobiographer's life present
num erous shapes o f the self as determined by a particular set o f circumstances.
Hovering som ew here outside o f these works is what is recognizable as the self that
gives cohesion to and shows a relation between these otherw ise discontinuous
perspectives o f w hat is considered the autobiographer's self.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Since the invention o f autobiography as a literary genre 1600 years ago, writers
have searched for ways to define the self using memory to represent the internal
experiences that give m eaning to that self. As culture has evolved, so, too, has the role
o f the individual in society changed. This study has shown that shifts in culture and the
self both are m utually reflective and are influenced by developm ents in science and
technology, art, and literary theory. The self, which as we have seen indicates culture,
has undergone num erous constructions, ranging from its synonymous identification
with the Church during antiquity to its current multifacetedness in a secular society.
Beginning w ith St. Augustine's The Confessions (401), generally recognized as
the first autobiography, w e saw the self as a microcosm o f society, which during
antiquity in Europe was aligned solely with the Church. The purpose o f life was to
proceed along the providential or "correct" path, which began at birth and continued
straight forward to death, w here one would be reunited with God. Because completion
o f the Christian life included a return to God, memory was vital to fulfilling the purpose
o f life, for that was how som eone recognized God after death. The science o f the time
was the philosophy that nature, providence, and memory all progressed linearly. As a
result o f the single purpose and identity in life, the individual in autobiography was
strictly limited to showing oneself as an example for the rest o f the Christian
community. By incorporating the popular form o f the rhetorical argument, which
unfolds in strict serial fashion and which defers to a higher authority (in this case the
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ultimate authority—God) for validation, Augustine's text reinforces the linear order o f
providence accepted as the only correct order in his society.
As secularism began to take hold and the Church lost its position as the sole
institution o f power in society, the individual began to be held accountable prim arily to
society and secondly—if at all—to God. The Confessions o f Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
completed in 1770, show a m an distressed over his inability to represent accurately to
his audience the good m an he really is inside. He worries continually that people will
read his words and misjudge him as a rogue. Attempting to influence his
readers/judges, he creates a textual audience that sits in Judgement o f him; he reasons
that if the audience o f the text can see his true nature as good then his actual readers and
neighbors may be swayed to do the same. Underlying his concern for being
misinterpreted, however, is his struggle and failure to come to terms w ith and unite the
numerous sides o f Jean-Jacques. To his credit, his recognition o f the difficulty in
reckoning with the multiple views o f the self situates his text as a precursor o f
modernism, which, among other things, is grounded in this very idea.
As society looked outside o f the Church for answers to life's m ysteries,
developments in science and technology-specifically the introduction o f invasive
experimental m ethodology regarding the study o f the brain and the invention o f the
telegraph as a com m unication tool—influenced how one looked at m em ory and the
evolution o f the self. Rousseau's society saw mem ory as necessary in tracking the
development o f the self. However, the linear movem ent o f memory and growth o f the
self that was linked to the b elief in providence during antiquity was now attributed to
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the belief that, because we live in time, w hich is linear, w e also develop
chronologically. C ircum scribing one's developm ent, then, in what was considered the
natural and correct order and presenting it in such a fashion so as to show one's
achievem ents and to make one's individual m ark in society was the purpose o f
autobiography. Memory, therefore, was a necessary tool for reconstructing one's life
from beginning to end on the page and for arriving at a com plete, definitive view o f the
writer. What Rousseau's text so clearly shows is that these goals are unattainable, not
through any fault o f Rousseau, but because they are born out o f the desire for linear
order and not out o f the reality that the world is actually highly nonlinear. His text reads
like a picaresque novel, with adventure after adventure presented chronologically, not
necessarily focusing on how specific events m ay have developed or defined the self.
W hat Rousseau introduced regarding the self in autobiography, Gertrude Stein
explored in great detail in The A utobiography o f A lice B. Toklas (1933) and Everybody's
A utobiography (1937). Taking Rousseau's approach even further, Stein not only delved
into how the self is constructed through m em ory, but how one actually remem bers the
self while she is writing. H er writing style in the autobiographies (what literary critics
have com e to call stream -of-consciousness) captures m ovem ent—that o f the m ind, the
self, and society. M oving in jum ps, tangents, and loops as opposed to strict linear
chronology, her writing attempts to m imic the actual m ovement o f the mind and
developm ent o f the self. Her style reflects both work in contemporary science, which
was perform ing invasive experim ents with electrodes on the brain and which had
recently derived equations to represent the nonlinear systems in nature, as well as
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advances in technology, which included high-speed transportation and electrical
com m unication.
A s the speed at which society functioned increased, the self was perceived as
more m ultidim ensional and decentered than ever, as subsequently represented by the
work o f Cubist artists. Stein and other m odem writers aim ed to show the mutual
influence o f changes in cultural truths that challenged traditional hierarchies and views
o f the se lf by presenting the num erous perspectives o f the self in a single autobiography
w hich—all o f the pieces together—would construct an am algam ation o f the person.
Furtherm ore, the self was defined in relation to a larger portion o f society due to the
access to the world that technological advances created. N ow , the self was not only
constructed in term s o f the Church and the immediate com m unity, but with an extended
com m unity and readership that was reachable by way o f autom obile, airplane, or
telephone. No longer was autobiography intended either to be an exam ple o f how to
live correctly or to justify one's actions, but to show oneself in relation to the many
groups w ith w hich one identifies, in the attem pt to unite these various sides o f the self.
The m odernists, as Stein's texts reinforce, were knowingly caught in the m iddle ground
between understanding that the world actually possessed a nonlinear order and the
desire, nonetheless, to represent the self as a once whole entity that was now in pieces
but w hich was capable o f being reconstructed following linear, N ewtonian principles
into its original form.
A fter the m odernists were dissatisfied w ith their attem pts to recreate the self as a
whole again in text, the postm odernists em braced the idea that humans are too divided
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by culture ever to become cohesive wholes again. Like previous autobiographies,
David Antin's Autobiography (1967) and "Autobiography 2" (1968) show a collision
between the internal understanding and external perception o f the self. His work,
however, is not an expansion o f traditional autobiography; it is a break from
conventional ideas o f the genre and o f order in reaction to a completely new culture
after the m odern period. The second h alf o f the twentieth century ushered in
technological advances and scientific developm ents that further changed the speed at
which society functioned. To m eet the needs o f a faster-moving society, information
was also transm itted faster, producing a barrage o f stimuli that the individual needed to
process and that postm odern artists and writers represented as fragm entation and collage
in their work.
Reflecting the increasing complexity and interconnectedness o f society, Antin's
early work brings together num erous aspects—such as unidentified voices, clips from
advertisem ents, and news item s—that had never before been considered appropriate for
autobiography. As com m unication technology, such as televisions, satellites, and
computers, allowed for even greater access to remote parts o f the world, many
com binations o f influences with which one could identify were possible, making it more
difficult for individuals to identify and communicate sim ilar experiences with each
other. Responding to the ironic breakdown in the ability to translate experience while
com m unication technology improved, the art community abandoned expressionism and
adopted mechanical reproductions and geometric forms that emphasized the stark
contrast in conventional ideas o f order and reality.
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W ith conventional ideas o f order, center, and hierarchies dismantled, the notion
o f an individual possessing the ability or authority to create a view o f the se lf at all was
questioned by postm odernists. A ntin responded to the paradox o f postm odern
autobiography by creating a text in which the self hovers outside o f the text and is
hinted at in terms o f how it is defined by surrounding objects—which initially may seem
similar to what Stein achieves in her autobiographies. However, Antin goes beyond
Stein to relinquish his control as orchestrator o f the text. His autobiographies shift
person and voice to reveal shards o f other people's stories. His em phasis on
fragmentation and his lack o f an obvious center to his text reflect his postm odern
culture. His texts em phasize the postm odern constructs o f process over product, the
absorption o f the individual into society, and the acceptance o f entropy over linear
conventional order in nature. W e see many parts, pieces, fragments, yet they do not add
up to the whole.
As this study has dem onstrated, human nature desires order and is w illing to
consider new ideas o f order when conventional ones no longer work or exist. Karl
Lashley's 1950s theory o f mem ory (Rose 1993) proclaiming that we sim ultaneously
process information everywhere and nowhere in the brain is sim ilar to the postm odern
notion o f a fragmented self which is not centered but is dispersed throughout society. If
the self can only be defined or constructed through memory, then it seems plausible that
if memory is dispersed and not centralized, so, too, is the self. In embracing the idea
that there was no unified, continuous self, postm odern writers were still searching for an
understanding o f the self, a way to put one's life in order. This attempt to order one's
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life has corresponded with developm ents in culture and technology as the various
periods have shown. N ow that technology has allowed us to explore areas in greater
depth (specifically the advances com puters have brought to the fields o f physics and
mathem atics) researchers interested in m em ory and the se lf are looking outside o f the
human body for answers regarding the self and its location in nature, which is now
generally accepted as chaotic and nonlinear. M athem atician Roger Penrose (1989)
believes that the answer to understanding the self lies in quantum theory and in locating
the individual in term s o f the cosm os. Likew ise, the currently popular fields o f chaos
theory and neural networks require one to consider the relationship o f individual
elements to an entire system as the system changes shape, allowing new orders to
emerge in an overall pattern that m ay at tim es appear to be in disorder. W hile this
sounds like a return to the past ideas o f Heraclitus, scientists believe that with available
technology and new understanding o f nature, some principles o f the ancient
philosophers may once again becom e viable theory in our culture.
David Antin's later works indicate a cultural shift towards the em ergence o f
chaos theory, a new order or type o f coherency, which is not linear but is, instead, based
on recursions and fractal geom etry in which patterns develop across m ultiple layers and
scales o f systems that approach different degrees o f completeness (or w hat we recognize
as the system in order) and disorderly order. F or patterns to emerge, then, consideration
o f one's place in history (debunked by postm odernism ) is necessary; otherwise, the
isolated fragments o f the patterns remain incoherent in relation to each other and the
system wherein they fall. In order to see how the various perspectives that constitute
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the self fit together and affect the overall shape o f the self, memory, history, and
retrospection are all necessary in order to get a sense o f that self or system changing
throughout time. Is this self continuous then? Yes. Is it stable or unchanging and,
therefore, always im mediately recognizable? No. As chaos theory and nonlinear
dynam ics support, the self is reflective o f n a tu re -o f which humans are a part; it
continuously approaches new orders and then quickly turns back into itself and m oves
toward a different version o f order.
Because this understanding o f the s e lf is one that proposes that the self does not
evolve linearly or ever com pletely (and, therefore, never definitively), the study o f
autobiography, to be more accurate, must cease perpetuating the delusion that one t e x tregardless o f how many perspectives are included-w ritten at one point in tim e can
possibly be considered definitive. The self by nature as an incomplete system defies
absolute definition. At this point, the best w e can hope for is to consider the entire body
o f w ork across the life span o f an autobiographer. Across these layers or scales o f the
writer's life, we can see various stages o f developm ent and versions o f the self
"hovering" and how these stages and versions relate to one another to change the overall
shape o f the self, not necessarily the linear concept o f cause and effect, or how one
station in life led to the next. This shift away from the idea that one complete, definitive
version o f the self is possible reflects cultural changes supported by developm ents in
science and the arts that now allow society to see the world as highly interrelated and
interdependent both with other societies and the environment.
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W ith nonlinear systems, such as the self, the parts do not add up to the whole.
As Bart Kosko points out, "You can study arm s and legs and other parts and still not
know how a hum an behaves" (1993, 108). Likewise, you can see a piece o f som eone in
an autobiography and still not have a com plete picture o f who that person is. What you
see is merely a dot in the larger pattern o f that person's self, and you m ust see all o f that
person's work throughout various periods o f his or her life in order to see how they
together present an overall shape—which is not to be confused with an overall complete
or definitive view—o f that person. So, ultim ately, perhaps the writing o f an
autobiography while one is still living and developing perpetuates the m isguided notion
that the true version o f the self is attainable. Perhaps it is necessary for us to change our
expectations o f what autobiography can and should aspire to achieve. Instead, the study
o f the self may actually be the task o f the outsider who can view the subject as a
dynam ic being possessing unique patterns that emerge and which we can attribute to
that person only after examining her or his entire life and shape o f self.
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